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Abstract

The detection and elimination of threats to cyber security is essential for system
functionality, protection of valuable information, and preventing costly destruction of
assets. This thesis presents a Mobile Multi-Agent Flow-Based IDS called MFIREv3 that
provides network anomaly detection of intrusions and automated defense.
This version of the MFIRE system includes the development and testing of a MultiObjective Evolutionary Algorithm (MOEA) for feature selection that provides agents with
the “optimal” set of features for classifying the state of the network. Feature selection
provides separable data points for the selected attacks: Worm, Distributed Denial of
Service, Man-in-the-Middle, Scan, and Trojan.
This investigation develops three techniques of self-organization for multiple distributed agents in an intrusion detection system: Reputation, Stochastic, and Maximum
Cover. These three movement models are tested for effectiveness in locating good agent
vantage points within the network to classify the state of the network.
MFIREv3 also introduces the design of defensive measures to limit the effects of
network attacks.

Defensive measures included in this research are rate-limiting and

elimination of infected nodes.
The results of this research provide an optimistic outlook for flow-based multi-agent
systems for cyber security. The impact of this research illustrates how feature selection
in cooperation with movement models for multi agent systems provides excellent attack
detection and classification.
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A MULTI AGENT SYSTEM FOR FLOW-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION

I.

Introduction

The United Nations’ Telecommunication Chief, Hamadoun Toure, stated that the next
world war could potentially take place in cyberspace. “Loss of vital networks would
quickly cripple any nation, and none is immune to cyber attack” [31]. Cyber attacks
taken against the United States, China, South Korea and Estonia illustrate that government
networks are vulnerable and it is far more difficult to apprehend attackers in cyberspace
[31]. Even if attackers are identified, they are often located in countries with favorable
jurisdiction for their network activities. Former Department of Homeland Security Stewart
Baker stated that an increasing number of U.S. companies are retaliating against attacks
with “strike-back” technology. He also stated that these retaliations could violate state and
federal law [24].
Passive defense systems have bolstered network security, however 5.5 billion attacks
took place in 2012 according to Symantec; an 81% increase from 2011 [87]. It is
clear that cyber attackers are not deterred from infiltrating high value networks such as
banks, governments, and military. The reason is simple, the benefit of acquiring sensitive
information far outweighs the cost of working to breach the passive security. The key to
deterring malicious attacks is decrease the probability of unauthorized access to networks,
quickly detect and eliminate threats once they are detected, and most controversially;
increase the cost of launching an attack by counter offensive measures [24].

This

investigation focuses on the later two approaches for improving network cyber security.
As stated by Symantec security expert, Donna Howell, the key to not being victimized
by cybercrime is to maintain systems that are secure in order to deter attackers [87]. All
1

systems are vulnerable, but attackers target the weakest defenses much like the lion eats the
slowest antelope [87]. This may be true in the commercial market, however government
systems are targeted despite maintaining the highest levels of network security [136]. For
this reason, President Barack Obama issued twelve cyber-security initiatives to bolster
network defenses [136]. This research effort develops from the initiative, ”Deploy an
intrusion detection system of sensors across the Federal enterprise” [136].
1.1

Protecting the Network
Network attacks come in various delivery formats and serve multiple purposes.

Attacks can generally qualify under a few major classes. A subset of these major classes
of attacks allows for good testing for the purposes of grading the abilities of an anomaly
based intrusion detection system.
Three major classes of network cyber security threats include [163]:
• Attacks that consume network resources, denying their use for legitimate purposes
• Attacks that infiltrate systems, allowing attackers unauthorized access to system
resources, including sensitive data, data storage, privileged relationships with other
systems, and network connectivity
• Unauthorized vulnerability scans, providing attackers vital reconnaissance in
preparation for infiltrating activities
A quality attack likely falls under one attack class and consist of a series of attacks.
A series of attacks allows achieving an overarching goal through mutual reinforcement.
For example, a successful scan allows an attacker to infiltrate networks with great stealth
and precision; once in control of multiple hosts, the attacker may use them to launch a
distributed denial of service attack on another target system or network. Alternatively, the
attacker can use these newly acquired assets to conduct further scans more efficiently. As
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another example, a clever attacker may launch a denial of service attack on a highly visible
service to divert the attention of security personnel from his infiltration activities.
Within these categories, many types of intrusion are recognized and five of them are
evaluated in this research effort [126]. The attacks examined in this research effort include:
Denial of Service, Worm, Scan, Trojan, and Man-in-the Middle. These represent a list
of attacks that create flow-based anomalies in the network in both a local and distributed
fashion. This is not a plethoric list of possible attacks, but does list the common categories
of attacks on networks. For a list of common network threats see Appendix B.
Intrusion Detection Systems protect the local area network from malicious traffic of
the outside Internet. The principle focus of the system is to monitor local traffic for signs of
malicious activity. In most Intrusion Detection System (IDS) no effort is expended to share
the obtained information with another IDS [126]. Compiling information over a broad
view of a distributed network from multiple sources provides greater information than is
obtainable from a single entity. IDSs with shared network statistics can better detect threats
progressing across network nodes [77].
Threats are unpredictable in their location, but it is beneficial to move an observing
Intrusion Detection Systems to the point of attack to improve classification. To perform
this task, we explore the concept of multi-agent IDSs, in which individual agents are able
to move throughout a distributed network, and share data to collectively determine if an
attack is occurring.
Multi Agent System (MAS) for Intrusion Detection (ID) is not a new concept. Multi
Agent Systems are appropriate for highly dynamic environments and environments with
distributions of data, expertise, and location [81]. Networks are often complex, dynamic
environments with security requiring various expertise.
The pursuit of the research is to improve the current reputation-based Multi-Agent
Intrusion Detections System, MFIRE, developed by David Hancock [77] and Timothy
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Wilson [185]. The two common characterizations of an IDS are network or host-based and
signature-based or behavioral-based. All characterizations have fatal flaws in classification
capability.
A signature-based IDS reacts to strings flowing across its detection system that match
a repository of malicious signatures [42]. This system is effective, yet it requires an up to
date repository to detect many attacks. An up to date signature repository can also become
overwhelmed comparing each signature to the signatures in an ever expanding repository.
A behavior-based IDS reacts to system activities considered anomalous [112]. This means
that the system must already be infected before the IDS reacts. The technique integrated
in this effort comprises of a combination of the two IDSs. Agents monitor inbound and
outbound traffic flows in a fashion similar to that of a signature-based detection method,
however it does not keep a repository of malicious signatures. Instead, the agents examine
statistics related to these traffic flows and react if a disturbance to the normal statistics
occurs.
For the best results, agents need to use the best available features to classify the
traffic flows. Since anomalous statistics indicate specific attacks, the use of features that
provide the same statistics regardless of the state of the network work against accurate
classifications. We use a feature selection Multi-Objective Algorithm to select features that
indicate the state of the network. In that sense, as opposed to maintaining an ever-growing
list of malicious signatures, agents maintain a list of “universal” features to classify attack
types instead of exact/known attacks.
Network-based intrusion detection typically occurs at the network gateway. The IDS
has an overarching view of the entire network and is capable of detecting disturbances
between groups of hosts. The network-based IDS however, fails to protect individual
hosts from attack [167]. Detection of an attack on a single host effectively requires a hostbased IDS. The difficulty with host-based intrusion detection is the inability to recognize
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malicious activity that spreads across the entirety of the network [36]. Previous work on
mobile agents by Hancock [77] and Wilson [185] aimed to combine the benefits of both
network and host-based intrusion detection. Multiple autonomous mobile agents reside
transiently at network hosts. The agents are capable then of addressing local anomalies and
summarizing the local information for a central entity performing network based intrusion
detection functions. This effort is further extended by the elimination of a single central
controller for agent movement and network-based intrusion detection. Instead, the agents
themselves each keep track of their own local statistics as well as a combined set of
summarized statistic in order to recognize both local and network based anomalies.
Despite the best efforts of network security, intrusions occur. Once they occur agents
are capable of taking an active roll in limiting the damage, spread, and overall effectiveness
of an attack. Limiting the spread of a Denial of Service attack can be as simple as limiting
the traffic rate within the network. Closing ports on an infected node from a virus or worm
effectively removes the node from the network preventing the spread to uninfected systems.
1.2

Goal and Objectives
The goal of this research is to develop a scalable distributed Multi Agent System

(MAS) for the defense of flow based system attacks and anomaly detection and
identification.
We achieve this cyber security goal and increase the effectiveness of a flow-based,
multi agent network attack classifier with the following high-level objectives:
• Continue design and evaluate a multi-agent intrusion detection system using a
Reputation system
• Evaluate the MFIREv2 multi-agent intrusion detection system using stochastic
search
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• Design and evaluate a multi-agent intrusion detection system using deterministic
search with search incentives and Maximum Cover
• Design and evaluate a Multi Objective Evolutionary Algorithm for best subset feature
selection
• Determine if attacks can be classified using a Linear Kernel as opposed to the Radial
Basis Function when using MOEA selected features
• Create a robust distributed simulation framework for evolving self organizing multiagent systems
• Create a robust simulation framework for the automated defense of the network
Research results include an evaluation of the environment’s classification performance.
The research produces an effective and efficient simulation environment to conduct ongoing, flow-based intrusion defense experiments.
1.3

Approach
This research effort continues a framework for conducting simulations of networks

under attack, and a multiagent system which is trained to detect threats and provide
defensive measures. Feature selection and training take place outside the MFIRE system.
Any system can be used for these processes with the effectiveness validated within the
MFIRE system.
The multi-agent framework provides an ongoing platform for MAS and network
research. The agents aim to find better node locations for classifying an attack, however
the user can instantiate the agents to perform other actions as well. We seek to compare
the effectiveness of three distinct models for attack identification. These models use the
same classifier, but agent movement decisions follow three different systems. A reputation
system is used among multiple agents called providers to dictate agents’ movement
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decisions. With the second model, the agents are allowed to move freely on their own,
with their behavior optimized using a genetic algorithm. Finally, a more direct search is
implemented using a deterministic search method optimized for Maximum Cover of the
network. For a comparison, we also examine the case when agents are at a fixed random
location and no movement is allowed called the baseline case.
This research follows from three previous efforts by Eric Holloway [84], David
Hancock [77], and Tim Wilson [185]. The three previous efforts introduce similar concepts
that can envelop a broader Intrusion Detection System. We continue previous MFIRE
developments which tests the effectiveness of a flow-based, multi-agent network attack
classifier by moving agents to improved locations. We also seek to include work inspired
by Eric Holloway that created automated defense of the network by working to stop attacks
without user intervention being necessary.
Included in this effort is thorough feature selection testing. None of the previous efforts
placed significant emphasis on the quality of features used by agents in attack classification.
The expanse of all network attacks be tested on an “optimal” feature subset determined by
an Evolutionary algorithm. Also the effect of placing the feature set for best classifying a
specific attack when only that attack and normal traffic flow take place is examined.
Wilson [185] took elements of both Holloway’s [84] and Hancock’s [77] efforts to
create a single integrated simulation environment for multi-agent flow-based intrusion
detection.

Wilson’s effort included executing initial baseline experiments to test the

combined approach, and demonstrate the potential usefulness of such an environment.
This research effort aims to improve upon the three efforts. The free-movement
and reputation models are compared to a baseline, but the reputation model no longer
requires a centralized controller. Making the agents completely autonomous and selforganized eliminates the single point of failure while maintaining the algorithmic approach
of the reputation model. We aim to take the automated defense approach introduced by
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Holloway and apply it to attacks outside of the scope of his effort. The deterministic
approach introduces the idea of node memory for comparison with the other models. Node
memory allows agents to avoid “bad” nodes, but increases the amount of data in the system
dramatically.
1.4

Thesis Overview
This chapter provides an introduction to the problem with goals and objectives

to approach a solution.

Chapter 2 explores the various background concepts in

approaching a Multi-agent system for intrusion detection. Chapter 3 details the design
and implementation of MFIREv3. Chapter 4 presents the testing and analysis of the results
of our system. Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of the effective results of the research
and the overall impact of the tests. Opportunities to further investigate these impacts is
proposed as future work in the conclusions of Chapter 5.
The Appendix includes a history of the MFIRE design from previous research efforts.
It also includes fine grained details of system communications, tests, and lists of popular
products relating to ID that are not used in this effort. The Appendix is referenced at
points in the document for related information. Portions of the document, including the
Appendix, reference taxonomies of attacks, IDS packages, and Classification packages.
These taxonomies help establish the decision process of choosing a subset of the taxonomy,
as well as shed light on the other options.
Results from the experiments demonstrate that MFIREv3’s movement models allow
the agents to find nodes in the network that increase the system’s classification accuracy.
The original decentralized approach proposed by Wilson [185], is thoroughly tested for
the first time and provides good vantage points using fewer network resources than the
other two movement models. The deterministic search model provides a new avenue
of development involving specific node “reputation”. Tests illustrate an improvement in
classification accuracy using this approach over the baseline model.
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The results also demonstrate the effectiveness of “optimal” feature sets for classifying
attacks. Both in the cases where the agents needed the optimal set to detect all five attacks
and just one of the five attacks, accuracy increased from the random feature selection used
in MFIREv2. With respect to the defensive measures, the results illustrated that agents are
effective in limiting the effects of attacks.
MFIREv3 can be used for any number of experiments involving flow-based network
simulation or multi agent system. The MFIREv3 simulation environment provides a
scalable framework to execute network threat analysis using robust multi-agent, flow-based
techniques. Conducting a wide variety of experiments, not specific to intrusion detection,
is possible with the current framework.
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II.

Background for Flow-Based Intrusion Detection

This investigation focuses on the improvement and expansion of network-based
attack recognition.

The primary effort focuses on determining an “optimal” feature

set for recognizing a flow-based attack, the classification of these attacks on a system,
autonomously determining and finding “optimal” agent locations for detection, and the
mitigation of flow-based network attacks once they take place. This chapter supports these
goals by discussing the foundations, concepts, and current research relevant to network
intrusion detection, classification, feature selection, and defense.
Section 2.1 discusses the various aspects of network modeling including traffic,
topology, and visualization. Section 2.2 details the important aspects of pattern recognition,
which is the principal component of anomaly-based intrusion detection systems. The
applications of these pattern recognition techniques is discussed in section 2.3. Section
2.5 introduces the five attacks implemented in this research effort.

Multi-Objective

Optimization is discussed in section 2.6 with the applications of a Multi-Agent System
in section 2.7. The chapter concludes with a discussion of reputation in a Multi-Agent
System, Defensive measures of agents.
2.1

Network Modeling
Network topology is the arrangement of various nodes within a computer network.

There is both a physical and logical topological structure, where the physical model
illustrates the locations of the nodes and their interconnections while the logical model
illustrates the data-flow between components within the network.

A collection of

routers and other networked devices under the same administrative control is called an
Autonomous System (AS), and gateway routers are responsible for forwarding traffic to and
from other autonomous systems. An example of an AS is a Local Area Network (LAN),
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where any given node within the LAN has physical links to other nodes within the network
that pass data to one another. The Internet consists of many AS and other sub-networks.
An inter-autonomous system routing called Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) handles traffic
between AS [104]. Figure 2.1 illustrates a basic Local Area Network topology where traffic
would flow between the separate nodes and to the Internet.

Figure 2.1: Illustration of LAN Topology [44]

Two primary modeling concepts within this domain are topology and traffic. With
a firm grasp of these principle aspects, we can devise a network modeling system that
achieves a good balance between efficiency and accuracy. Testing and evaluation must be
carried out on a modeled network. It is not appropriate to deploy an untested defensive
application without evaluation on a modeled network. Testing and evaluation on a modeled
network allows for controlled conditions over a range of situations [17]. Modeled networks
also provide reduction of maintenance that would otherwise be unwieldy on an operational
environment.
2.1.1

Model Limitations.

Realistic modeling of Internet Network Topology is difficult given the overall
organization of the complex network itself. The internet is a network of nodes that
are themselves networks. Certain entities represent specific qualitative behaviors within
the simulation. A qualitative simulation as defined by Kuipers [102], is “the prediction
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of the possible behaviors consistent with incomplete knowledge of the structure of the
physical system.” These qualitative behaviors that require representation in this research
investigation include the actions of both malicious and benign users of the Internet, as well
as development of a network topology given the requirements of the system.
A qualitative behavior or solution can be either sound or complete. A sound solution
is one where no trajectory which is the solution of a concrete equation matching the input
can be missing from the output. A complete solution is one that does not produce any false
prediction for any particular input. This is in accordance with the incompleteness of any
strong formal system as proven by Kurt Gödel [56].
Despite this limitation, many refined models exist capable of handling all of most
practical data. The modeling process illustrated in this effort is inspired by a process of
starting with a simple model and refining the model in steps until arriving at the intended
degree of “realism” of the system [82].
2.1.2

Network Topology Model.

The creation of a valuable environment for performance evaluation is the direct
product of network topology Yook et al [188]. It is often the case that protocols working
seamlessly on prototypes fail to scale up to real networks making them ineffective. This
is caused by the ineffective realization of key components of real network complexity in
a model. The key and greatest challenge of modeling network topology is capturing the
dynamic properties of a real network with topologies growing and changing over time.
Effective dynamic models allow defensive measures to be tested on realistic predictions of
the future network topology [188].
Early attempts at topology modeling relied heavily on random graphs [28, 52]. One of
the most popular network models was the Waxman Model, which created graphs based on
the Euclidean distance between nodes [180]. Although effective modeling small networks,
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the ability to model complex network topology fell short with Waxman’s model requiring
a new approach.
The next advancement in modeling network topologies proposed the induction of each
different hierarchical level of the network model [49]. The Waxman model was never
intended as an all-purpose model for network topology, as Waxman designed the model as
a test for Minimum Steiner Tree Problems [35]. The difference is that intranetwork data
and internetwork data are not the same and need to be treated differently. This effort lead
to the creation of two network topology generators; Tiers [49] and Transit-Stub [97, 190].
In the late 1990’s research conducted on internet topology found that the Internet
is a scale-free network: a network whose degree distribution follows a power-law, at least
asymptotically [55]. That is, the fraction P(k) of nodes in the network having k connections
to other nodes goes for large values of k as

P(k) ck−λ

(2.1)

With this discovery, three eigenvalues were calculated corresponding to the powerlaw that characterize the inter-domain topology measurements derived from BGP routing
tables. The three values were the Rank exponent, Outdegree exponent, and the Eigen
exponent. The calculations of these exponents lead to the discovery that they are all
practically equal, meaning that the Internet could be classified as a scale-free network [54].
Utilizing the findings of the scale-free network model, Barbási and Albert incorporated
the results into a study of the attack tolerance of complex networks [4, 16, 45]. They
concluded that the Internet’s AS-level architecture follows a power-law distribution, that it
is resilient to random attacks but very vulnerable to attacks targeting central important
nodes. These select nodes have most of the links to other nodes, while most of the
nodes have very few links making most of the nodes resilient to attacks with the most
important ones very vulnerable. Barbási later worked with Yook in further demonstrating

13

the shortfalls of existing topological network models and refining what came to be known
as Barbási-Albert (BA) models [188].
Although certain critics object to the power-law approach, specifically Willinger, it
can be concluded from the BGP-derived AS maps are “Pareto-type principles; that is, a
small number of nodes have many neighbors, while most nodes are connected to only a
small number of neighbors” [101]. For more on Willinger’s opposition to the BA model
see [101, 183]
Willinger instead advocates for using domain knowledge and exploiting the details that
matter when dealing with a highly engineered system [183]. In an interesting development
using this approach and power-law models, a model known as Fabrikant-KoutsoupiasPapadimitriou (FKP) developed [54]. FKP successfully generated topologies exhibiting the
power-law relationships, but instead of using a purely stochastic approach, these power-law
properties arise from a simple Multi-Objective Optimization (MOO), involving “last-mile”
connection costs and transmission delays as measured in hops [161]. Each node i arrives
at a uniformly random point and attaches itself to the node j that minimizes the weighted
sum :

min j<i {α · di j + ecc( j)}

(2.2)

The Euclidean distance between the nodes, di j , represents the “last-mile cost.” The
relative importance of this objective is determined by the weight, α. The other term is the
eccentricity of j and captures the distance from the center to j.
Spatharis et al. present a well-balanced approach called the Controlled Distance (CD)
Model [161] based on the power-law models of FPK [54] and Willinger model [183].
The objective of CD is to address the need for edges between nodes that are not quite
leaves, nor particularly central, but are of intermediate centrality. As each node i is added
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to the network and linked to the node j, a second edge is attached from j to another node k
minimizing

mink {α · d jk + ecc(k)}

(2.3)

over all k such that the hop distance from j to k is at most a constant c [161].
By decreasing the power-law exponent while having high average degree and several
leaves, this model is considered a top performing topological model [161]. By achieving
similarity to the Internet’s AS graph, this model allows for extensive testing and evaluation
with improved scalability for protocols.
Topology generators include:
• TopGen [161]
• Tiers [49]
• GT-ITM - Georgia Tech Internetwork Topology Models [35]
• Inet [186]
• nem [119]
• BRITE [125]
• GDTANG - Geographic Directed Tel Aviv University Network Generator [15]
• RealNet [41], [40]
RealNet is a newer addition to the list [77] which relies on publicly available datasets
including BGP tables and traceroute records, as does [55]. It addresses some of the
problems inherent in these datasets and does not attempt to fit specific power-law-based
statistics. For example, it gives direct consideration to the IP-aliasing problem, whereby
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more routers may be inferred than actually exist because each router has a different IP
address for each of its interfaces. It also factors in likely policy relationships between
neighboring autonomous systems [77].
In summary, many shortfalls exist with the power-law approach to modeling network
topology even with the Internet exhibiting Pareto-type principals. The ideal topology
modeling approach should appease both the engineers responsible for implementing actual
Internet topologies, as well as the protocol and application developers seeking validation
that the program works for an extended time frame. Although this perfect topology
modeling framework does not exist, FKP/CD provides a reasonable approach [185].
2.1.3

Simulated Network Traffic.

In addition to modeling network topology, the simulated Internet traffic must be
realistic in order to properly examine protocol. Traffic modeling began with simple Poisson
distributions, but now includes models that exhibit self-similarity [20]. Even more so than
Internet network topology, the traffic created between nodes has been shown to display
scale-invariant statistics.
A widely used model for packet routing is the Poisson model. Willinger and Paxson
[184] advocate against the Poisson model for better, more fractal-like traffic distribution
models [77]. For network traffic, a Pareto model may be preferred.
The Pareto model exhibits scale-invariant behavior [69]. It has a density function
P(X) =

αbα
,
xα+1

x ≥ b, which has a heavy tail [99]. Figure 2.2 shows an example for

α = 1.0, b = 1.0. Willinger and Paxson explain that this heavy tail accounts for the
fractal nature of aggregated network traffic [184]. To generate a random Pareto-distributed
sample, inverse transform sampling is used. Given a random variable U drawn from the
uniform distribution (0, 1), T , is Pareto-distributed [48], and given by

T=

b
1

Uα
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(2.4)

Figure 2.2: Probability density function for Pareto distribution, α = 1.0, b = 1.0

2.1.4

Network Simulation Environment.

This section focuses on the underlying network simulation framework. Specifically,
we discuss Discrete Event Simulation.

This method views the simulation as being

composed of a chronological sequence of events, each of which occurs in an instant
and changes the state in the system, possibly resulting in more events being scheduled.
Comprehensive treatment of Discrete Event Simulation is given in [13].
Components of DES systems include:
• Clock - The simulation keeps track of current simulation time in appropriate
measurement units, but unlike in real time simulations, time in a DES jumps from
one instantaneous event to the next.
• Schedule - The set of events to handle, typically implemented as a priority queue
sorted by event time.
• Random-Number Generator - pseudorandom, which is desired in order to support a
rerun of a simulation with exactly the same behavior
• Streams - Independent function streams for each function variable
17

Typical usage of a DES includes the gathering of statistics, for which facilities may
be provided, and the specification of a stopping condition. As may be the case with
continuous- but not real-time simulation, a discrete event simulation runs at a rate that is
not tied to the real-world clock. When resources permit, simulations may be run potentially
much faster than real time, which is useful for collecting large amounts of statistics. In other
cases, it may be desired that simulations run much slower than real time, perhaps paused
for an extensive period of time via checkpointing, which is useful for direct observation
and analysis of system dynamics.
A recent, innovative network-based anomaly detection system is presented in [93].
The authors use a two-stage classification approach to detect novel intrusions of various
types, and is shown to have good empirical performance. Many IDS systems have shown
in recent years to achieve good performance with real-world traffic [19, 80, 81, 85, 90,
129, 187]. Our approach is substantially different, in that we seek a robust environment to
generate simulated network traffic; and the goal of our research focuses on improvement
in performance given the movement of agents, not on achieving absolute performance.
Thus it is difficult to find existing systems to compare our approach, however many of
systems previously mentioned provide a basis for our key concepts of multi-agent systems,
network-based detection, anomaly-based classification, and flow-based statistics.
One final method of performance enhancement includes parallelization of the DES. As
is the case with any system, parallelization allows for network resources to be used more
efficiently by reducing bottlenecks in computation. Parallelization of DES is discussed
extensively in [64]. More recently, Park and Fishwick present their work using graphics
processing unit-based clusters in [139].
2.1.5

Visualization of Network Model.

In this thesis investigation several expressive visualization techniques for intrusion
detection and anomaly data are considered. The key idea is to classify the underlying
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data according to its prominence on the resulting visualization by importance value. The
importance property drives the visualization pipeline to emphasize the most prominent
features and to suppress the less relevant ones. The suppression can be realized globally,
so the whole object is suppressed, or locally. A local modulation generates cut-away and
ghosted views because the suppression of less relevant features occurs only on the part
where the occlusion of more important features appears [60].
Features within the data are classified according to a new dimension denoted as object
importance. This property determines which structures should be readily discernible and
which structures are less important. Next, for each feature various representations (levels
of sparseness) from a dense to a sparse depiction are defined. Levels of sparseness define
a spectrum of optical properties or rendering styles. The resulting image is generated by
ray-casting and combining the intersected features proportional to their importance. An
additional step to traditional volume rendering evaluates the areas of occlusion and assigns
a particular level of sparseness. This step is denoted as importance compositing. Advanced
schemes for importance compositing determine the resulting visibility of features. If the
resulting visibility distribution does not correspond to the importance distribution, different
levels of sparseness are selected.
The applicability of importance-driven visualization is demonstrated on several
examples from medical diagnostics scenarios, flow visualization, and interactive illustrative
visualization in [175]. Importance-Driven Feature Enhancement propels the utilization of
the most vital information with limited noise from extraneous data or applications. The
visualization of the network model must cater to the needs of the research effort. In this
investigation, the agent based system must effectively demonstrate the actions of the agents.
2.1.6

MASON.

There is a wide variety of discrete event simulation engines available for building an
agent based simulation (see Appendix C). Typically, each emphasizes a certain domain or
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technique. For example, OMNeT++ [174] is geared toward network simulation, as is ns2
[121] and cnet [122, 123], while Parsec’s emphasis is parallelism [12]. Finally, MASON
[116] caters to the needs of multi agent systems simulation. MASON is used in MFIREv3
as it was in previous versions of MFIRE [77, 185] and in SOMAS [84].
MASON is a single-process DES core and visualization toolkit written in Java [116].
It is flexible enough that it can be used for a wide range of simulations, but emphasizes
support for “swarm” simulations with up to millions of agents. It is fast and portable and
produces guaranteed replicable results, courtesy of checkpointing facilities.
There are three principle reasons for the selection of MASON as the underlying DES
engine:
• This research concerns a multi agent system - MASON’s structural expertise
• MASON does not impose nor even provide a predefined abstraction of real-world
computer networks. Our implemented network simulation is customized to focus on
prototyping a system able to function in a moderately complex network environment.
Several of the discrete event simulation engines mentioned in this section are
heavily invested in accurate simulation of real-world protocols, network devices,
and applications, but the much higher complexity of these environments introduces
networking issues not directly relevant to MFIRE’s initial implementation.
• We have some prior experience with MASON. This research began as a way to
complement the attack mitigation capabilities of Holloway’s Self Organized Multi
Agent Swarms(SOMAS) [84], and continued through the two previous iterations of
MFIRE [77, 185]. SOMAS and all MFIRE versions operate in a MASON-based
network simulation.
MASON is designed to handle large numbers of agents in complex environments
[116], but it is not explicitly an agent framework, such as the frameworks provided by
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JACK, Cougaar, JADE, and others [113]. These frameworks in some cases (e.g. JACK
[86] and JADE [21]) provide compliance with the interoperability standard called the
Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) [22]. Such agent frameworks should
be explored for use by MFIRE in future research.
The underlying model runs in a layer independent of the visualization layer. Thus,
while the visualization facilities enable easy interaction with simulations, simulations may
run without visualization, or the visualization can be changed at will, perhaps according to
the preferences of the observer. The basic elements of the MASON model and visualization
layers are presented in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3: Basic elements of the MASON model and visualization layers [116]

The visualization layer runs on top of the simulation model controlling the agents,
topology, traffic, and communicating with the Disk. The Disk contains the necessary data
producing the simulation and stores the results of the experiment [116].
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MASON has been used successfully for applications ranging from physics demonstrations to cooperative target observation in unmanned aerial vehicles to the testing of ant
foraging algorithms [116].
For this research, the MASON DES continues to be selected due to its agent-based
features and tight Java integration. OPNET, OMNet++ and NS2/NS3 simulate routing
at a much more detailed level than is needed for our purposes, though may be explored
in future research. The purpose of this research investigation requires the simulation of
movement models to test multiple movement algorithms. MASON allows for generic
testing of the effectiveness of movement models, classification, multiple feature sets, and
actions as proposed by Holloway [84] without the over-detailed framework necessary for
packaging the system for commercial use. The MASON DES provides scalability to adapt
to changing criterion without a burdensome overhaul of the framework that is required in
more detailed environments [116]. OPNET, OMNet++ and NS2/NS3 may provide suitable
transitions to a real network implementation.
2.2

Pattern Recognition
Given the groundwork for a simulation framework reflecting the domain of the

Internet, we continue by presenting the research in recognizing malicious activity on a
network. Pattern recognition is the assignment of a label to a given input value [27]. One
example of pattern recognition is classification. Classification works by assigning each
input value to one of a given set of classes [153]. If the classification is accurate, precise,
and timely, the malicious activity may be counteracted. Figure 2.4 illustrates the general
components of a Pattern Recognition System that are discussed in this chapter.
Legitimate traffic has been characterized as presenting short periods of high density
traffic followed by long periods of idleness. Deviations from this traffic flow may reveal
the presence of anomalous and potentially malicious traffic. Using techniques from the
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Figure 2.4: A general perspective of a pattern recognition system [149]

broad field of pattern recognition, one can classify the traffic features in order to discover
intrusions of the network.
Pattern recognition algorithms generally aim to provide a reasonable answer for all
possible inputs by matching inputs to what pattern best-fits the observable data [153]. This
is very different from pattern matching algorithms, which look for exact matches in the
input with preexisting patterns [50].
Authoritative texts on pattern recognition include [50], [79], and [27]. A general
description of a pattern recognition system is shown in Fig. 2.4. The definition found
in [79] is the primary source for pattern recognition throughout this investigation.
2.2.1

Formating Data.

Preprocessing formats the data, possibly performing some filtering in the case of noise
or some system or environmental anomaly. Data preprocessing is an important step in
the pattern recognition process. Loosely controlled data gathering methods often lead to
impossible combinations (e.g. Gender: Male, Pregnant: Yes), missing values, out-of-range
values, etc [10]. Without data preprocessing, this data would cause misleading results and
waste resources solving impossible data structures [79].
Feature generation, sometimes referred to as feature extraction, is the transformation
of raw data into derived data points that may facilitate the characterization of the observed
process [14]. When the input data to an algorithm is too large for processing and suspected
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to contain redundant data, then the input data is transformed into a reduced set of features
or vectors. The features are selected by the quality of information the feature provides in
helping to determine the classification of the state [172]. This reduction to a set of features
is known as feature extraction, and this dimensionality reduction can also be applied to a
set of features to further reduce the magnitude of data [173]. This process is known as
feature selection, and it is further discussed in 2.2.2.
It is often the case that the raw data itself is used for feature measurements.
Commonly, features are statistical measurements of the raw data or may be the result of
passing the raw data through a mathematical transformation such as a Fourier transform.
The results of the transformation create features; statistical data descriptors that distinguish
clusters or states. The feature is represented as X. If X is a feature, it has p elements, and
components are accessed via subscripts X j [173].
2.2.2

Feature Selection.

Dimensionality reduction from Figure 2.4, or feature selection, filters the available
features with the premise that not all features are useful [100]. Some features might
be redundant or be harmful for the classification process due to their random nature or
tendency to indicate an incorrect class. Even if all features are useful, resource limitations,
in terms of computation, bandwidth, or storage, may require filtering the least beneficial
information prior to performing clustering, classification, or regression. Feature selection
benefits classification by speeding up the learning process, enhancing the generalization
capability, improving model interpretation, and potentially reducing the need to enter
higher dimensional space in order to separate classes [100].
As noted by Gates at al. in [72], the three principle objectives of feature selection are:
1) improving prediction performance; 2) enabling faster, more efficient prediction; and 3)
providing a better understanding of the underlying process that generated the data.
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One of the primary reasons feature selection has the potential to greatly improve
prediction performance is that it directly confronts the curse of dimensionality [23]. Hastie
et al. [79] examine some of the many manifestations of this problem. Essentially, such
manifestations arise from the fact that in order to maintain the same sampling density
enjoyed in a lower dimension, the number of samples must increase exponentially as one
moves to higher dimensions. Usually, the number of samples practically attainable is far
fewer than necessary to maintain the desired sampling density. The impact of this is either
poor performance in classification accuracy or the creation of an artifact and slow rates of
computation due to an overabundance of data [79].
Both simple and complex methodical approaches exist for feature selection algorithms. Feature selection methods can be decomposed into two categories: feature ranking
and subset selection [72]. Feature ranking ranks the features by a metric and eliminates
the worst performing features. Subset selection searches the set of possible features for the
optimum subset, although this is impractical for large numbers as the problem is NP-Hard
[5], therefore finding a “good” subset becomes the objective. For this investigation a simple feature ranking approach called ReliefF is examined as well as a more robust subset
selection algorithm that also employs feature ranking techniques to reduce complexity.
2.2.3

Embedded Methods.

Subset selection of features can be decomposed into three types of algorithms:
wrappers, filters, and embedded [105].
With embedded methods the structure of the class of functions under consideration
plays a crucial role, and techniques are developed that are specific to certain classifiers.
See [105]. Embedded techniques are embedded in and specific to a model and therefore
are not used in this research effort.
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2.2.4

Wrapper Methods.

Wrapper methods test feature subsets against the chosen learning machine, which is
regarded as a black box [98]. The primary issue becomes determining how to search the
space of all possible variable subsets which could take an impossible amount of time [5].
Another issue is assessing the prediction performance of a learning machine to guide the
search and halt it once a good fit is reached [98].
2.2.5

Filter Methods.

A filter method typically involves some notion of feature ranking independent of the
choice of the predictor. This is computationally efficient because it requires only the
computation of p scores and sorting the scores [72]. It introduces bias but may have
considerably less variance compared to other methods and is therefore robust against over
fitting [72, 79]. Filter methods include analyzing performance as a single variable classifier
and information theoretic ranking criteria [79].
These filter techniques can be useful but also incur limitations. The underlying
assumption is that variable dependencies can be ignored, but in practice, this is not always
the case [72]
Methods that score variables individually and independently of each other cannot
to determine which combination of variables would give the best performance. Filter
methods often provide reasonable performance though, and the computational efficiency
is unmatched.
A common technique for filtering features involves ranking them according to
how well they separate sample data distributions collected from two classes[72]. The
Bhattacharyya distance [26], named after the mathematician, is a measure of the distance
between two sample distributions. If two sets of samples are produced by the same process,
the estimated distributions should be very close, and the Bhattacharyya distance near zero.

26

Formally, for discrete probability distributions p and q over the same domain X, the
estimate of the Bhattacharyya distance DB (p, q) is [72]:
DB (p, q) , −ln(BC(p, q))

(2.5)

where
BC(p, q) ,

Xp

p(x)q(x)

(2.6)

x∈X

is the Bhattacharyya coefficient. For each value of x ∈ X found in both sample sets p and
q, BC(p, q) increases, up to a maximum of 1 when p(x) = q(x) for all x ∈ X; in this case,
DB (p, q) = 0 [72]. Conversely, as the limit of BC(p, q) approaches 0, observe that DB (p, q)
increases without bound [72].
Filter methods are capable of supervised learning [72]. Supervised learning is the task
of inferring a function from labeled training data [79]. A supervised learning algorithm
analyzes the training data and produces an inferred function, which is called a classifier.
The inferred function should predict the correct output value for any valid input object.
This requires the learning algorithm to generalize from the training data to classify the
current data input [72].
Relief is a feature ranking method that provides supervised learning by using the
nearest in-class H and out-of-class M instance and determines the ranking based on a
weighting scale [79]. By picking an instance R and determining that instance’s nearest
hit and miss it is able to update the weights of its attributes A using the equation [79],
W[A] = W[A] − DIFF(A, R, H)/n + DIFF(A, R, M)/n

(2.7)

where n is the number of instances selected and DIFF is the difference function used to
calculate the difference between values of attributes [72].
The difference function is normalized by n, such that all values fall within the range
of -1 to 1, with 0 meaning that the two values are exactly the same [4]. The difference
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between instances is the total difference, so that using the Manhattan rule the sum of the
distances over all attributes provides the difference between classes.
After randomly selecting n instances, the ReliefF algorithm finds the nearest K
neighbors from its class as well as the nearest K misses from each of the other classes.
This means the weight from each of the other classes is determined by that class’s size
[79]. This allows ReliefF to work with multi-class data as opposed to datasets containing
only two classes.
ReliefF is a very fast method for feature selection as it is a first-order classifier,
however it does not take into account feature relationships [72].

In many cases,

combinations of less quality features provide a better classifier than a combination of the
top features. This is due to the Synergy of features; where the whole is greater than the
sum of its parts [74]. In order to find the best set of features for classification, one must use
a subset selection approach as discussed in 2.2.9.
2.2.6

Hybrid Methods.

Wrappers and filter methods both use a search algorithm to search through the space
of possible features and evaluate each subset. For this effort, a hybrid combination of a
filter and wrapper method is considered in order to prevent over fitting and reducing the
complexity of performing an exhaustive search on a model. This still benefits from the
tailoring to a model without solely relying on a simpler filter.
Memetic frameworks for the hybridization of wrapper and filter feature selection
methods are a growing field in classification problems for both single and multiple objective
instances [152]. A meme is a “unit of culture” which in this case represents the pattern of
behavior of the data [46]. Thus a memetic framework incorporates the culture or history of
the features.
The purpose of the research effort is to incorporate traditional evolutionary algorithms
to improve classification performance while accelerating search for optimal feature subsets.
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Single objective feature selection classification using MOEAs is shown to speedup
classification of optimal feature subsets [166], while multi-objective/ multi-class problems
require the classification of features for multiple classes. In the multi-objective case, certain
features that can be shown to improve the classification for one class often degrade the
classification capability for another class [27].
The feature selection algorithm cannot select one set of features that optimally
classifies for each of the classes. Instead of choosing one subset of features, the MOEA
moves towards an optimal front of non-dominated solutions [27]. Each point on the nondominated front illustrates a selection of features and their relative accuracies within the
four classes. Some features that might independently be good features might cause too
much noise in combination with other features. On the other hand, a feature that might
not help classify attacks by itself could be very helpful for another set of features. The
objective of the MOEA is to mutate the combination of features until it finds the best
choices for subsets of features. For a discussion of MOEAs, see 2.6.2.
2.2.7

Classification and Regression.

Classification, clustering, and regression represent the three fundamental problems of
pattern recognition [27], one or more of which must be addressed by any pattern recognition
system.
Classification is a process that assigns one of a discrete number of labels to each input
[27]. A is the ‘true’ output and takes values from the set A. The classifier is Â and should
also take values from A. Regression seeks to model a continuous process [100]. The output
of the function being modeled is denoted as Y and takes values from some continuous set,
such as R, and a predictor for Y is Ŷ [79].
In pattern recognition, we want to learn x 7→ y where x ∈ X is an object and y ∈ Y
is a class label [100]. In the case of Network Intrusion Detection, x would represent and
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individual data stream and y would represent the type of attack or lack of attack of the data
stream.
Classification and regression as supervised learning techniques require training data in
which inputs are associated with known output [172]. Based on the specific classification
or regression technique selected by the system designer, the system derives the necessary
parameter values for a process that reliably transforms the training input into the desired
output.
Formally, given a training set (x1 , y1 )...(xm , ym ), we want to train the classifier to
generalize such that given a previously seen x ∈ X it finds a suitable y ∈ Y. In other
words, we want to find a classifier y = f (x, α) where α are the parameters of the function
[100].
We can attempt to learn f (x, α) by choosing a function that performs well on training
data:
Remp (α) = 1/m

m
X

l( f (xi , α), yi )

(2.8)

i=1

where l is the zero-one loss function, l(y, ŷ) if y , ŷ and 0 otherwise. Remp is called the
empirical risk, and m represents the training error [100].
We are trying to minimize the overall risk [100]:
Z
R(α) =
l( f (x, α), y)dP(x, y)

(2.9)

where P(x, y) is the (unknown) joint distribution function of x and y. R(α) represents the
test error.
A second formalization of the process of minimizing misclassification is shown in
[79], using the Expected Prediction Error (EPE):
EPE , E[L(A, Â(X))]

(2.10)

L is a loss function, and the expectation E is taken with respect to the joint distribution
P(A, X). With K = |A| classes, the loss function may be represented as a K × K matrix
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L [100]. This loss matrix has values of zero on the diagonal. Everywhere else, a nonzero value L(k, l) indicates the penalty for misclassifying an observation as belonging to Al
when it actually belonged to Ak [100].
By conditioning on X, we can rewrite 2.10 as [100]:
K
X
L[Ak , Â(X)]P(Ak |X)
EPE = EX

(2.11)

k=1

When the loss function is zero-one, meaning that a single unit penalty is assessed for
any misclassification, the intuitive guidance for Â(X) is [100]:
Â(X) = Ak if P(Ak |X = x) = max P(a|X = x)
a∈A

(2.12)

In other words, the classification output should be the most probable class given the input
for any number of classes. Naturally, what makes this difficult is the fact that one has to
estimate the probabilities using a limited set of training data.
In order to provide the best possible classification with limited training data, we review
several of the more popular classification techniques [100]. The Support Vector Machine
discussed in 2.2.9, which is used in this research effort is considered arguably the best
classifier for this type of problem [100]. The basic idea of a SVM is to find the hyperplane
that separates the training data with the maximum margin [172]. By maximizing the
distance on either side to the nearest samples, the largest buffer possible is created between
each class of data decreasing the probability of misclassification. For mathematical details,
the reader is referred to [79, 100, 172].
Most methods for classification use numerical values and are unable to handle
symbolic information directly. Packet data can contain non-numerical, qualitative data
that indicates potential attacks. Converting this data into a numerical structure presents
challenges, however it greatly increases the ability for effective classification. Experiments
conducted in [80] greatly improved the classifier’s accuracy using symbolic conversion.
Outside of Support Vector Machines, other classification algorithms that were
considered but not chosen for this research assignment are:
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• Gene Expression Programming [138]
• Maximum Entropy Classifier Logistic regression [70]
• Naive Bayes Classifier [148]
• Neural Networks [79]
• Quadratic Discriminant Analysis
• Binary Classifier Tree [100]
Gene expression programming (GEP) is an evolutionary algorithm that creates
complex tree structures that learn and adapt by changing their sizes, shapes, and
composition, much like a living organism [138]. GEP has been criticized for not being
a major improvement over other genetic programming techniques. In many experiments, it
did not perform better than existing methods [138].
Maximum Entropy Logistic regression is a regression model which generalizes
logistic regression by allowing more than two discrete outcomes [70]. Greene published a
book entitled, Econometric Analysis, on this type of classification [70]. Logistic regression
assumes that all data is case specific, meaning that no overlap in cases can exist. This along
with other assumptions from the text [70] make this classifier incapable of performing the
necessary functions for MFIRE.
A Naive Bayes Classifier is a simple approach for the complex classification. A naive
Bayes classifier works by assuming the presence of a given feature is unrelated to the
presence of any other feature [148]. One advantage of a naive Bayes classifier is that it
requires very little training data to estimate the parameters necessary for classification.
Because independent variables are assumed, only the variances of the variables for each
class need to be determined and not the entire covariance matrix [148]. Comprehensive
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comparisons with other approaches, including SVMs and Neural Networks, showed that
Bayes classification is outperformed by these and many other approaches [148].
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) is a wide family of different algorithms and
methods. A neural network consists of an interconnected group of artificial neurons, and
it processes information using a “connectionist” approach to computation [108]. In most
cases, a neural network is an adaptive system that changes its structure during a learning
phase [179]. Neural networks are used to model complex relationships between inputs and
outputs or to find patterns in data. ANNs are designed much like a decision tree, however
through training an adaptive system can move decision nodes to improve classification [25].
Neural Networks were designed to decide between multiple classes, unlike Support
Vector Machines which require wrapper methods to convolve the two-class classification
to a multi-class classification [108]. For this reason one might consider neural networks
the obvious choice for a classifier. Neural Networks are an excellent classifier for many
experiments, including intrusion detection, however SVMs have been shown to outperform
ANNs in cases with limited training data, good feature selection prior to training, and cases
where rapid classification is necessary [179].
Neural networks other advantage over SVMs besides the multi-class design, is that the
Neural Network is designed to continually learn (reinforcement learning) while it classifies
[108]. This makes Neural Networks valuable for cases where the inputs regularly change.
For this reason, Neural Networks are often selected for classifying user interest on product
advertisements such as Amazon, Google, and Netflix [177].
2.2.8

Clustering.

Algorithms that derive the decision or discriminant function using prototype patterns
or training data are called supervised algorithms for learning [79]. Clustering seeks to
identify the natural groupings of the data without the use of labeled data and is therefore
classified as unsupervised learning. Typically, the number of groupings or clusters is not
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known beforehand, making the clustering process partially subjective. It is up to the user to
determine whether certain groupings are one large cluster, or two, or many based on their
relative distances from each other and to the other members of its cluster. The solution is
to either simply specify the desired number of clusters and evaluate the resulting cluster
assignments, or define some distance-based threshold from which the number of clusters
is derived. In a Network Intrusion Detection however, it is more likely to predefine the
number of attack classes that exist in an attempt to more accurately cluster the data streams.
Clustering requires a measure of dissimilarity d j (xi j , xi0 j ) between values of the jth
instance [79]. Then
D(xi , xi0 ) ,

p
X

w j · d j (xi j , xi0 j );

j=1

p
X

w j = 1.

j=1

is the dissimilarity between objects i and i0 given the inputs xi , xi0 and weight vector w [79].
Usually, d j (xi j , xi0 j ) = (xi j − xi0 j )2 , but other choices are possible, or even required in the
case of non-quantitative attributes [79].
Clustering is the search for an encoder C(i) that assigns the ith of N observations to
one of K clusters. An encoder may be evaluated by measuring the between-class scatter to
within-class scatter ratio,

B(C)
.
W(C)

Between-class scatter is defined as [79]:

K
1X X X
B(C) ,
d(xi , xi0 )
2 k=1 C(i)=k C(i0 ),k

while within-class scatter is
K
1X X X
W(C) ,
d(xi , xi0 )
2 k=1 C(i)=k C(i0 )=k

We desire high

B(C)
W(C)

in order to achieve the goal of high between-class scatter and low

within-class scatter, thus establishing clusters with well-defined boundaries [79].
A commonly used clustering algorithm is the k-means algorithm, which is based on
minimizing a performance index, F [27]. K is the number of clusters specified by the user,
and F is the sum of squared distances of all points in a cluster to the cluster center.
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The k-means algorithm begins by assigning each observation to the cluster with the
closest mean. As stated above, and intuition suggests; there are exactly K means that each
observation can be assigned. With each observation assigned to a cluster, the means of
each cluster are recalculated with the centroid of each cluster becoming the new mean [27].
With new values for each centroid, the algorithm reassigns each observation to the closest
mean, which may have changed due to the shift of the K value [27].
The algorithm is deemed to have converged when the assignments no longer change.
In general, there is no guarantee that it converges to the global optimum, and the result is
highly dependent on the initial assignments of K. As the k-means algorithm is usually very
fast, it is common to run it multiple times with different starting conditions [27].
Other common Clustering Algorithms include: [3]
• Categorical mixture models
• Deep learning methods
• Hierarchical clustering (agglomerative or divisive)
• Kernel principal component analysis
2.2.9

Support Vector Machines.

Support Vector Machine (SVM) were originally used to solve supervised two-class
classification problems for use in the field of statistical learning theory [79, 100]. SVMs are
now capable of solving one-class and multi-class classification problems and are capable
of running in parallel in order to reduce training and classification time [173]. SVMs were
developed at AT&T by Vladimir Vapnik and are now a well-known and popular technique
for classification and regression [172]. Two-class SVMs solve classification problems by
determining an optimal separating hyperplane between the two given classes and are known
for relatively fast classification and training despite their high accuracy [100]. SVMs also
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are capable of utilizing high-dimensional feature space to optimize the distance between
features and the separating hyperplane [173].
SVMs work by a priori learning from observed data. This model of learning by
example can be shown as three components:
1. a generator of random vectors x, drawn independently from a fixed but unknown
P(x);
2. a supervisor that returns an output vector y for every input vector x, according to a
conditional P(y|x), also fixed but unknown;
3. a learning machine capable of implementing a set of functions f (x, α), α ∈ Λ; in this
case a Support Vector Machine.
The problem of learning according to Vapnik, is choosing from the given set of
functions f (x, α), α ∈ Λ, the one which predicts the supervisor’s response most accurately
[172]. These selections are made based on the training set of data drawn according to
P(x, y) = P(x)P(y|x).
Vapnik described the Problem of Risk Minimization in Statistical Learning Theory
and SVMs by showing that in order to choose the best available approximation to the
supervisor’s response, the learning machine must measure the discrepancy L(y, f (x, α))
between the response of y from the given input x and the response provided by the learning
machine: f (x, α) [173]. Vapnik explains that the expected value of the loss between the
supervisor’s response and the learning machine can be shown as a risk functional [173]:

R(α) =

Z

L(y, f (x, α)) dP(x, y)

(2.13)

The empirical risk of learning machines, specifically SVMs, in using a least square
method yields the empirical risk function [173]:
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Remp (α) = 1/l

l
X
(yi − f (x, α))2

(2.14)

i=1

where l is the current feature and (yi − f (x, α))2 is the mean squared error.
Empirical risk is a quality estimation of the experimental expected performance of
the SVM, however the true risk must be accounted for as well in order to illustrate the
complexity of the SVM. The true risk can be given by the empirical risk plus an additional
term [173]:
s
R(α) ≤ Remp (α) +

h(log( 2m
+ 1) − log( n4 )
h
m

(2.15)

where h is the dimensionality of the set of functions parameterized by α. This is a measure
of the functions’ complexity. The more phenomena that are described, the larger the value
of h. Therefore, h is the maximum number of points that can be separated in all possible
ways by that set of functions.
SVMs operate in vector spaces like many other learning machines. The dimension
of the vector space is determined by the number of features used. An SVM creates a
separating Hyperplane f (x) = w · Φ(x) + b that separates the individual classes most
effectively [172]. In creating the separating hyperplane, w represents the normal vector
perpendicular to the hyperplane, b is the offset from the origin, and features are mapped to
the higher dimensional space with x 7→ Φ(x). As an example the polynomial mapping of a
set of features is [172]:
Φ : R2 → R3 (x1 , x2 7→ (z1 , z2 , z3 ) := (x12 ,

p
(2)x1 x2 , x22 )

(2.16)

Figure 2.5 illustrates two hyperplanes separating the same data in sections (a) and
(b). The hyperplane in part (a) of the Figure does not maximize the margin to the two
surrounding lines. This hyperplane increases the chance that a faulty classification because
there is less of a margin of error between the two classes. The hyperplane of part (b) of
Figure 2.5 separates both data sets optimally. The margin of part (b) to the two surrounding
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lines, representing the class borders, is maximized. The classification of a vector is
performed by determining on which side of the hyperplane the vector lies to determine
which class it belongs. By increasing the margin it becomes easier to determine which side
of the hyperplane the vector belongs on, thus increasing the classification accuracy. The
SVM in particular defines the criterion to be looking for a decision surface that is maximally
far away from any data point. This distance from the decision surface to the closest data
point determines the margin of the classifier. This method of construction means that the
decision function for an SVM is fully specified by a subset of the data which defines the
position of the separator. These points are referred to as the support vectors.
Figure 2.5 shows the margin and support vectors for a sample problem. Other data
points play no part in determining the decision surface that is chosen [120].

Figure 2.5: Poor (a) and Optimal (b) separating hyperplanes of an SVM. The poorly
separating hyperplane offers bad generalization ability whereas the optimal separating
hyperplane perfectly divides both data sets by maximizing the margin of the hyperplane
[120]

As stated above, Part (a) of Figure 2.5 features a non-optimal hyperplane. The
margin of the hyperplane is visibly smaller than the margin in part (b). How this effects
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classification accuracy is in the generalization ability since vectors lying very close to the
hyperplane can be misclassified more easily. The difficulty of training an SVM now lies in
finding the “optimal” separating hyperplane. The hyperplane is calculated from a training
set D = (~xi , yi ), where D is the data points used in the training of the classifier, and each
member is a pair of points x~i and a class label, yi corresponding to it. A decision hyperplane
~ which is
is defined by an intercept term b and a decision hyperplane normal vector ω
perpendicular to the hyperplane also called the weight vector [100]. To choose the “best”
hyperplane that is perpendicular to the normal vector, use intercept term b. All points x~i on
~ T ~x = −b. The linear classifier then becomes [173]:
the hyperplane satisfy ω

f (~x) = sign(~
ωT ~x + b)

(2.17)

And the value of -1 indicates not in the current class, where a value of 1 indicates
in the current specified class. By moving the hyperplane to a location farthest away from
points of the two classes, the optimal hyperplane is reached.
The dimensionality and complexity of Φ(x) can be very large (O(nn )), making w hard
to represent in memory, and hard to solve [172]. Kimeldorf and Wahba [96] presented the
representer theorem, which shows that
w=

m
X

αi Φ(xi )

(2.18)

i=1

for some variables α. Instead of optimizing w directly we can optimize α [96]:
f (x) =

m
X

αi Φ(xi ) · Φ(x) + b

(2.19)

i=1

and K(xi , x) = Φ(xi ) · Φ(x) is called the kernel function.
So far only the linear classification capability of SVMs is introduced. Nonlinear
classification by means of kernel functions are able to separate data which might not seem
linearly separable in an SVM. SVMs are also cpable of classifying prefiltered data [120].
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Figure 2.6: SVM separating features with a hyperplane in a higher dimensional space [96]

Figure 2.6 illustrates a data set that would not be linearly separable without being brought
into a higher dimensional space. The two data sets are not linearly separable without
accepting many training errors because many points would reside on the wrong side of
the hyperplane. To solve the nonlinear classification problem, kernel functions, defined as
K(X, Y) = [ρ(x), ρ(y)]v, are used [96]. The purpose of the Kernel Trick is to transform
vectors from the lower dimensional input space to the higher dimensional feature space in
which the data sets become linearly separable [172]. The Kernel often uses the Gaussian
radial basis function kernel, k(xi , x j ) = exp(−λ||xi −x j ||2 ) f or λ = 1/2φ [100]. Other Kernels
for nonlinear classification include Polynomial homogeneous, Polynomial inhomogeneous,
and Hyperbolic Tangent [118].
SVMs have shown good results in data classification, but their training complexity is
very dependent on the size of the dataset. SVMs are known to be at least quadratic (O(n4 ))
with the number of training data points. One approach to reduce training data size is to
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use a hierarchical clustering algorithm, as described by Horng [85]. The algorithm creates
a clustering feature tree, which is then used to merge disjoint clusters. Experiments using
this technique on the intrusion detection problem are encouraging [85].
Another interesting use of SVMs in the intrusion detection problem is introduced
in [166], which evaluates a hybrid decision-tree/SVM system. Their hypothesis is that
different classifiers are better at detecting certain attacks than others, and that an ensemble
approach using several different classifiers can exploit the misclassification and improve
performance. Experimental results support this assessment [166].
To this point, the only discussion of SVMs is two class binary problem solvers.
Multiclass SVMs are able to assign labels to instances for a finite set of classes. The
dominant method for solving a multiclass SVM is to reduce the multiclass problem into
several binary classification problems and combining the results [101].
The common methods for reducing multiclass decision problems are one of the labels
and the res, known as the one-versus-all approach, or between every pair of classes; oneversus-one. Other methods for such reduction include the use of Directed Acrylic Graph
SVM (DAGSVM) and error correcting output code [101].
Crammer and Singer [157] propose the use of an SVM method which casts the
multiclass classification problem into a single optimization problem. This avoids the
process of decomposing the problem into multiple binary classification problems.
Crammer and Singer propose that starting with set S = (~x1 , y1 , ..., ~xm , ym ) be a set of m
training samples, a multiclass classifier maps using the function H : X → Y each instance
of ~x to an element y of Y. The form of the classification process is [157]:

k
~R · ~x]
Hm (~x) = arg maxr=1
[M
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(2.20)

~ r is the rth row of M. The inner product of
where M is a matrix of size kn over R and M
the rth row of M is the similarity score or confidence of the r class. To construct a multiclass
predictor, the misclassification error becomes the following piecewise linear bound [157]:

~ r · ~x + 1 − δy, r ] − M
~ y · ~x,
maxr [ M

(2.21)

where δ p,q equals 1 if p = q and 0 otherwise. The above bound is zero if the confidence
value for the correct label is larger by at least one than the confidences assigned to the
rest of the labels. Otherwise, the value suffers a loss which is linearly proportional to
the difference between the confidence of the correct label and the maximum among the
confidences of the other labels. A graphical illustration of the above is given in Figure 2.7.
The circles in the figure denote different labels and the correct label is plotted in dark grey
while the rest of the labels are plotted in light gray. The height of each label designates its
confidence. Three settings are plotted in the figure. The left plot corresponds to the case
~ r · ~x + 1 − δy, r ] − M
~ y · ~x
when the margin is larger than one, and therefore the bound maxr [ M
equals zero and is correctly classified. The middle figure shows a case where the example
is correctly classified but with a small margin and suffers some loss. The right plot depicts
the loss of a misclassified example.

Figure 2.7: Margin Bound for Multiclass SVM [185]
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Although SVMs apply optimal classification techniques when binary classification
is necessary, when decomposed into multiple binary classification problems this is not
always the case for multiclass problems [109]. [110] shows an alternative for multiclass
problems using a Multicategory SVM. The multicategory SVM implements the “optimal”
classification rule as the sample size gets large, overcoming the sub-optimality of the
conventional one-versus-rest approach. Their method deals with the equal misclassification
cost and the unequal cost case in unified way.
The basic principals of the method are similar to those of Crammer and Singer, where
a matrix is formed of the j possible classes, and a data point belonging to that class is
mapped to that class with a value of 1. If it is not part of that class it is marked with a -1.
The main problem with this then becomes over-fitting the data. Misclassification leads to
a penalty if the data is not separable, however fitting the data too closely leads to a penalty
as well. This set of rules allow the SVM using Gaussian Radial Basis function to use the
best dimension in finding all of the linear hyperplanes. The crux of their methodology is
the following Lemma:
Lemma: The minimizer of E[L(Y) · ( f (X) − Y)+ ] under the sum-to-zero constraint is:
f (x) = ( f1 (x), ..., fk (x)) with: f j (x) = {1 i f j = arg maxl=1,...,k pl (x), − 1/k otherwise}.
Notice that the minimizer is exactly the representation of the most probable class.
Hence, the classification rule induced by f (x) is naturally φ(x) = arg max j f j (x). If
f (x) is the minimizer in the Lemma, then the corresponding classification rule is φ −
B(x) = arg max j p j (x), the Bayes rule for the standard multicategory case.
Support Vector Machines suffer from a scalability problem in both memory use
and computational time. To improve scalability developers have created a parallel SVM
algorithm (PSVM) [109], which reduces memory use through performing a row-based,
approximate matrix factorization, and which loads only essential data to each machine to
perform parallel computation. Let n denote the number of training instances, p the reduced
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matrix dimension after factorization, and m the number of machines or cores. PSVM
reduces the memory requirement from O(n2 ) to O(np/m), and improves computation time
to O(np2 /m).
A short subset of popular SVM packages is located in Appendix D.
2.3

Intrusion Detection
The previous section described the field of pattern recognition, including classifica-

tion. Applying classification techniques on the AS-level of a network allows for the detection and characterization of malicious activity.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) fall into two pairs of categories: host-based or
network-based; and anomaly-based or signature-based 9. Recognizing malicious activity
on a computer network is called Intrusion Detection, and it is the job of the IDS [29].
A Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) monitors and analyzes the network
packets on its network interfaces. It was the first type of IDS and consists of an agent
on a host that identifies intrusions by analyzing system calls, application logs, file-system
modifications, and other host activities. A HIDS monitors the dynamic behavior and the
state of the network. In a HIDS, sensors usually consist of a software agent. An example
of a HIDS is OSSEC [42].
A Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) is an independent software platform
that identifies intrusions by examining network traffic and monitors multiple hosts. Its
main function is to discover unauthorized access to a computer network by analyzing traffic
on the network for signs of malicious activity. Network intrusion detection systems gain
access to network traffic by connecting to a network hub, network switch configured for
port mirroring, or network tap. In a NIDS, sensors are located at choke points in the
network to be monitored. Sensors capture all or part of network traffic and analyze the
content of individual packets for malicious traffic. An example of a NIDS is Snort, an open
source NIDS developed by Martin Roesch and maintained by Sourcefire Inc. [1].
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An Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection System (ADS) works by detecting computer
intrusions and misuse by monitoring system activity and classifying it as either normal or
anomalous. Typically, these systems begin by determining normal operating conditions
for bandwidth, protocols, ports and device connections. The classification is based on
heuristics or rules, rather than patterns or signatures, and detects any type of misuse that
falls out of normal system operation. This opposes signature based systems which can only
detect attacks for which a signature has previously been created [9].
In order to determine what is attack traffic, the system must be taught to recognize
normal system activity.

This is most often accomplished with artificial intelligence

techniques, including neural networks and classifier systems. Another method, known as
strict anomaly detection, is to first define the normal usage of the system using a strict
mathematical model, and flag any deviation from this as an attack. CFEngine developed
by Mark Burgess has support for this technique [33], as well as RRDTool by Tobi Oetiker
[137].
Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection does have some short-comings, namely a high
false positive rate and the ability to be fooled by a correctly delivered attack. Attempts
have been made to address these issues through payload-based techniques used by PAYL
[178] and MCPAD [142]. Signature-based systems have a very low false-positive rate, but
are more limited in the types of attacks they can detect. Novel attacks which are designed
to thwart signature-based systems may still be detectable by an anomaly-based system.
Details of terminology and specific concepts of intrusion detection are further
discussed in Appendix E.
2.4

Flow-based Intrusion Detection
The traditional idea of a network flow, as defined in [187], is a unidirectional data

stream between two computer systems where all transmitted packets of this stream share
the following characteristics: IP source and destination address, source and destination
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port, and IP protocol. Thus, all network packets sent from host A to host B sharing the
above mentioned characteristics form a flow. Every communication attempt between two
computer systems triggers the creation of a flow, even if no connection is established. In
the simplest case, a complete flow is well-defined when a complete flow set-up and teardown are observed, as is the case with most TCP communications. Complexity in any
flow definition occurs when the set-up is incomplete or tear-down is abnormal. UDP is
notoriously troublesome because it is connectionless protocol.
In addition to the above mentioned core characteristics, several other properties of a
flow can be conveyed, for instance:
• The number of packets which have been transferred
• The number of bytes which have been transferred
• The start or end time of a flow
• The disjunction of all TCP flags occurring in the flow

Figure 2.8: Network flow

Figure 2.8 illustrates a bidirectional communication between two computers which
results in the creation of two flows. Host A is the initiator of the communication and
has the IP address 10.0.0.1. Host A sent several packets to host B which is assigned the
IP address 10.1.1.2. The source port of this communication is 4312 on host A whereas
the destination port is 80 on host B. All the network traffic is monitored by the NetFlow
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router. The communication finally results in two unidirectional network flows. The first
flow (illustrated as grey squares) describes the communication from A to B and the second
flow (illustrated as white squares) from B to A.
Winter [187] describes a technique to collect network flows on actual hardware, with
a commercial package called NetFlow. NetFlow runs on Cisco routers and collects flow
statistics which it sends to a central collector. A separate device can poll this collector
to run analysis on current flows in the network. MFIREv3 does not use live network
flows – instead all traffic is simulated. However the NetFlow architecture provides a wellknown framework for modeling flows, and this model is useful in discussing this research
investigation.
A useful set of real-world flow data and metrics is provided by Andrew Moore
[133]. Real network traffic was collected over a 24-hour period at a research facility
with approximately 1000 active workstations. Individual flows are constructed from this
data, and labeled as idle, interactive (two-way), or bulk (one-way). Only data and metrics
corresponding to the TCP protocol are collected; UDP and ICMP are ignored. Flows are
characterized into 249 metrics.
However, one does not need to observe a specific TCP connection or tear-down to
use flows. A microflow abandons such concepts in favor of observing traffic in a more
immediate fashion. This concept treats flows as a collection of packets to/from nodes, but
does not distinguish bi-directional flows; everything is treated as one-directional. These
flows are robust to incorrectly formatted TCP connections and tear-downs because they
do not rely on those actions for measurement. A disadvantage is that microflows lose
potentially useful information, including the cumulative time that a connection has been
established, or the amount of data sent since the beginning of a connection. A good
comparison between the usefulness of both approaches for the ID problem is provided
in [177].
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In the environment used in this research effort, TCP is not specifically implemented;
rather everything behaves like UDP. Because of this, mircroflows are the obvious choice.
2.5

Network Attacks of Interest
This section discusses five common types of network attacks: distributed denial of

service, vulnerability scans, worm propagation, man-in-the-middle, and Trojans or Trojan
Horse attacks. A taxonomy of network and computer attacks is located in Appendix B.
We focus on attacks which cause significant changes in traffic flows. Background on other
attacks can be found in [159].
2.5.1

Denial of Service Attacks.

Mirkovic [130] presents a comprehensive taxonomy of different DDoS attack types,
Figure 2.9. We concentrate on flood attacks [162], although the MFIREv3 environment
is capable of simulating a Semantic or other DoS model as well. A flood attack involves
malicious agents sending large volumes of traffic to a victim system, to congest the victim
system’s network bandwidth with IP traffic with the victim’s own legitimate resources.
The victim system slows down, crashes, or suffers from saturated network bandwidth,
preventing access by legitimate users.
Formal models for DDoS and their detection are proposed in the several articles. One
method applied to DDoS detection is the k-nearest neighbor (kNN) algorithm with feature
weighting and selection based on a genetic algorithm [129]. Overall accuracy of over 97%
for known DDoS attacks is achieved, and over 78% in the case of unknown attacks.
Scepanovic [150] focuses on the scenario in which a cluster-based filter is deployed at
the target network and serves for proactive or reactive defense. A game-theoretic model is
created for the scenario, making it possible to model the defender and attacker strategies as
mathematical optimization tasks. The model is based on the continuous nonlinear knapsack
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Figure 2.9: Taxonomy of DDoS Attack Mechanisms [122]

problem [66]. The experimental outcome shows the high effectiveness of cluster-based
filtering in proactive and reactive DDoS defense.
Once service is denied or begins suffering bandwidth reduction the DDoS is detected,
however early detection is important [141]. If a target can detect an attack before the
actual damage occurs, the target can win more time to implement attack reaction and
protect legitimate users. Second, if attacks can be detected close to attack sources, attack
traffic can be filtered before it wastes any network bandwidth. However, there is generally
insufficient attack traffic in the early stage of an attack and at links close to attack sources.
Consequently, it is easy to mistake legitimate traffic as attack traffic. Therefore, it is
challenging to accurately detect attacks quickly and close to attack sources.
Finally, flash crowds are very similar to DoS attacks, which can cause network
congestion and service degradation. However, flash crowds are caused by legitimate traffic,
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whereas DoS attacks caused by malicious traffic. Hence, it is important to differentiate DoS
attacks from flash crowds so that targets can react to them separately.
DoS attacks can be easily detected since the target’s services degrade as the attack
manifests. False positives are a serious concern for DoS attack detection. Since the
potency of DoS attacks does not depend on the exploitation of software bugs or protocol
vulnerabilities, it only depends on the volume of attack traffic. Consequently, DoS attack
packets do not need to be malformed, such as invalid fragmentation field or malicious
packet payload, to be effective [141]. As a result, the DoS attack traffic can look very
similar to legitimate traffic.
2.5.2

Vulnerability Scans.

A vulnerability scan is used to conduct network reconnaissance. A remote attacker
usually attempts to gain information or access to a network on which it is not authorized
or allowed. Network reconnaissance is increasingly used to exploit network standards and
automated communication methods. The aim is to determine what types of computers
are present, along with additional information about those computers; such as the type
and version of the operating system. This information can be analyzed for known or
recently discovered vulnerabilities that can be exploited to gain access to secure networks
and computers. Network reconnaissance is possibly one of the most common applications
of passive data analysis. Numerous tools exist to make reconnaissance easier and more
effective.
A port scan is an attack that sends client requests to a range of server port addresses
on a host, with the goal of finding an active port and exploiting a known vulnerability of
that service [154]. The result of a scan on a port is usually generalized into one of three
categories:
• Open: The host sent a reply indicating that a service is listening on the port.
• Closed: The host sent a reply indicating that connections are denied to the port.
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• Filtered: There was no reply from the host.
Potential security concerns exist for both the program responsible for delivering a
service (on open ports), and with the operating system that is running on the host (on open
or closed ports). Filtered ports do not tend to present vulnerabilities. There are many
standard scanning formats, some of which follow standard Internet protocols, others which
purposefully do not [159]. Some common techniques are outlined:
TCP CONNECT scan—The simplest port scanners use the operating system’s network
functions. If a port is open, the operating system completes the TCP three-way handshake,
and the port scanner immediately closes the connection. Otherwise an error code is
returned. This scan mode has the advantage that the user does not require special privileges.
However, using the OS network functions prevents low-level control, so this scan type is
less common. This method is noisy, particularly if it is a complete sweep of all ports: the
services can log the sender IP address and Intrusion detection systems can raise an alarm.
TCP SYN scan—SYN scan is another form of TCP scanning. Rather than use the
operating system’s network functions, the port scanner generates raw IP packets itself, and
monitors for responses. This scan type is also known as “half-open scanning”, because it
never actually opens a full TCP connection. The port scanner generates a SYN packet. If
the target port is open, it responds with a SYN-ACK packet. The scanner host responds
with a RST packet, closing the connection before the handshake is completed.
The use of raw networking has several advantages, giving the scanner full control
of the packets sent and the timeout for responses, and allowing detailed reporting of the
responses. SYN scan has the advantage that the individual services never actually receive a
connection. However, the RST during the handshake can cause problems for some network
stacks, in particular simple devices like printers.
UDP scan—UDP is a connectionless protocol so there is no equivalent to a TCP SYN
packet. However, if a UDP packet is sent to a port that is not open, the system responds with

51

an ICMP port unreachable message. Most UDP port scanners use this scanning method,
and use the absence of a response to infer that a port is open. However, if a port is blocked
by a firewall, this method falsely reports that the port is open. If the port unreachable
message is blocked, all ports appear open. This method is also affected by ICMP rate
limiting.
An alternative approach is to send application-specific UDP packets, hoping to
generate an application layer response. For example, sending a DNS query to port 53
results in a response, if a DNS server is present. This method is much more reliable at
identifying open ports. However, it is limited to scanning ports for which an application
specific probe packet is available. Some tools (e.g., nmap) generally have probes for less
than 20 UDP services, while some commercial tools (e.g., nessus) have as many as 70. In
some cases, a service may be listening on the port, but configured not to respond to the
particular probe packet.
TCP ACK scan—ACK scanning is one of the more unique scan types, as it does not
exactly determine whether the port is open or closed, but whether the port is filtered or
unfiltered. This is especially good when attempting to probe for the existence of a firewall
and its rulesets. Simple packet filtering allows established connections (packets with the
ACK bit set), whereas a more sophisticated stateful firewall might not.
TCP FIN scan—Firewalls are, in general, scanning for and blocking covert scans in
the form of SYN packets. FIN packets are able to pass by firewalls with no modification to
its purpose. Closed ports reply to a FIN packet with the appropriate RST packet, whereas
open ports ignore the packet on hand. This is typical behavior due to the nature of TCP,
and is in some ways an inescapable downfall.
2.5.3

Worms.

It is vital to detect active worms effectively. In the near future active worms may spread
across the whole Internet in a very short period of time, making the average detection time
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critical. A common way to detect worms is to place sensors in a network to monitor
messages sent to non-existent IP addresses. Administrators of networks are aware of
exactly which IP addresses are in use in their domains, and common worm attacks do
not have access to this information. If a message is sent to a non-existent IP, then this flags
the sender as suspicious [39]. Attackers that wish to build stealth into the system must take
preliminary steps to discover a network map prior to initiating the worm.
Many models exist for worm propagation [39, 95, 111, 151, 176, 193, 194]. The basis
of many of these is the general epidemic model, which considers a fixed population size N
where each individual can be in one of three states: susceptible to the disease (S), infected
(I), or removed (R) [111]. In networking terms, removals can occur if the victim is taken
offline or becomes immune (patched) to the infection. The normal state progression for an
individual is S → I → R, normally termed an SIR model. But in the networking domain,
victims who recover and do not obtain immunity to the infection become susceptible again:
S → I → S , an SIS model. Also known as the Epidemiological Model, this is formally
represented as:
dn
= β(1 − n) − dn
dt

(2.22)

where n(t) is the fraction of infected nodes, β is the infection parameter, and d is the death
rate. The solution to the above equation is
n(t) =
where ρ =
2.5.4

d
β

and n0 ≡ n(t = 0) =

n0 (1 − ρ)
n0 + (1 − ρ − n0 )e−(β−d)t

sizeo f hitlist
N

=

(2.23)

h
N

Man-in-the-Middle and Eavesdropping.

The Man-in-the-Middle (MiM) attack is a form of active eavesdropping in which the
attacker makes independent connections with the victims and relays messages between
them, making them believe that they are talking directly to each other over a private
connection, when in fact the entire conversation is controlled by the attacker [154]. The
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Table 2.1: Parameters for the spread of active worms [111]
vulnerable machines

N

number of vulnerable machines

Size of hitlist

h

number of infected machines at the beginning of the
spread of active worms

Scanning rate

s

average number of machines scanned by an infected
machine per unit time

Death rate

d

rate at which an infection is detected on a machine
and eliminated without patching

Patching rate

p

rate at which an infected or vulnerable machine
becomes invulnerable

attacker must be able to intercept all messages going between the two victims and inject
new ones, which is often a simple task for an attacker [111].
A MitM attack can succeed only when the attacker can impersonate each endpoint
to the satisfaction of the other often times requiring the issuing of false authentication.
Most cryptographic protocols include some form of endpoint authentication specifically
to prevent MitM attacks. For example, SSL can authenticate one or both parties using a
mutually trusted certification authority.

Figure 2.10: Illustration of SSL Thwarting MitM Attack
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MitM attacks do not normally flood networks with traffic or attempt to spread once
they reach the target node of a system. This makes detection unique for the MFIRE system,
as there is very little indication that the flow between two or more nodes has been changed.
However, compared to normal traffic flow the packet exchange rate becomes statistically
noticeably slower [169]. This concept is illustrated in an effort by Tartakovsky et al. in
2.11.

Figure 2.11: Detection of MitM Attack in UDP Mode [169]

According to cyber security experts, “the man-in-the-middle attack has been shown
to be one of the most serious threats to the security and trust of existing protocols and
systems” [192]. A major source of the threat is the inability to permanently remove the
threat from the system and detection is difficult if the attacker remains quiet.
Quite simply, MitM attacks are very difficult to perform on systems with SSL or
similar authentication.

Advanced attacks though might be capable of deceiving the

authentication process. The speed of dataflow between nodes decreases by definition with
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a MitM and detection of this slowdown is essential. On a broad spectrum, the detection
of MitM due to decreased flow speeds is shown as a good detection mechanism by many
research attempts [169]. Without propagation throughout the network however, no tests
have proposed solutions for detecting the attack on a large network with few intrusion
detection agents. Where the detection of a worm, DDoS, or scan becomes an issue of
catching the intrusion before it propagates too far, MitM presents the issue of having the
attack located at all on a very large system.
2.5.5

Trojans and Back-doors.

Unlike the worm, scan, and DDoS, a Trojan Horse is utilized for the creation of a
vulnerability. A Trojan is a malicious application that masquerades as a legitimate file but
instead enables an attacker unauthorized access to the system. Trojans do not attempt to
inject themselves into other files like a computer virus or worm, but rather create a back
door, destroy a single system, or steal information by updating it to an outside source.
Trojans may use drive-by downloads or install via internet-driven applications in order
to reach target computers. Trojans often utilize social-engineering in order to install
themselves on the host-computer [131].
Rather than focusing on the Trojan itself, the detection goal is truly locating the backdoor created by the initial attack. Creating a back door allows unauthorized access to
the system for an attacker from which the attacker could easily run any number of other
attacks such as DDoS, worms, and scans, or simply steal valuable information. As long as
the back-door remains ajar, the system remains highly vulnerable even if initial attacks are
thwarted [131]. It is even possible that the initial attacker leaves a back-door open without
intent to attack the system again, and a new attacker, finding the vulnerability via network
scan, exploits the vulnerability for painless access to the system.
Back-doors are typically very difficult to detect if they are not known by the standard
anti-virus software [131, 139]. Trojans conceal their presence by executing as a plug-in
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or as a dynamically-linked library. Many have very little immediate impact on the normal
operation of a system and so are difficult to detect by the user. These characteristics enable
Trojan Horses and Back-doors to go undetected for a significant period of time, providing
the attacker with a large window of vulnerability on the system [131, 139].
A small subset of the known Trojan exploits include [139]:
• PWSteal.Tarno.Q logs passwords and information typed into specific webforms such
as banks. Propagating via email attachments, this Trojan registers as a browser helper
similar to a toolbar. The stolen information is periodically transmitted back to the
attacker via hard-coded url.
• Trojan.Lodeight.A code tries to install malicious code on the compromised computer
and opens a Back-door on TCP port 1084. When this Trojan is executed, it connects
to one of two predefined websites, downloads a remote file and then executes it. This
remote file may be any arbitrary program, including a Beagle worm.
• Trojan.Vundo is part of an adware program that presents the user with pop-up
advertisements. By exploiting a Microsoft Internet vulnerability, a downloader
component is executed on the victim. It then retrieves an adware component by
connecting to a specific IP address. The adware is injected into dierent processes as
a DLL. Besides displaying advertisements on the infected machine, it also degrades
performance by decreasing the amount of virtual memory available
Trojans and Back-doors display five common characteristics [146]:
• The malicious code is executed without user intervention.
• The malicious code may be directed by a remote attacker once a connection is made.
• Resources used by the malicious code, such as file names and network addresses, are
hard-coded in the binary.
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• OS resources (processes, memory) used by the malicious code may be consumed for
the purpose of degrading performance.
• They cannot be invoked by the attacker and are autonomous

at least until a

connection is made.

Figure 2.12: Event Classification Abstraction Levels for Harrier [40]

One formal model of the attack and detection of a back-door intrusion by Cheng et al.
[40] called Harrier uses the approach of breaking data flows into five categories of resource
types: User Input, File, Socket, Binary, and Hardware. Besides monitoring the source of
the data flow, which is important for detecting back-door access to the Internet as opposed
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to a legitimate user, their model also incorporates Event Monitoring illustrated in Figure
2.12.
2.6

Multi-Objective Optimization
A Multi-Objective Evolutionary Algorithm (MOEA) is utilized for finding the

“optimal” subset of a set of points representing conflicting objectives. Multi-Objective
Optimization (MOO) is the process of simultaneously optimizing two or more conflicting
objectives under certain constraints, and a useful process for this optimization is MOEAs.
Multi-Objective Optimization is also known as Multi-Objective Programming, Pareto
Optimization, Multi-Criteria Optimization, or Multi-Attribute Optimization [103]. Pareto
Optimization refers to the process of finding the optimal or Pareto front of points for all of
the conflicting criteria. Since two or more conflicting objectives require multiple solutions
where one objective improves to the detriment of the conflicting objectives, a front of all of
the optimal solutions is produced. This front of non-dominated, optimal solutions is known
as the Pareto Front [103].
2.6.1

Multi-Objective Problems.

Multi-Objective Problems (MOPs) exist in almost every field of business and decision
processes. Common scenarios requiring optimization over multiple criteria include any
business decision with cost vs. quality. Optimal decisions need to be taken in the presence
of trade-offs between two or more conflicting objectives [63].
For nontrivial MOPs, one solution that optimizes every objective does not exist. While
searching for solutions, improving one objective further often results in the decline of the
other objectives [63]. A tentative solution is called non-dominated or Pareto optimal if
it cannot be eliminated from consideration by replacing it with another solution which
improves an objective without worsening another one.

Finding such non-dominated

solutions leads to the development of an optimal front of solutions where choosing any
solution from the front is not any worse than another solution, because any other choice
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would require at least one objective to suffer for the improvement of other objectives [168].
After a Pareto Front is created the decision maker must choose what solution from the front
is best based on what the decision maker determines is most important to keep and what is
an acceptable sacrifice when it comes to the multiple objectives [63, 103].
2.6.2

Stochastic Search.

In a complex Network Intrusion Detection System agents take on a number of
parameters determining attack classification, agent movement, sensors, and any other
parameter improving the system. With the large degree of data gathered by each parameter
and the complexity of meeting multiple objectives, finding the optimum solution or
solutions is not possible.

In many cases, one or more of the objectives is a Non-

Polynomial Complete (NPC) problem. Stochastic search techniques allow the location
of good solutions quickly that are not necessarily optimum solutions.
Recognizing a good solution for a Multi-Agent System or other MOP is an easier
function to perform than finding a good solution. Recognizing a good solution simply
requires comparing the current solution to the previous solutions or a set of previous
options, while finding a good solution requires searching intractable space for optimal
solutions.

Stochastic search algorithms allow for finding near-optimal solutions to

problems with large numbers of solutions along a Pareto Front [168]. Stochastic search is
useful on problems that can be formulated as finding a solution maximizing or minimizing
a criterion among a number of candidate solutions. Search algorithms move from solution
to solution in the space of candidate solutions by applying local, until a solution deemed
optimal is found or a time bound is elapsed.
The hill climbing local search algorithm is a commonly known, simple local search
algorithm. Hill climbing involves starting with an arbitrary or previously chosen solution,
followed by attempting to incrementally find a better solution by changing a single element
of the solution utilizing Depth-First Search (DFS). If the change produces a better solution,
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that change becomes the new solution. This process repeats until the final solution cannot
make any incremental changes that improve its state [11].
A problem with simple hill climbing is that it suffers from a tendency to get stuck
at a local optimum and fails to search for greater global optima. Some improvements to
the algorithm attempt to mitigate this tendency and allow the search to move to global
optima include stochastic hill climbing, random-restart hill climbing, hill climbing with
backtracking and Tabu search [43].
An Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) is a type of stochastic search that utilizes the
principals of biological evolution as inspiration for local search. Reproduction, mutation,
recombination, and selection applied to candidate solutions or individuals of the population
allow for the algorithm to evolve towards optimal solutions [11, 43, 168]. EAs evolve
solutions over generations of applying the organic operator methods. The evolutionary
process aims to keep a balance of the best candidates as well as a number of non-optimal
solutions in order to keep diversity in future generations and avoid moving towards a local
optima.
Bäck Evolutionary Algorithm Formalism [11]: Optimization as a minimization of a
function f : M ⊆ Rn → R, M , ∅ consists of searching for ~x∗ ∈ M such that f (~x∗ ) > −∞
and

∀~x ∈ M : f (~x∗ ) ≤ f (~x)
The goal is to find the global optimum ~x∗ for the objective function f within the
feasible region M, however time constraints make reaching this goal unlikely. Instead,
the best solution found given time or another constraint is selected.
Evolutionary computation begins by initializing a population of candidate solutions.
Each candidate solution consists of a vector of parameters proposed as solutions for
the optimization problem. The fitness of candidate solutions is then measured by the

61

given parameters and candidate solutions are then ranked or graphed for selection in the
reproduction phase of the algorithm. In the case of a single objective EA, the quality of a
solution could be measured as a single value. For a MOP the strength of a solution could
still be measured as a single value if it is simply a weighted sum of all of the objectives,
however it is more common for the quality to be represented as a vector. Members chosen
for reproduction into the next generation are selected by their fitness values as well as
keeping diversity within the population. After selection of the candidates based on fitness
and diversity, selected individuals then undergo recombination and/or mutation to produce
new candidate solutions. Recombination produces offspring by combining the objective
values of parent similarly to passing genes from two parents to a child. Mutation only
involves one parent and simply changes specific parameter values as a means of exploring
the solution space. The resulting population consist of the best solutions from parents,
offspring, and mutations. If an offspring or mutation does not yield a more optimal solution
than the previous generation, it is likely not kept in the population. After reproduction, all of
the solutions are evaluated for fitness and then the selection process repeats. The selection
process continues until some stopping criteria is reached such as number of generations
completed, performance fails to improve, or acceptable performance achieved.
The basic Evolutionary Process is outlined in Algorithm 1.
In all cases of computation the decision maker (DM) desires that only a few
solutions are available for ease of decision.

With a Multi-Objective Evolutionary

Algorithm (MOEA), the algorithm is attempting to optimize a vector objective function
with constraints between multiple conflicting objectives. It is desired that an MOEA
generates MOP solutions in Ptrue which provide a trade-off of performance efficiency and
effectiveness [14].
MOEAs have a great advantage over other MOP search techniques they are capable of
encoding individual solutions in numerous straightforward representations as chromosomal
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Algorithm 1 Evolutionary Algorithm Process
Generate the initial population of individuals
Evaluate the fitness of each individual in that population
while Stopping Criteria Not Met do
Select the best-fit individuals for reproduction - parents
Breed new individuals through recombination and mutation
Evaluate fitness of new individuals
Select the best fit individuals to be parents for next generation
end while

objective values. Although the No Free Lunch (NFL) Theorem [76] implies that MOEAs
are not universally robust solutions for all MOPs, in general the Problem Domain model
does not need to be modified for an MOEA. This makes understanding the search process
significantly easier as much of the information remains in its native form [11].
Achieving the exact Pareto front for any given MOP is difficult and often not
acceptable given reasonable time constraints.

MOEAs allow for reasonably good

approximations of PFtrue in limited computational time. The purpose of MOEAs is to find
these acceptable approximate Pareto fronts and Pareto optimal solutions within a given
error. Types of Evolutionary Algorithm Techniques Include
• Genetic algorithm [14]
• Gene expression programming [58]
• Evolution strategy [11]
• Memetic algorithm [46]
• Differential evolution [165]
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• Nueroevolution [164]
• Learning classifier system [171]
2.7

Multiagent Systems
A common design question for any IDS is how to maximize the benefits and minimize

the penalties associated with network-based as well as host-based approaches. The MAS
paradigm offers a way to accomplish this, with the added advantages of flexibility and
robustness provided by this approach.
Russell and Norvig [149] define a single agent through several properties: autonomous
operation, ability to perceive the environment, persistence over a long period of time, ability
to adapt to change, and ability to create and pursue goals. These goals are typically in
support of a broader objective. Franklin and Graesser [62] provide a survey of definitions
for software agents, and an associated taxonomy.
Multiagent systems can be used to solve problems that are difficult or impossible for
an individual agent or a monolithic system to solve. A multiagent system is a collection of
agents that collaborate, explicitly (e.g., via cooperation) or implicitly (e.g., via competition)
to achieve a broad objective or series of objectives. The main feature which is achieved
when developing multi-agent systems is flexibility, since a multi-agent system can be added
to, modified and reconstructed, without the need for detailed rewriting of the application.
These systems also tend to be rapidly self-recovering and failure proof, usually due to the
heavy redundancy of components and the self-managed features.
In the networking domain, if agents are required to be mobile, then all hosts in the
network must have a generic agent platform installed which provides the environment in
which the agent executes. Agent migration then consists of sending agent state to a remote
process responsible for reinstantiating the agent.
Jansen lists some specific advantages of a mobile, agent-based IDS [90]:
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• Overcoming network latency - if an agent is present on a node requiring remedial
action, the agent can respond more quickly than if action must be initiated by a
central coordinator
• Reducing network load - Communication requirements are reduced by allowing
agents to process sensor data locally, instead of requiring each node to send sets
of sensor observations to a central processing location. Sharing the results of local
processing incurs a relatively light demand on bandwidth.
• Autonomous execution - surviving agents continue to operate when part of the IDS
fails
• Platform independence - agent platforms with standard interfaces may be written for
multiple operating systems to allow effective MAS execution in a heterogeneous OS
environment
• Dynamic adaptation - the system can be reconfigured during run-time in a variety
of ways. The mobility of the agents allowing them to seek effective positions is a
reconfiguration. Agents can clone themselves or request assistance from other agents
in high demand situations. Selected agents can be replaced while non-selected agents
continue to operate. One can also update repositories of behaviors and parameters
which agents access periodically.
Potential disadvantages include decreased performance and/or increased resource
consumption when mobility is implemented ineffectively. Also, since each agent is a
member of a trusted network that, if compromised, could provide the attacker considerable
leverage, digitally signed communications (including migrations) are essential.
Multiagent systems provide countless research opportunities in the field of intrusion
detection, as illustrated by [90], and many other fields of complex problem solving [167].
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The three areas of interest for this research effort include distributed systems, autonomous
self-organizing agents, and adaptive agents.
When talking about a problem, one might ask, why distribute the intelligence? The
main reason to distribute intelligence in computer systems is to decompose a complex
problem by breaking it into many less complex problems with a subsystem designed to
solve each part. If each subsystem performs its action efficiently the problem can be
conquered effectively [57]. A home builder does not need to know the process of creating
lumber; the builder just needs the wood to build the house. In intrusion detection with
multiple agents, an agent does not need to know the exact data another agent calculated,
just whether or not the agent located an intrusion and its location [181].
Further rational for the use of distributed intelligence is that the problem itself is
physically distributed [57]. A single agent simply cannot adequately monitor hundreds
of nodes to detect for intrusions. Multiple agents must collaborate in order to monitor the
physical distribution of nodes on the network.
Problems are also widely distributed in terms of functions. Not one entity can be the
knowledgeable expert for every part of a complex system [181]. A race car driver is not an
expert in tire production, engine construction, and fuel refinement. It is too burdensome,
and even if this driver was an expert in all of these facets, would one expect this well
educated driver to individually perform all of these tasks prior to each race? MASs allow
heterogeneous agents, meaning agents with different specialties or tasks to perform [57], to
work together in order to complete a complex task such as network classification.
Collaboration and self-organization is required among agents in distributed systems.
Besides the heterogeneous nature of problems within a complex network, problems
often present complexity in the form of difficult calculations or multiple objectives and
constraints [167]. Each agent must take care of its own local problems and communicate
the results to its collaborating agents. Focusing on the local problem allows for the parallel
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processing of a larger objective, while communicating necessary and important results
(summary) to the collaborating agents allows for self-organization in the form of organizing
tasks and providing alerts if the agents need to adapt to system changes [57].
A great example of collaboration among local entities completing a global task is air
traffic control towers. The amount of data, constraints, and parameters with multiple failure
points makes a single controller model impossible for maintaining the system of global
flights. Instead local air traffic controllers take care of the inbound and outbound flights
from their airport, much like an agent monitoring a node, and only communicate necessary
information to other towers. One example of vital information that requires communication
that leads to adaptation and self-organizationis an emergency landing. If a flight requires
an emergency landing, the towers and aircraft must communicate the needs of the system
to adapt the flight patterns for an unexpected landing [167].
This scenario is not unlike a network under attack. MFIREv3 is meant to allow agents
to adapt to a dramatic change in the environment when a network intrusion takes place.
Agents must communicate the effects of the attack and reorganize to classify and address
the intrusion.
Another form of adaptation within a MAS, besides its role in self-organization, is the
possibility of an agent to adapt its own focus [57]. Agents are meant to perform specific
tasks efficiently and effectively, however unforeseen changes in the environment could
reduce or increase the necessity of an agents primary task [181]. For instance, a set of
X agents in the MFIREv3 model each are capable of identifying one specific type of attack.
If all of the agents capable of detecting a Worm propagation suddenly failed, the remaining
agents would select a subset of agents to take on the feature recognition capabilities of a
Worm propagation to prevent the network from the vulnerability of an undetected Worm
attack.
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For a detailed description of Multiagent Systems and Distributed Multiagent Systems
see [57, 90, 167, 181]. The following section details the concepts of reputation and trust
among agents in a Multiagent System.
2.8

Reputation and Trust
In the general sense, reputation is what is generally said or believed about an agent’s

character or standing [92]. The pursuit of an adaptable multi agent system achieving
Meadows’ notion of self organization [124] leads to the need for a way to effectively govern
the agents’ communication and mobility patterns.
We consider the use of reputation to achieve this purpose. Reputation is defined as
the collective observation, by a society, of a particular agent’s past behavior. A reputation
system provides publicly-available assessments of agents’ trustworthiness based on ratings
from past transactions [155].
Trust, on the other hand, is a subjective internal measure by which a particular agent
makes use of the reputation of and its own record of direct experience with other agents to
govern its interactions [88].
A variety of trust models exist. Huynh et al. [88] review three distinct modeling
approaches:
• Mechanisms deriving trust via certificates, rules, and policies
• Centralized trust mechanisms in which witness observations are collected by a central
authority; also known as centralized reputation mechanisms
• Decentralized systems

In each model, the agent evaluating the trustworthiness of another is called an
evaluator, while the evaluated agent is called the target. The evaluator may query witnesses
with direct experience with the target. The witnesses respond to the evaluator’s queries with
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Figure 2.13: Generic trust model: conceptual relationships [77]

ratings. The collective ratings impact the target’s reputation, which the evaluator uses along
with internal criteria to determine the target’s trustworthiness. Figure 2.13 demonstrates a
generic view of the relationships between the evaluator, target, and witnesses [77].
Trust and reputation are central to effective interactions in open multi-agent systems
(MAS) in which agents, that are owned by a variety of stakeholders, continuously enter and
leave the system. Such a concept of reputation focuses on the difficulty for agents to form
stable trust relationships necessary for confident interactions. This implies an environment
in which individual agents are greedy, able to make their own decisions, and not necessarily
seeking to optimize the good of the system.
Many computational and theoretical models and approaches to reputation have been
developed [53, 88, 147, 155, 189]. In all cases, electronic persona are created, which reflect
the specific forum under evaluation.
MFIREv1 and MFIREv2 relied on a centralized reputation system with the goal of
indicating the level of service one agent expects to get from another. The basis of a
centralized approach is the same as that of online rating systems employed for shopping
[147]. Following an interaction, a witness conceptually rates the target according to the
perceived level of service received. The rating is stored centrally and combined with

69

other ratings to allow the centralized evaluator to determine the resulting reputation. This
reputation can then be used as a criterion by which other agents or online shoppers decide
whether to trust the reputation holder.
The first objective of this research effort uses a different definition of reputation. In the
commonly described system, agents do not make decisions on their own. Agents simply
use the available local observations in order to make a classification, which is sent to a
central agent controller. The controller dictates to individual agents whether they should
move to a new location. In this sense, agents are simply the eyes of a single central
controller and cannot be enticed to perform any individual actions. The elimination of
a central controller allows the agents to choose freely their location based on reputation
and movement criteria. The movement criteria encourages exploration of the network to
areas not under observation by other agents. This feature eliminates the possibility of
“piggy-backing” on another agents search.
One example of a multiagent system using Reputation is SPORAS [189], in which
new agents start with a minimum reputation value, and build up reputation during their
time on the system.
The rules of the MFIREv3 Reputation system are listed in Algorithm 2.
The first two rules discourage users from simply creating new accounts to escape
the consequences of a series of bad interactions. But one can imagine environments in
which migration should be encouraged, such as when the service an agent can provide is
dependent on the agent’s location. In such cases, a migration threshold may be set below
the restart value. In this way, reputation may be used to govern the mobility patterns in the
multi agent system. This is one of the desired behaviors of our system and is thus part of
the movement model.
Other research contained in [88, 147, 155] demonstrate other approaches.

70

Algorithm 2 MAS Classification
1) New users start with a minimum reputation value, building up reputation during their
activity on the system
2) The reputation value of a user never falls below the reputation of a new user
3) After each transaction, the reputation values of the involved users are updated
according to the feedback provided by other parties, which reflect their trustworthiness
in the latest transaction
4)Users with very high reputation experience much smaller rating changes with each
update
5) Ratings must be discounted according to age so that the most recent ratings have more
weight in the evaluation of a user’s reputation

We can consider the concept of Reputational Incentives defined in [34]: the truster
calculates the reputational gain (or damage) that a trustee experiences as a result of good
(or bad) feedback being communicated to the society, and considers this as an additional
incentive. Pertaining to the intrusion detection problem, a trust model is defined by [19],
and also makes use of the NetFlow concept of flows.
2.9

Defensive Measures of Network Agents
Automated defense of a network intrusion can provide another barrier for intrusions

set on disrupting a network. A wide range of automated defense techniques exist of varying
effectiveness, complexity, and also ethicalness [127].
The Department of Defense (DoD) conducted a 90-day exercise consisting of 30 cyber
defense companies on the issues pertaining to automated defense [127]. The conference
focused on the issues pertaining to the prevention of attacks as opposed to the current
response techniques common in network security. A major issue with preventing attacks is

71

the legality and ethics with striking a threat before or after an attack with a cyber attack of
one’s own [158].
The present state of network security consists of what we shall refer to as passive
defense. The defensive measures do not engage an attacker outside of the network itself.
Instead passive defense aims to respond to a known intrusion and stop it, while possibly
gathering information on the attacker location [9].
One common form of passive defense is the Honey Pot. A Honey Pot is a trap set to
detect, deflect, or in some manner counteract attempts at unauthorized use of information
systems. Generally it consists of a computer, data, or a network site that appears to be part
of a network, but is actually isolated and monitored [157]. A Honey Pot seems to contain
information or a resource of value to attackers, but the information is merely a distraction
to monitor the attacker for possible location [127].
Another form of automated attack defense is rate limiting. Rate limiting helps
preventing flooding of from Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. According to many tests,
rate limiting is a formidable reactionary response against flooding DoS attacks [132]. Rate
limiting is simply the application of rules to a network to limit traffic flow. Since the
purpose of a DoS attack is to flood the network with malicious traffic, rate limiting prevents
the attack from spreading outside the compromised node quickly. This makes targeting the
correct node quickly a much easier task, and it also prevents the destruction of network
resources. While the rate limiting rules are applied however, the rate at which normal
traffic passes through the network is hindered as well [83].
Many pieces of literature propose other reactionary defense mechanisms such as
killing of active network connections, filtering, reconfiguration, re-imaging, artificial
immune systems, and source-traceback mechanisms [83].
Killing of active network connections of infected nodes is a quick method of
containing the attack. In most cases this simple measure can immediately stop a Denial of
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Service attack or a Scan [9]. In cases of Worm propagation attacks, the “flood gates” must
close all around every infected node on the network or else the Worm simply propagates
from the areas still connected to the network [9].
Reconfiguring the network often confuses many automated attacks as well as human
attackers. Certain reconfiguration measures can help force an attack into non-critical areas
of the network, away from sensitive data, and into Honey Pots [6]. Re-imaging infected
nodes simply sets the node back to factory defaults and removes the infection [127].
Artificial immune systems are a growing field in network defense. Immune systems
work to by learning about attacks as they occur in order to build up “immunity” in future
cases [158]. The procedure also works to repair attacked and infected system nodes by
re-imaging nodes to get them on-line and stop the spread of malicious traffic [158].
None of these passive reactions to network intrusions, including rate limiting and
source traceback mechanisms, are considered ethically unsound. All of these defenses
are metaphorical pieces of armor, with the exception of source traceback mechanisms,
designed to withstand the bullets of malicious attacks. The source traceback mechanism is
simply a locater to find out where the “bullets” originated. These mechanisms provide no
threat to the outside Internet as all of the defensive procedures are internal to the network.
The idea of defensive measures being internal to one’s own network follows the
ideology of safeguarding owns home or other property. In general, safeguarding one’s
property is encouraged, however leaving the property after it the attack in order to seek
retribution from the attacker might cross certain legal and ethical boundaries [158].
Active defense is a relatively new concept in network security, although it stems from
an idea as old as time [83]. Network administrators of high-value companies wish to do
more than build up the metaphorical armor of network security. Armor wheres down under
a constant barrage of attacks, and even the best armor has vulnerabilities. It only takes
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locating one vulnerability for an attacker to render the rest of the defensive measures useless
[9].
This is the plight of network security administrators. Attackers constantly barraging
their systems with attacks in hopes of finding a vulnerability, but the network being attacked
is not allowed to strike back. Certainly attackers would be less willing to go after a system
if it was known that the network security team, or automated agents, would be allowed to
fight back with malicious code as well.
The broad definition of active defense is any measure originated by the defender
against the attacker. The purpose of any computer network defense is to protect information
systems [158]. These active measures should at least thwart any attack in progress, and
ideally make further attacks more difficult. We can divide them into three broad categories:
counterattack, preemptive attack, and active deception [83].
Active deception directs the attacker to a virtual model of the network or a Honey
Pot [83]. The attacker believes the attack is destroying the targeted system when in fact
the attacker is no longer a direct threat. Active deception is effectively an active Honey
Pot, where the defender actually attempts to push the attacker towards the trap as opposed
to letting the attacker stumble into it. This type of defense does not provide any ethical
dilemma, since all of the action still takes place in the defenders own network [157].
The ethical dilemma is reached with counter-attacks and preemptive attacks to a
network. Much like their names suggest, a counter attack is a direct attack by the defender
on the attacker’s network during or immediately following an attack [83]. A preemptive
attack is one where the defender knows the attacker is preparing for an attack and strikes
the attacker’s system before the attack can take place.
The idea of preemptive attacks presents the greatest amount of skepticism as a morally
acceptable defensive strategy. Attackers are not likely to advertise that they are going to
attack a specific network, with certain exceptions in cases involving Anonymous, LulzSec,
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and similar groups [127]. Having malicious code on ones one computer is not illegal, and
therefore the only crime committed in a case of preemptive attack is by the “defender”
[127]. Even if a group such as Anonymous states that they are going to attack a specific
company, the IP addresses of the attackers is unknown unless the company was already
illegally searching for the group. Preemptive attacks in the name of defense follow the
same logic as attacking a man at his home because he threatens to hurt you the next day.
The main difference however, between attacking a man at his home and attacking
his network resources is that in the former case, laws, police, and the justice system are
capable of handling physical disputes. In many recent cases of network attacks, there does
not appear to be any sort of law enforcement capable of deterring criminals. Confusing
international laws and no real effective “Internet police”, leave companies with viable assets
wondering how to protect themselves [127, 157].
This “cyber wild-west” makes the morality of counteracts against known attackers a
debatable discussion; although the illegality remains concrete . Counter attacks involve
locating the attacker’s network resources and attacking them with a Worm or DDoS the
same way a normal attack would take place. In some cases, the counter attack may try
to install programs that help discover the physical location of the attacker in order to help
prosecution for criminal offenses [127]. Regardless of ethical and legal issues pertaining
to counter attacks, commercial industries with valuable or sensitive data are resorting to
these measures and if the “Internet police” are unable to handle hackers in their mother’s
basement, it is unlikely that they are able to catch the professional security officers as well
[127].
2.10

Summary
This chapter considers, in Section 2.1, the Autonomous System level Internet topology

and traffic modeling requirements in order to conduct the desired objectives. This is
followed in Section 2.2 by a discussion of the prototypical Pattern Recognition system as a
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template for what our system must implement and accomplish. In particular, our research
implements a classification system. Evaluation of classification systems is consequently
discussed in Section 2.2.7. Section 2.3 examines pattern recognition in the context of
identifying malicious network activity, which is known as intrusion detection; particular
consideration is given to flow-based techniques. In Section 2.7, a brief discussion of multi
agent systems and their applicability to intrusion detection is presented. To achieve a degree
of ‘self-organization’ as defined in this list, Section 2.8 considers the notion of reputation.
A far broader way to achieve self-organization via the use of Evolutionary Computation is
presented in Section 2.6.2. Also, the evolving definition of Multi-Objective Optimization
emergence is addressed in Section 2.6. Outside the realm of detection, identification, and
self-organization, section 2.9 presents measures taken by networks and agents to aide in
the protection of the network.
The next two chapters employ these concepts in the presentation of multi agent system
designs for detecting, classifying, and countering network attacks.
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III.

MFIREv3 Design Methodology and Implementation

An updated MFIRE design is required per the goals and objectives of section 1.2
for autonomous classification of network attacks in a model type network. This research
builds upon the MFIRE framework of Hancock [77] and Wilson [185] by adding additional
attack features, introduced in section 3.2.5. MFIREv3 implements an improved attack
classification system with feature selection in section 3.3. Furthermore, in Section 3.5 we
integrate features proposed by Holloway [84] to allow agents to behave in more elaborate
ways and take a roll in the defense of the network. This chapter develops these design
concepts.
Section 3.1 formalizes the problem of Intrusion Detection we solve with this research
effort with Section 3.2 detailing the design of the simulation environment. The methods
for agent classification training are deigned in Section 3.3. The design methodology of
testing the defensive aspects of agents in the network is discussed in Section 3.5. A short
discussion of the visualization environment and a summary conclude the chapter.
3.1

Intrusion Detection System Formalization
Intrusion Detection (ID) system design is an ongoing process. Simulating network

environments and traffic creates controlled scenarios providing insight into detection
capabilities of agents. The multi agent system, with several performance-enhancing details,
is leveraged in this design in order to maximize the performance. The agents are designed
to be mobile and cooperative in terms of sharing feature observations and defense. Over a
series of simulated attacks, MFIREv3 searches for optimal agent locations for both effective
detection and defense of attacks.
The design of a suitable network simulation environment involves the representation
of essential network components and operations. Specifically, nodes must route traffic,
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generated by processes, over links with limited capacity, in a topology reflective of what is
seen in the real Internet (see Section 2.1). Some of the processes represented are normal,
generating traffic according to distributions seen on the real Internet, while other processes
represented are malicious, causing congestion on network links, systematically extracting
information regarding potential vulnerabilities of network nodes, or spreading copies of
themselves to other nodes without authorization.
Enabling the properties described in such a simulated network environment requires a
both representation of traffic as content-bearing packets as well as facilities for delivering
these packets to specific destination processes. Many facilities for instantiating a network
complete with its nodes, links, processes, and properties of each already exist and are
utilized in this research.

To aide in the understanding of high-level traffic patterns,

Intrusion Detection, defensive measures, and agent movement, visualization facilities must
be considered as well.
3.2

Simulation Environment
The package hierarchy provides a framework in which to place the required

representations of MFIREv3.

In addition to the network simulation environment, a

multi agent classification system is designed as a set of processes, with components
including agents and an optional agent controller. To support the agents’ classification
responsibilities, interfaces are designed for classification techniques and feature definitions,
enabling changes in detailed implementations without requiring changes to the system
architecture. Lastly, the defense system is supported by the MAS and classification system
to provide supplemental support for the elimination of network threats.
A detailed History of the MFIRE design, from its origin in SOMAS [84], is located in
Appendix A.
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Figure 3.1: MFIRE v3 Package Diagram.

Figure 3.1 presents a general view of the package hierarchy involved in the simulation.
Highlighted regions are additional implementations to MFIREv3. Also, the agent controller
and manager are not used in this version, however they remain in the framework. The
controlled, one-way dependencies between the visualization layer, the domain layer
(MFIRE), and the application layer (MASON) exhibit a software engineering principle
known as Model-View Separation [106]. This principle states that domain objects should
not have direct knowledge of view (UI) objects. It allows the visualization layer to be
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changed without requiring any changes in the domain or application layer. The domain
layer (MFIRE) consists of the following groups of classes:
• Network - includes representations of physical domain entities of interest. This is the
‘core’ of the simulation.
• Scenarios - concrete realizations of the abstract MFNetwork. The prominent class
is the TopgenNetwork, which includes facilities for loading a network produced
by the Topgen AS-level Internet topology generator. Each class in this package is
characterized by a a unique set of Processes initially running on a subset of the nodes.
• Processes - These are analogous to the networked applications on the real Internet.
Each Process runs on a host node and may receive and/or generate traffic.
• Payloads - Specially crafted payloads execute code when opened by a certain
receiving processes. These payloads can be written for legitimate purposes, such
as Remote Procedure Calls (RPC), but our focus is on payloads that install malicious
processes on the receiving node.
• Multi agent system - This package includes the “worker bees” - the Agents, the
“queen bee” - the AgentController, as well as AgentManagers with special local
oversight of any Agents on the same host node. In this version of the MFIRE
system, the Agent Controller and Managers are bypassed by the agents direct
communication in a fully distributed system, however the Controller and Managers
can be reinstantiated with minor changes to the test.
• Agent Defense- This package allows agents to take an active roll in eliminating
network threats. The current version includes the ability to shut down a compromised
node, limit traffic flow, and gather information of the attack location if available.
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• Classification - Agents make use of entities in this package to make local
classification decisions. Included are the classification algorithms, enclosed in the
‘classifiers’ package, and the observations and features used. Strictly speaking, both
observations and features are statistics-based calculations, but we distinguish the
observations as being more “raw” than the features. By ‘feature’ we imply there
is something composite in its nature - it may be an average of observation values or
the result of some other series of mathematical operations on the observations and/or
other features.
At the top of Figure 3.1 is the MASON discrete event simulation engine package.
MASON provides many facilities for the execution of the simulation as well as the
visualization tools.

The details of the visualization are specified via entities in the

visualization package at the bottom of the diagram.
Figure 3.2 shows the class diagram of MFIREv3. Architectural detail of some of the
prominent classes is provided, however it is not a comprehensive listing. The diagram
provides some of the essential class associations between the agents, provider agents,
attacks with the MFIREv3 network simulation.
3.2.1

Network Design.

From Section 3.2.1 we discuss how network topology is the arrangement of various
nodes within a computer network.

There is both a physical and logical topological

structure, where the physical model illustrates the locations of the nodes and their
interconnections while the logical model illustrates the data-flow between components
within the network.

The physical network components simulated in this research

investigation include [77]:
• Nodes - each node represents an Autonomous System (AS). Internal to an AS is
a collection of routers, switches, firewalls, and edge devices, including servers and
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Figure 3.2: MFIREv3 class diagram.

clients. These devices are all abstracted into one node in our simulation, represented
by the MF Node class in Figure 3.2. Nodes route traffic via routing tables, initialized
via the Floyd-Warshall shortest path algorithm [61]. This is analogous to gateway
routers employing BGP on the real Internet, though with BGP, policy decisions often
trump routing efficiency (competing Internet service providers, for example, may
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refuse to allow ‘through’ traffic without compensation). Each node is addressable
by a unique identification number. Nodes provide resident processes with basic
communications facilities, such as the send() method, which creates and sends
packets. Nodes implement the Steppable interface and therefore supply a step()
method invoked on each timestep of the simulation. This method primarily switches
packets from the inbound queues of all NodeInterfaces to the outbound queues of
NodeInterfaces identified in the routing table, via lookup on the packet’s destination
address.
• NodeInterfaces - These are intermediaries between Nodes and 1) Links; or 2) Node’s
resident Processes. The first case includes all external-facing interfaces, while the
second describes the Node’s internal interface. Each is an entry/exit point. All
NodeInterfaces have an inbound queue and an outbound queue. The inbound queue
is read by the attached Node and written to by the attached link. The outbound queue
is read by the attached link and written to by the attached Node.
• Ports - associated with nodes, ports are the communication end points for processes
running on servers and clients. In the real world, each computer typically has many
thousands of ports associated with each transport-layer protocol. For example, there
are 216 ports available for Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and another 216 for
User Datagram Protocol (UDP), the number being fixed by the width of the port field
in the segment, respectively datagram header [143, 144]. In our simulation, each port
on an AS node corresponds with a port on an arbitrary host internal to the AS.
• Port Directory - Certain “well-known” ports are reserved for special purposes. This is
the case with the real Internet, for which a list is maintained by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) [2] specifies how certain ports are to be used, such as
port 80 for Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic. When these standards are
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adhered to, finding public services is greatly simplified. Also, filtering of certain
expected types of traffic becomes simple. Observe that, in our simulation, some
ports are reserved for components of the multi agent system.
• Links - links in our network simulation are strictly point-to-point and connect
autonomous systems together. Links are full duplex but have finite bandwidth.
Depending on the scale of the simulation, links may vary in length, affecting
propagation delay. One of three scales is specified at the start of each simulation:
– LOCAL - All links have the same unit length. Packets traverse these links in
one step of simulation time.
– REGIONAL - Link lengths vary from one to ten units. This is useful when the
simulated AS topology spans a continent.
– GLOBAL - Link lengths vary from one to 100 units. This is appropriate for
simulation of an AS topology in which some of the nodes are satellites in
geostationary orbits, for which propogation delays can indeed be on the order
of 100 times those of terrestrial links.
Scale is realized with each link being composed of sublinks. Links implement the
Steppable interface. Each timestep, when the Link’s step() method is called by
the Schedule, the Link causes each Sublink to pass its traffic to its adjacent Sublink
(or, ultimately, NodeInterface).
• Processes - these include processes that strictly generate traffic for the benefit of the
simulation as well as classifying agents that generate actual communication traffic
(primarily to share observations). All processes run on nodes and must be assigned a
port before they can send and receive packets. Processes implement the Steppable
interface. When step() is called, the Process first receives and processes traffic, and
then generates outbound traffic.
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• Packets - Each packet consists of the following:
– Source node address - identifies the Node of origin
– Source port - the port used by the sending Process
– Destination node address - identifies the Node hosting the intended recipient
Process
– Destination port - communication endpoint for the intended recipient Process
– Sequence number - Facilitates sending messages spanning multiple packets
– TTL - Time To Live - the number of hops allowed before some intermediate
Node discards the packet. This mitigates problems arising from routing loops
induced by congestion or misconfiguration of the routing tables.
– Payload - a string containing the message the sending Process wishes to pass
to the intended recipient. The format of this message is entirely up to the
communicating processes.
– size - Indicates the size of the payload, in numbers of characters, if a real
payload is used. If a real payload is not required (e.g. to simulate background
traffic or junk traffic sent by denial-of-service processes), the sending Process
can simply specify the desired size of the packet to be sent, leaving the payload
string null and preserving memory.
During initialization, after all network components have been instantiated, all
Processes, Nodes, and Links are scheduled to execute associated tasks on each timestep.
They are prioritized as follows:
• 1. Processes handle received traffic and generate new traffic
• 2. Nodes handle traffic by switching packets from inbound queues to appropriate
outbound queues or ports
85

• 3. Links move traffic along component Sublinks toward the NodeInterfaces on either
end
3.2.2

Multi Agent System Design.

Section 2.7 proposed that the common design question for any Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) is how to maximize the benefits and minimize the penalties associated with
network-based as well as host-based approaches. This section discusses our methodology
in maximizing the benefits of a Multi-Agent IDS while minimizing the penalties using a
distributed system.
Figure 3.3 presents a high-level view of the nominal flow of execution from the
perspective of the MAS. Five states are shown. Figure 3.3 indicates that the transition
from each state is governed by the clock. This implies synchronization among participating
elements. Typical message exchange for each state is shown in Figure 3.4. Figure 3.4 is
similar to the message passing scenario introduced by Hancock [77], however the central
controller is replaced by multiple agent providers shown as Agent P.

The explanation of MFIRE’s high-level states is made simpler by assuming agents
have been collecting observations from their respective host nodes for nearly a full cycle
when it comes time to check in with their Provider. Furthermore, each agent is assumed to
have a reputation stored with their Provider.
• Check-in: Agents notify the provider of their intention to participate in the next round
of observation exchange and classification. The provider notes the source address and
port of each CHECKIN message. Each agent must have a provider, however not each
agent is required to be a provider.
• Transition: The provider makes an observation sharing assignment for each Agent
that checked in. It does this by constructing a roulette wheel from the reputations of
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Figure 3.3: MFIREv3 Activity diagrams for the Agent

other checked-in Agents. This roulette wheel is used to make a sharing assignment
stochastically with preference given to Agents with higher reputations. The provider
notifies the selected Agent with an ASSIGN message.
• Assignments: Selected Agents receive assignments. Some Agents may receive
multiple sharing assignments, while others receive none. For each assignment
received, the Agent stores the address and port for the designated recipient as
contained in the ASSIGN message.
• Transition: End the current observation cycle, calculate features, and start a new
observation cycle. Observations are traffic statistics collected on each timestep. At
the end of each observation cycle, there exists an Observation set for each traffic
statistic measured. Features typically summarize one or more of these Observation
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Figure 3.4: MFIRE Activity Diagram Message Exchange

sets. Agents calculate Feature values and store them for later use. Any Agents with
sharing assignments also send their set of Feature values to all assigned recipients
using SHARE messages.
• Observation Exchange: Agents wait to receive SHARE messages. Each Agent
expects to receive one.
• Transition: Agents use two classifiers to make two classifications for the network
activity observed over the previous cycle. One of these uses only locally calculated

88

feature values, while the other uses the combined set of local and received feature
values. Agents send the results to the provider agent in a RESULTS message.
• Results: The provider agent receives RESULTS messages from all checked-in
Agents.
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Algorithm 3 MAS Classification
denote classification by agent ai at time t using only local feature values as lit
denote classification by agent ai at time t using combined local and shared feature values
(e.g. from peer agent a j ) as cit
denote the majority classification at time t as mt
denote network activity classes as Ak ∈ A for 1 ≤ k ≤ K
denote the vote tally for network activity class Ak at time t as vkt
Require: 0 ≤ θl ≤ 1
procedure MASClassification(θl )
for all received RESULTS messages resultsit do
if resultsit contains a combined classification cit then
add 1 to the vote tally vkt for Ak for k = cit
else
add θl to the vote tally vkt for Ak for k = lit
end if
end for
mt = k : vkt = max vht where 1 ≤ h ≤ K
h

return mt
end procedure

• Transition:
– The Providers tally the votes. In each RESULTS message, the vote is the
classification made using the combined local and shared feature value sets.
When this is not available because the Agent never received a SHARE message,
the Provider uses the classification made using only the local feature value set,
weighted for less influence. The system’s classification is the majority vote.
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See Algorithm 3, in which θl represents the weight of a classification derived
from local feature values only.
– The Providers update each Agent’s reputation as introduced in section 2.8.
For each Agent, each sharing assignment it had garners a rating which can
positively or negatively affect the reputation. Every Agent furthermore has
its reputation decayed regardless of whether it had a sharing assignment, and
regardless of whether it checked in. See Algorithm 11.
– The Provider sends each Agent in its subset a STAY or a MOVE instruction
based on whether the Agent’s reputation is above or below a threshold.
• Wrap-up: Agents wait to receive MOVE or STAY. Upon receiving MOVE, an Agent
selects a neighboring node based on Max Cover, last visited, and proximity to area of
interest (possibly attacked or vulnerable node). It also sends a MIGRATE message
to the node’s it may provide for and updates its location for its provider as well.

Figure 3.5 shows the flow of execution of the Agent and the Provider independently.
From this figure it can be deduced that when an agent is acting as a provider it has merely
two states: it is either waiting for Agents to check in, or it is waiting for the Agents to
send their results, with significant actions taking place on the transitions between states as
described above. Meanwhile, a search Agent has a collection of synchronization-related
states, and three of the nominal states described above. It is either waiting for an ASSIGN
message from the providing agent, or it is waiting for a peer to send a SHARE message, or
it is waiting for a MOVE or STAY message from its provider.
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Figure 3.5: MFIREv3 detailed activity diagrams for the agent provider and the agent
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Table 3.1: Comparison of MFIRE Iterations

AS Network Scale

AS Network Size
AS Network Topology

Node Behavior

MFIRE

MFIREv2

MFIREv3

‘local’ only

‘local’,

‘local’,

‘regional’,

‘regional’,

‘global’

‘global’

10 nodes

100 nodes

100 nodes

manually designed

produced by Internet

produced by Internet

topology modeler

topology modeler

restricted processing

unrestricted process-

unrestricted process-

capacity / shut down

ing

ing

under heavy load
Packet Payloads

simulated

quantity

only

Attacks

payloads
for

DoS

used

interprocess

payloads
for

used

interprocess

communication

communication

DDoS, Worm, Scan

DDoS, Worm, Scan.
MitM, Trojan

MAS communications

out-of-band, instan-

in-band

with

Fully

Distributed,

taneous

network-based

in-band

delays

network-based

with

delays
Feature Selection

wrapper

method/

none

MOEA

Identify Source and

Identify Type of At-

Identify Attack and

Target of DoS At-

tack

Provide Active De-

Bhattacharya
MAS Objective

tack
SVM Kernel

fense

Gaussian

Gaussian
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Linear and Gaussian

Table 3.1 summarizes the key differences between this research, the system that is
quantitatively tested by David Hancock [77], and the system implemented by Timothy
Wilson [185].

In general, MFIREv3 features similar networking as in previous

experimentation, with improved feature selection, improved classification, full distribution
of agent communication, increased attacks, multiple attack classification, and defense
features.
3.2.3

Simulated Network Traffic.

For this effort we utilize our own representative data, known as Synthetic Data, as
opposed to real world data. Synthetic Data is production data that is not obtained directly
from an existing network [59].
Multitudes of reasons exist for choosing Synthetic Data over real network data.
Primarily, synthetic data is generated to meet specific needs or certain conditions that may
not be found in the original, real data. The DARPA Dataset for Intrusion Detection is
commonly criticized by experts as being an “outdated dataset, unable to accommodate the
latests trends in attacks” [170]. It is based on real-world network intrusions, however the
attacks no longer reflect the same statistics desired in training a Multi-Agent System.
Newer datasets do not contain adequate attack scenarios either. Instead, the data
reflects more normal conditions as opposed to the attacks necessary for training agents
[73]. University of California Irvine’s data repository presents many datasets that are out
of date or do not reflect the types of attacks necessary for our research.
Finally, many datasets are proprietary, classified, or incomplete.

The anti-virus

software companies and government agencies keep very important records of intrusion
data, however releasing the data for public interpretation could lead to a rapid advancement
in attacks [10]. Quite simply, the most accurate information on current network attacks is
not available for public use.
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Since none of the current repositories present the adequate datasets necessary for
our research we must instead create synthetic data as is done in many research efforts
concerning fraud detection, data mining, confidentiality systems and as is our case,
intrusion detection [170]. The algorithms and overall effectiveness of the system therefore
represents its ability to interpret the synthetic data. One cannot ascertain that the same
accuracies exist when placed on a real-world network, however the synthetic data is meant
to model existing traffic.
The purpose of using synthetic data is to test the algorithm’s effectiveness in a
controlled environment, but the environment itself needs to be as close of a model to real
attacks and network flow as possible for the test to have any meaning. Fabricating network
traffic involves creating background traffic for a normal “base” system, and manipulating
the base traffic for each attack according to what effect the attack would have on network
traffic [107].
As stated above, the normal (base) mode consists of only background traffic. For this
the Pareto model [100] described in Section 2.1 is used with parameters α = 2.0, and
C ranges from 0.01 to 0.1, randomly selected prior to each simulation. All other attacks
models also use this background traffic with additional traffic reflected in their attacks.
The fabricated synthetic data, following the Pareto model, adequately reflects real
world network traffic to the necessary degree for testing our simulation and showing proof
of effectiveness [100].
3.2.4

Observations and Features.

Each observation in MFIREv3 represents a traffic statistic collected over the duration
of a single time period. These are used to derive feature values, which are the average and
standard deviation of the observations within one observation period. We take inspiration
for flow metrics from both Cisco NetFlow [187] and Moore [133], with emphasis on
implementing metrics applicable to microflows (see Section 2.4). The fourteen metrics
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defined here represent a cross-section of possible flow-based statistics, but future work
should examine additional metrics, including implementing a macroflow approach (see
Section 2.4 and [133]).
The fourteen observations collected by agents in MFIREv3:
1. Average number of bytes per < destaddr, destport >-tuple
2. Average number of bytes per < sourceaddr, sourceport >-tuple
3. Number of distinct destination addresses
4. Number of distinct < destaddr, destport >-tuples
5. Number of distinct destination ports
6. Ratio of destination ports to destination addresses
7. Total number of inbound bytes
8. Total number of inbound packets
9. Ratio of packets to < destaddr, destport >-tuples
10. Ratio of packets to < sourceaddr, sourceport >-tuples
11. Number of distinct source addresses
12. Number of distinct < sourceaddr, sourceport >-tuples
13. Number of distinct source ports
14. Ratio of source ports to source addresses
Clearly there are many linear dependencies in this set of observations. Care must
be exercised when performing feature selection from this set. When decomposed into the
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84 combined features, the Bhattacharya Coefficient cannot effectively eliminate the linear
dependencies. This is illustrated in Figure 3.6, which separates the features by thousands
of bins and still fails to eliminate the dependencies. It is for this reason a Support Vector
Machine is required for classification in order to take features to a higher order. Details on
general feature selection are provided in 2.2.2, and the feature selection process utilized in
the effort is examined in 3.3.3.

Figure 3.6: Illustration of Linear Dependecies in Features

Additionally, linear separability of all 5 attacks and the normal state given a set of
three features selected by the MOEA for performance proved futile. Figure 3.7 illustrates
the overlap that would certainly lead to high misclassification rates for the agents given
the same features. Two solutions for this are examined in this research: using a higher
order, non-linear (Radial Basis Function (RBF)) classifier which was utilized in MFIREv2,
and testing multiple feature sets to linearly discriminate between two or more states of the
network. The latter approach would provide the ability to give agents different feature sets
in an attempt to improve the speed of classification by using a linear classifier.
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Figure 3.7: Illustration of Non-Linear Separability: Magenta-DDoS Worm- Red ScanGreen MitM-Yellow Trojan-Blue Normal-Black(Covered); Feature 1: Number of distinct
destination addresses Feature 2: Total number of inbound bytes Feature 3: Std. Dev-Ratio
of packets to (dest addr, dest port)

Figure 3.7 highlights the overlap of attack features using the same set of three features.
Each color represents one of the five attacks. There is no linear separability between attacks
using these features, however it is possible that using specific feature sets for each attacks
could improve separation.
3.2.5

Attack Models.

This research consists of modeling five attacks: DDoS, worm propagation, vulnerability scan, Man-in-the-Middle attack, and Trojan, and one normal (non-attack) mode. These
attacks are described in Section 2.5 and represent a broad section of network intrusions.
In all cases, background traffic is flowing on the network, and is the predominant source
of packets. The attacks implemented in the current research are designed primarily to test
to the effectiveness of the MAS reputation system. They are in no way a comprehensive
suite of possible malware, but they represent a number of common attacks that both spread
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across networks or remain static within the network. Additional attack models should be
explored in future research.
The normal (non-attack) mode consists of only background traffic. For this the Pareto
model described in Section 2.1 is used with parameters α = 2.0, and C ranges from 0.01
to 0.1, randomly selected prior to each simulation. All other attacks models also use this
background traffic.
The DDoS attack consists of N processes which flood a single target T with packets
to port p at rate r packets per timestep. N, T , p and r are selected randomly prior to
each simulation. The node locations of the DDoS processes are random, selected from any
nodes in the network. Algorithm 4 illustrates the DoS process which uses a flood of small
packets. Using the smaller packets increases the likelihood that the packet is forwarded.
Figure 3.8 shows the effect of the attack within the MASON simulation environment.
Algorithm 4 DoS Attack Algorithm
Select target
Instantiate Source nodes with DoSProcess
for (All Source Nodes) do
Determine packet size 1/1000 of link capacity
while Time not complete do
Send 1000 packets to Port P of target.
end while
end for

Worm attacks are implemented by a set of vulnerable processes running on a subset of
nodes in the network. A worm process is equipped with a single exploit that targets a single
vulnerability. If the exploit matches the vulnerability on the target node, the worm is able
to instantiate a copy of itself on the target. Worms do not scan for vulnerabilities before
attempting the attacks; they simply make an attempt. However, the worm process never
sends an attack to a non-existent node. This is only possible if the worm has previously
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Figure 3.8: Illustration of MFIREv3 DDoS

performed a scan, or otherwise been given knowledge of the current network. The current
implementation assumes this knowledge is available to the worm a priori. Figure 3.9 shows
the effect of the worm process in the MASON environment. Algorithm 5 illustrates the
implementation of the replication worm in MFIREv3.
In a typical worm attack scenario, the attack surface is initialized by setting up several
active vulnerabilities in the environment. Next, InsecureProcesses are set up at every Node.
Each InsecureProcess is initialized with a random subset of the active vulnerabilities. The
InsecureProcesses are set to listen on a small number of ports. This is often the case in
reality, where vulnerabilities are typically associated with specific applications, and these
applications often run on a single well-known port.
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Figure 3.9: Illustration of MFIREv3 Worm

Algorithm 5 Worm Attack Implementation
Select target node addresses
Instantiate possible vulnerabilities
List target ports
Select rate of attack (how many attack packets to send each time step)
Set up InsecureProcesses on subset of Nodes (vulnerabilities and ports)
Time parameter before worm spreads
for Worm Active (When time parameter elapses to end time) do
Send attack packets determined by rate to selected address and port
if MaliciousCode execute() is called then
Malicious payload delivered
Run WormInstaller on new HostNode
end if
end for
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When the worm becomes active, on each timestep it sends as many attack packets
as its rate allows. Each packet is sent to a randomly selected address and port within
the initialization parameters. The packet is crafted to simulate exploitation of a randomly
selected vulnerability from its arsenal.
The effect of the worm propagation is achieved when the malicious code section
runs the program WormInstaller. It is a subclass of the abstract Payload class, which
specifies one method that must be implemented: execute(). This method is called by the
InsecureProcess if it is successfully exploited. The user can define new Payloads to run
various worm attacks. For the WormProcess, the Payload is a WormInstaller. It has the
sole purpose of installing a WormProcess on the host Node.
When an InsecureProcess receives an attack packet, it determines whether the active
vulnerability is one to which it is exposed. If so, the exploit is successful with a certain
probability. The probability is pulled from a map indexed by vulnerability number. This
value is 20% to simulate the uncertainty in a real-world attack surface caused by patching.
A vulnerability scan is modeled after simple TCP-connect port sweep. Note that the
current MFIRE environment does not implement the TCP protocol explicitly, however, all
processes within the environment are configured to mimic the effects of TCP and provide
replies to incoming packets as needed. In particular the connect message may be replied
with a response equivalent to an ACK, ICMP port unreachable, or ignored. The scan
process runs on a single random node, which sends connection requests to a random subset
of N target nodes on the network at rate r packets per timestep. The scan sends a packet to
all ports in the complete range of common port numbers. N and r are randomly selected
prior to each simulation. Algorithm 6 shows the Scan process while Figure 3.10 shows an
example block scan.
The Man-in-the-Middle attack places a new node inside the network and connects to
two randomly selected, neighboring nodes. The attack takes the exact same data transfered
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Algorithm 6 Scan Algorithm
Initialize range of addresses and ports
Set rate parameter (how many packets sent each timestep)
Instantiate Source nodes with DoSProcess
for (All < destination; port > tuples) do
Send CONNECT payload
if UNREACHABLE is received then
< destination; port > tuple is CLOSED
Else < destination; port > is OPEN
end if
end for

Figure 3.10: Illustration of MFIREv3 Scan Report

from Node A and transfers it to Node B and vice versa. The extra node also holds delays
data transfer speeds by holding onto the communication for a short period of time before
transmitting it to the receiving node. The packets are thus delayed extra timesteps and might
expire before reaching their target. Also, the packets all contain lower time-to-death values
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than if they did not hop through the malicious node. The implementation and illustration
are in Algorithm 7 and Figure 3.11, respectively.
Algorithm 7 MitM Implementation
Select target node A
Select target neighbor B
List target ports
Time parameter before transmitting packet
for All packets from Node A do
Read < destination; port > tuple
Hold for Time Parameter
Pass to Node B
end for
for All packets from Node B do
Read < destination; port > tuple
Hold for Time Parameter
Pass to Node A
end for

Figure 3.11: Illustration of MFIREv3 Man-in-the-Middle Attack
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The Trojan attack, attacks a randomly selected node and makes frequent calls to the
network hub to send traffic outbound from the simulated network. This simulates the theft
of information to an outside attacker. Besides communicating with the outside attacker, the
attack slows down all traffic through the node in order to steal data. The attack also opens
many ports on the node, using the InsecureProcess developed for the Worm Propagation
Algorithm 5, to open as many access ports to the node as possible. This insures the attacker
can re-access the node if not all ports are properly secured when the attack is discovered.
The Trojan attack is illustrated below in Algorithm 8
Algorithm 8 Trojan Implementation
Select target node
Run InsecureProcess
Set rate for updates
Set time delay for packet theft
Time parameter before worm spreads
for Trojan Active (When time parameter elapses to end time) do
Send updates to outbound node
if Access port closed then
Run InsecureProcess
Find available open port
end if
end for

As stated previously, the attacks implemented in the current research are designed
primarily to test to the effectiveness of the MAS reputation system. Additional attack
models should be explored in future research as well as variations of the above attacks. The
number of variations of attacks is infinite, however flows, trends, and statistical variations
provide good statistical generalization for many of these variations.
3.3

Training the Agents
With the simulation environment completed, a priori agent training is required in

preparation for executing experiments. Training the agents is vital in providing the tools
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to the agents in order for the to classify attacks as described in Section 2.2. Agent training
consists of generating the training data, followed by training the classifier on that data. In
general, we refer to generating training data as running in offline mode, and testing the MAS
as running in online mode. Many of MFIREv3’s functionality performs the same in both
modes, and Figure 3.12 shows the relationship between the two. In offline mode, agents do
not make classifications or move; they are merely located in the network to observe and log
flow-based traffic statistics. A classification model and scale file are the outputs generated
from this data. In online mode, agents are making active classifications and moving in the
network. The agents’ classifiers use the classification model and scale file as inputs.

Figure 3.12: MFIREv3 offline training and online testing execution paths

The entire training and testing process is described in three high-level steps:
• 1. generate training data (MFIRE offline mode)
• 2. train the classifier (external process)
• 3. test the MAS (MFIRE online mode)
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The first two steps are conducted once. After the classifier is trained, the same
one is used in all agents, for all experimental models: reputation, free-movement,
and deterministic. The final step is performed multiple times, as needed for the final
experiments. Using the same classifier allows us to compare the effectiveness of all
three models for accuracy, speed, and functionality. Additionally, agents must have the
same classifier, even if heterogeneous features are used, to establish a standardized test to
compare agent performance. Note that steps one and three take place within the MFIREv3
framework directly, and once set up do not require user interaction. Step two requires
additional user interaction, and is conducted with external software packages.
3.3.1

Generating training data.

The purpose of generating training data is to establish a baseline of information that the
agents can use for classification of attacks in MFIREv3. The background of this process is
discussed in Sections 2.2.7 and 2.2.9. The primary software class for creating training data
is contained is DataGenerator. This executes simulations in offline mode—that is, agents
are located in fixed, random positions and do not move or generate attack classifications.
In all other respects, the simulation environment behaves exactly the same way as online
mode. To create training files, two agents are located in the network, and record all local
flow-based statistics observed at their node. These files represent raw local data only.
After all of the required simulations are performed, several functions are applied to
the local feature data. First, the two local feature files are combined to create a single
combined feature file. Recall that local features and combined features are used separately,
and an individual classifier is created for both. Local features from two different agents
are converted into three combined features: average, multiple, and difference of the two.
From this point on in the process, the local data and combined data remain distinct entities
and are treated in parallel, although they are handled in the same way. Second, the feature
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elements are scaled to between 0 and 1, and a scale file is created, to be used later in testing.
Third, the data is split into separate training and validation sets.
An additional operation to scrub the data is added to this process as well. Scrubbing
outliers has been shown to reduce training time and improve classification generalization
by reducing overfitting [172]. This is part of the current research not formerly part of the
MFIREv2 system.
3.3.2

Training the Classifier.

The chosen classifier for this research is a Support Vector Machine (SVM) (see
[79, 100]). Classifiers are discussed throughout Section 2.2 with SVMs detailed in Section
2.2.9. SVM is selected due to its “high generalization performance without the need to add
a priori knowledge,” even in the face of many features [37]. Other classifiers present many
potential alternatives (see Section 2.2), and should be examined further in future research.
Note that the MFIREv3 environment is written to work with any classifier.
Although ANNs provide excellent qualities, the SVM outperforms a Neural Network
in many instances [177]. Feature selection provides “optimal” features allowing better
classification with an SVM. Lastly, the data flows remain relatively consistent between
attacks. There is not new information presented after training that the classifier needs to
learn.
To realize an SVM implementation, the LibSVM package [36] is selected due to its
Java integration and its useful grid search method for finding optimal training parameters.
Further details of the LibSVM package and alternative packages can be found in section
2.2.9. LibSVM provides the needed multi-class classification technique, implemented
internally as the standard one-vs-one model. We make use of the LibSVM library function
svm predict, standalone executables svmtrain and svmscale, and python script grid.py.
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3.3.3

Feature Selection.

Feature selection is another important aspect to training a classifier. If a smaller
subset of quality features can be provided to the classifier, it is faster to train, and may
improve classification generalization by reducing overfitting. One possible approach is to
use Bhattacharya coefficient analysis [77]. Another simpler, albeit more computationally
intensive, approach is the “leave-one-out” method. In this, the classifier is tested multiple
times, each with leaving one feature out. In this way, the experimenter can see which
features are useful and which are not. This method is crude in that it treats features as
singular entities and does not consider the combinatorial effects they may have. A third
method is to do a search (see Section 2.6.2) for useful features. The search algorithm is the
primary method for feature selection used in this research effort, however on a number of
occasions the Bhattacharya coefficient is utilized for feature selection between two classes
and two features for quick comparison.
The initial simple algorithm for feature selection is shown below in Algorithm 9.
Algorithm 9 Embedded Genetic Algorithm
Initialize :Randomly generate an initial population of feature subsets encoded in binary
strings of all features.
while (not converged or computational budget is not exausted) do
1. Evaluate fitness of all feature subsets in the population based on J(s).
2. Select the elite chromosome si to undergo filter method based on local search.
3. Replace si with an improved new chromosome s0i using Lamarckian learning.
4. Perform evolutionary operators: restrictive selection, mutation, and crossover.
end while

For a given candidate solution S encoded in a chromosome, X and Y define the sets
of selected and excluded features encoded in that particular chromosome S. Each iteration
generates a population of 30 candidates over 80 iterations. The ADD operation selects
a highly correlated feature from Y and adds it to S and the DEL operator finds the least
correlated feature in X and deletes it from S. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.13.
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Figure 3.13: Add and Del Mutations

Algorithm 9 illustrates a single objective memetic algorithm for feature selection.
It is a hybridization of a filter method based local search and a Genetic Algorithm
(GA) Wrapper method. At the start of the search, the initial population is randomly
initialized with each chromosome encoding a candidate feature subset. Each chromosome
is composed of a bit string equal to the length of the total number of available features. In
the case of the MFIREv3 design, this would be 84 features for the combined set and 24
local features for each agent. The encoding of the chromosome is simply a bit string where
a ’1’ represents the feature is included in the subset and a ’0’ represents exclusion from the
subset. The fitness of the chromosome subset is then determined using generalization error.
In order to keep chromosomes with smaller numbers of features, if two chromosomes have
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miss rates within a certain epsilon difference, the chromosome with fewer features is given
a higher chance of surviving. The Lamarckian learning [71] forces the genotype to reflect
the result of improvement through placing the locally improved individual back into the
population to compete for reproductive opportunities.
The main shortfall of Algorithm 9 is that it does not distinguish Partial-Class
Relevance (PCR) from Full-Class Relevance (FCR). PCR features are those that are only
capable of differentiating between a subset of classes (attacks), while FCR features help
provide distinction between all classes. For the initial part of this research we want all
agents to utilize the same features, therefore FCR features provide a greater advantage.
When testing agents with different feature sets in order to detect specific attack types
with specific agents, PCR and FCR features are less vital and Algorithm 9 provides faster
selection than Algorithm 10. Future research could introduce adaptive agents that adapt
the features utilized based on the flows present in the network. For that effort, Algorithm
10 could provide the initial features for each agent. and based on a positive attack reading
choose a specific feature subset from Algorithm 9 to better classify the attack.
Each iteration generates a population of 30 candidates over 80 iterations.

As

previously stated, the Single-Objective Memetic Algorithm did not distinguish between
PCR and FCR features in multiclass problems. The true FCR and PCR features are
computationally intensive to find, so in most cases they are approximated using a OneVersus-All (OVA) scheme.
The search for optimal PCR feature subsets of k OVA sets can naturally be casted as
a multi-objective optimization problem with each objective corresponding to the feature
selection accuracy of each OVA set. The MOP considered is thus defined as:

min F(s) = ( f j(s), ..., f k(s)) sub ject to s ∈ S
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(3.1)

Algorithm 10 Embedded Multiobjective Memetic Algorithm
1. t = 0
2. Initialize :Randomly generate an initial population P(t) of feature subsets encoded
with binary strings.
3. Evaluate fitness F(s) of each solution in P(t).
4. Rank P(t) using Pareto dominance and calculate crowding distance.
while (Termination Criterion not Fulfilled) do
5. Select a temporary population P0 (t) from P(t) based on Pareto
ranking and crowding distance.
6. Perform crossover and mutation on P0 (t).
7. Evaluate fitness F(s) of each solution in P0 (t).
S
8. Rank P0 (t) P(t) using Pareto dominance.
9. Apply filter method based on local search on the non-dominated solutions of 8,
and generate an improved population P00 (t)
S
S
10. Rank P(t) P0 (t) P00 (t) using Pareto dominance
calculate the crowding distance.
11. Select solutions from 10 to create a new population P(t + 1) based on
Pareto dominance and crowding distance.
12. t = t + 1
end while

f i(s) = −Acc(s, ci, c0 i), (i ∈ ( j, ..., k))

(3.2)

where F(s) is the objective vector, s is the candidate selected feature subset, k is the
number of classes, and S is the feasible domain of s.
Once again in Algorithm 10, the start of the search begins with a randomly generated
list of initial population solutions with each chromosome encoding a candidate feature
subset. Each chromosome is composed of the same type of bit string for inclusion and
exclusion of a feature within a candidate feature subset. In each generation the offspring
population P(t) is generated from mutating the parent population P(t). Then a nondominated sorting categorizes the solutions of the mating pool into levels of Pareto Fronts
and the non-dominated solutions are filtered using the ADD and DEL operations shown in
Figure 3.13. Elitism and Diversity is maintained based on Pareto Dominance and Crowding
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Distance. The evolutionary operators applied in this algorithm are binary tournament
selection, uniform crossover, and mutation operators.
Following the implementation of the One-Versus-All scheme, a Partial-Class Relevant
subset is created for each class. There is also an optimal Full-Class Relevant subset that
is created, and assuming that the maximum number of features is not reached by the FCR
subset there must be a method for combining additional features from the PCR subsets. In
the current state of the algorithm only the FCR subset of features is used, thus eliminating
as many features as possible. The next step would be to employ a method of adding features
based on the number of PCRs they are in and breaking ties in a round robin fashion. The
most common method besides keeping all features is to employ an ensemble scheme where
each of the k + 1 feature subsets is employed for classifying all classes and the predictions
of all trained classifiers are then aggregated based on voting.
All three feature selection processes; Bhattacharya, Algorithm 9, and Algorithm 10
are implemented in [51].
3.3.4

Kernel Method Selection.

This section focuses on the potential for applying varying Kernel Methods into MultiAgent Systems as discussed in section 2.2. Using different Kernel functions as opposed to
the commonly employed “affinity functions” for MASs allows the classifier to operate in
feature space as was done in previous iterations of MFIRE [77, 185].
Kernel methods have been extensively studied in pattern recognition and machine
learning over the last decade, and they have been successfully utilized in a variety of
applications [38, 170]. A main advantage of kernel methods is that nonlinear problems
such as classification and regression can be solved using classical linear approaches. This
is essential for MFIREv3, as the five attacks and normal dataflow from our data sets are not
linearly separable as illustrated in Figure 3.14.
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Figure 3.14: Illustration of Non-Linear Separability: Magenta-DDoS Worm- Red ScanGreen MitM-Yellow Trojan-Blue Normal-Black(Covered); Feature 1: Number of distinct
destination addresses Feature 2: Total number of inbound bytes Feature 3: Std. Dev-Ratio
of packets to (dest addr, dest port)

Kernel machines have been shown to outperform many other techniques in regression
and classification problem, however its performance is highly dependent upon the kernel
function and hyper-parameters used [38, 170]. Unfortunately, there is no analytic method
to help the user discover the optimal kernel function or hyper-parameters. This means
that the common approach is a simple “trial-and-error” methodology that severely limits
the range of kernel functions that can be considered. Arjan Gijberts [67] presents an
automated approach for finding good kernel functions and hyperplanes using Evolutionary
computation, however this effort also uses the “trial-and-error” approach.
Previous versions of MFIRE utilized a Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel for
classification also known as a Gaussian kernel [185]. Using a Gaussian Kernel allowed
for excellent classification accuracy. Gaussian kernels are among the most widely used and
researched kernels in the field, however they are much less computationally efficient than
114

linear or uniform kernels [153]. A selection of common Kernels employed by SVMs are
illustrated in 3.15.

Figure 3.15: Kernels in Common Coordinate System [77]

A Gaussian kernel is of far greater complexity than a linear kernel, with a complexity
of O(nd) as opposed to O(n + d). To begin the process of improving classification rates
without decreasing accuracy drastically, we aim to find a linear kernel classifier. By using
a linear classifier, parallel SVM, and fully distributed agents, the rate at which the training
and classification processes complete should greatly improve from the previous version.
This effort compares the accuracy and time of classifying attacks using both a
Gaussian and linear kernel. The linear kernel certainly provides faster classification. This
effort compares the loss in classification accuracy as compared to the Gaussian kernel.
3.3.5

Testing the MAS.

During online testing, agents are instantiated in the environment, observe and share
feature information, and provide attack classifications. The class OnlineTest is the primary
method for performing online testing of the MAS performance.
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3.4

Movement models
The next primary element of MFIRE is the functionality which controls agent

movement. Recall that the goal of this research is to develop a Multi Agent System (MAS)
for the defense of flow based system attacks and anomaly detection and identification. The
following high-level objectives support this goal:
• Continue design and evaluate a multi-agent intrusion detection system using a
Reputation system
• Evaluate the MFIREv2 multi-agent intrusion detection system using stochastic
search
• Design and evaluate a multi-agent intrusion detection system using deterministic
search with search incentives and Maximum Cover
In this iteration of the research development, the agents use the same classifier for
both of the stated objectives. We are interested in comparing the performance of the
MAS using two different models for the way agents move in the network. The following
sections describe the reputation model and the free-movement model. These two models
are compared to a baseline model of non-moving agents (fixed model). The fixed model is
trivial, and is not described here in detail.
3.4.1

Agents using a reputation model.

The collective activity of the population of agents is tied together at the multi agent
system (MAS) level through a series of providers, which process the classification decisions
(‘votes’) of individual agents and reports the majority result amongst the rest of the
providers. The reputation framework is discussed in section 2.8 as well as alternative
methods to the reputation calculation used in MFIREv3. Previous versions of MFIRE chose
to allow a single AgentController determine movements and overall network classifications
[77, 185].
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In MFIREv3, prior to classification agents may receive sharing assignments from
their provider, and share feature values accordingly. Each agent is then able to make a
classification based on local as well as shared feature values. This is a simple evolution
from the Reputation system utilized in the previous versions of MFIRE [77, 185] by
distributing the intelligence of one AgentController amongst multiple agents. The rational
for moving to a distributed system is discussed in the distributed agent section 2.7.
Algorithm 11 Reputation Calculation
denote classification by agent a j at time t using only local feature values as l jt
denote classification by agent a j at time t using combined local and shared feature values
(e.g. from peer agent ai ) as c jt
denote the majority classification at time t as mt
Require: 0 < decay ≤ 1
procedure CalculateReputations(decay)
for all agents ai do
for all recipients a j of information provided by ai do
if c jt = mt then
if l jt = mt then
ratingi j ← neutral
else
ratingi j ← positive
end if
else
if l jt = mt then
ratingi j ← bignegative
else
ratingi j ← smallnegative
end if
end if
reputationi ← reputationi + ratingi j
end for
reputationi ← reputationi × decay
end for
end procedure
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The provider of an agent stores the agent reputation. Each round, it calculates a rating
for each sharing assignment an agent was given. The rating depends on a heuristic measure
of how much the shared feature values helped or hurt the recipient’s ability to classify in
step with the majority. After all ratings are processed, the provider may then decay each
agent’s reputation by 10%. The idea is to motivate agents to explore other nodes when they
are not perceived as making any positive contributions to the community.
Algorithm 11 details the idea. The values for variables neutral, positive, bignegative,
and smallnegative are reflected in Table 3.2.
MFIREv3 employs a distributed reputation system per the broad categorization of
[88]. This is different from the previous generations of MFIRE which utilized a central
controller. This approach puts the reputation of each agent under the control of a specific
provider (another agent) as opposed to a central reputation manager. As discussed in
section 2.7, distributed intelligence provides many benefits in the management of complex
problems.

Distributing the intelligence promotes a more thorough decomposition of

the complex problem. Fully distributed systems create complex management of agent
interactions, but is not prone to single point-of-failure issues. Both systems offer unique
benefits, and it is possible that the centralized approach is a better more sustainable
architecture, however utilizing a distributed approach allows for thorough quantitative
comparisons between the two architectures.
Agents start with a base reputation value of 0.5 ± 0.05, which is approximately twice
the migration threshold value of 0.25 used in experimentation. The Provider uses Table 3.2
to modify reputations according to how well agents’ observations helped receivers vote in
step with the majority. When an agent moves to a new node, its reputation is reset to the
base value. The small ±0.05 random offset imparts some non-deterministic movement into
the agents, and is needed to combat an observed behavior which causes agents to move
in lockstep with each other. This occurs if agents all make the same classifications period
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Table 3.2: How the Provider Rates Shared Feature Values
Receiver’s classification result, based on feature sets used
Local Only

Local + Shared

Rating

Same as majority

Same as majority

+0

Same as majority

Differed from majority

-0.1

Differed from majority

Same as majority

+0.1

Differed from majority

Differed from majority

-0.05

after period, which happens when they are using a very accurate classifier that is not very
sensitive to location in the network. Moving all at once is undesirable because no attack
classification is given if all agents are in motion. Recall that agents can either be classifying
an attack or moving, not both. In addition to this random offset, we also only allow at most
50% of the agents to move at one time. This ensures that in every period there are enough
stationary agents to make a classification.
When agents vote in step with the majority, and would have done so even without
the use of the shared observations, there is no reason to rate their providers positively or
negatively. On the other hand, if the agent is prepared to vote in step with the majority,
but ends up not doing so due to the influence of the shared observations, the judgment
of the crowd is viewed as superior to the opinion of a single peer and thus the provider
rates negatively. Real benefit is perceived when they would have voted out of step with
the majority but for the “corrective help” of the shared observations, and in such cases
providers rate positively. If the agent votes out of step with the majority and would have
done so even without the shared observations, the provider rates negatively. But, not so
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much as if the shared observations had dissuaded the agent from otherwise voting in step
with the majority.
3.4.2

Agents using a Stochastic Model.

Figure 3.16: Classification Rule

In the reputation model, agents rely on a provider to provide move or stay commands.
The Provider for an agent, which is another assigned agent, keeps track of reputation
of each agent, which is used for both sharing assignments and movement. The agents
themselves do not make any local decisions. In contrast, this model decouples agent
movement from the reputation system, and allows agents to move freely on their own.
The Providers still keep track of the reputation of each agent for feature sharing. Each
agent controls its own movement locally, via an actuator which provides a binary activate
or non-activate (boolean) decision. SOMAS [84] uses this approach and MFIREv2 [185]
implemented the free-movement model to test functionality, but did not provide thorough
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testing of classification accuracies or efficiency. SOMAS [84] implements the actuator
shown in Figure 3.16, which takes weights from a center point to determine a binary
activation area. These weights are found using a genetic algorithm.

Figure 3.17: Movement Actuator 3-feature Color Determines Probability

This research implements a model designed by Wilson [185], and incorporates a
stochastic element to the activation decision. It is important to keep agent movement in
the network somewhat randomized, so that they do not cluster at the same node and never
explore other areas. In addition, we like for a potential actuator to be easily manipulated
with a stochastic search routine, such as genetic algorithms. The solution we propose is
a probabilistic segmented actuator, shown in Figure 3.17. This actuator takes inputs from
N features, and outputs a activation probability. Probability maps are stored directly in
the actuator, and it functions as a quick lookup table, based on the location in feature
space. To develop and train such an actuator, one must define three things: dimensionality
(number of features), number of segments, and choose which specific features are selected.
The movement actuator may use the same local and combined feature sets available to the
agents’ attack classifier. For the research, we examine a 3-feature classifier, with 16 total
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segments. Features are selected from the optimal subset from the feature selection MOEA
described in section 3.3.3.
3.4.3

Deterministic Search with Maximum Cover.

The goal for agents moving autonomously within a network is to move to unique
locations that allow for the best classification of the type of attack to take place. If there
is one attack and only one agent, the optimum location is simply to be located on the node
being attacked in order to have the most accurate data as to the type of attack.
Real world network intrusion detection is not limited to one attack on one node. If
one attack is occurring and all of the agents are located near that attack in order to best
classify that attack, the rest of the network is open for attacks that go unnoticed. Leaving a
majority of the network vulnerable for a second or third attack in order to use all of the agent
resources to classify an initial set of attacks is not an acceptable solution to the classification
problem. Instead the agents must find optimum locations for classifying attacks while still
covering as many nodes on the network as possible.
This problem is the combination of two known Non-Polynomial (NP) Complete
problems [8]. The first of the problems is a Constraint Satisfaction Problem [8], where
given n agents and m attacks, what locations for the agents meet the constraints that every
attack must have an agent within X nodes of the attack, and no two agents can be within Y
distance of one another. The second NP Complete problem is a Maximum Cover problem
[32], where given n agents that each cover Y nodes, what locations within the graph allow
for the Maximum number of nodes to be covered while still meeting the constraints of the
first problem.
The final and most important constraint is the movement incentive. If no attacks are
detected and all n agents achieve a Maximum Cover, there is no incentive to search other
nodes unless this action receives incentives. The incentives are provided by awarding value
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to nodes that increases every time step that an agent is not within X nodes of the valued
node.
The Objective Function of the problem is to find the least cost agent locations with
regard to distance from the locations of attacks while achieving a Maximum Cover of
unique nodes by the agents and searching through all nodes within the network.
The output domain contains the Graph G including the locations of the attacks, agents,
and current node values. Also included in the output domain are three lists containing: the
costs from each agent to each attack, the nodes covered by the agents and their respective
totals, and the value of each node at the current time step. The problem can be broken into
6 separate structures that contain all of the objective data necessary for determining the
optimum solution:
• Graph G = n1 , n2 , , nn Graph of nodes
• Agents A = a1 , a2 , , an List of agents and their locations in the graph
• Attacks T = t1 , t2 , , tn List: Type of attack and their predicted location in the graph
• List D = d1 , d2 , , dn Distance between each agent and each attack (minimize)
• List C = c1 , c2 , , cn Number of unique nodes covered by agents and their locations
(maximize)
• List V = v1 , v2 , , vn Values at nodes with agents on them at current time step
(maximize)
Agents move in order to complete three objectives. The most vital and primary
objective of each agent is to make sure a detected attack is classified by moving toward
an optimal location for classification. Reputation does not exist within this movement
model. Instead, all agents are assumed to maintain “perfect” reputations. If one agent
detects an attack, the network is classified as being attacked by that attack and agents
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move to optimally classify that attack. If two agents detect different attacks, the agents
move to optimally classify both attacks and the network is classified as being under both
attacks. This methodology is not optimal and leads to many false positive classifications.
The objective of this model is to test the effectiveness of distributing knowledge amongst
the nodes for possible inclusion in a Reputational or other movement model.
The next objective is to achieve a Maximum Cover of the network to allow for the
greatest chance to detect a new attack early. The last objective is to search the entirety of
the network to promote detection of attacks on exterior nodes.
3.5

Defensive Measures Methodology
Section 2.9 presented a number of defensive measures to bolster an Intrusion

Detection System (IDS). Of the defensive methods presented, certain methods present
complicated ethical dilemmas while others are not suitable for an anomaly based IDS.
We selected two methods of defense for inclusion in MFIREv3: rate-limiting and node
elimination/rerouting..
Section 2.9 illustrates the effectiveness of rate limiting in real world applications. For
this research effort we qualitatively evaluate the spread of a DDoS attack with and without
rate limiting. The Pareto model of normal traffic described in Section 3.2.3 limits traffic to
a normalized rate below 0.1. The DDoS attack spreads at rates exceeding the normalized
0.1 threshold. Limiting the spread of traffic when the attack takes place reduces the ability
of the attack to spread. This is because many attack packets must drop as normal traffic
corrupts the flow of malicious packets on a chocked network. For this research experiment,
we limit the traffic to a maximum normalized value of 0.1 to prevent the spread of the
DDoS attack.
The elimination of a network node that is corrupted with a Worm attack can block the
attack in a small area of the network [39]. Incapable of infiltrating the remaining areas of
the network, a Worm attack is neutralized in the amount of time it takes to reimage the

124

compromised nodes. For this experiment, we block all traffic forwarded from one node in
the network in order to contain the attack. The network used in this experiment is specific
to testing the capabilities of containing a Worm attack and shown in Figure 3.18.

Figure 3.18: Worm Rerouting Network MFIREv3

Four agents placed at the four nodes connecting the leaves of the network to the center
of the network attempt to classify a Worm propagation. When the attack is detected, the
agent detecting the attack closes all ports on the node effectively removing the node from
the network. The Worm propagation begins at one of the four corners of the network
and aims to spread to as many nodes as possible before containment. At the end of each
simulation, the number of compromised nodes is counted (minimum of 3). If the attack
escaped the quadrant of the network it began in the defense is considered a failure. In a
larger network once a Worm takes over a central part of the network it is very difficult to
contain [39].
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3.6

Visualization
The purpose of visualization for any exercise is to provide vivid insight into a complex

system in order to demonstrate a better understanding of the system [60]. Chapters 2 and 3
present complex attack scenarios, agent movement, and network architecture that demand
visualization in order to best comprehend and evaluate the research experiment and design.
In many cases however, overly complex and intricate visualization tools designed with
compelling animations can distract the audience from the information at hand.
The intuition behind animation is clear: if a two-dimensional image is good on
paper, then a moving animation should be better [60]. This is the case for MFIREv3
as well. Quality, detailed information about the success of failure of agent movement,
defense, and attack spread can be derived from two-dimensional images of the network.
An improvement of this process is to visualize the agent movement up to the point where
they reach optimal locations for classification.
Visualization animation helps a viewer work through the logic behind an idea by
showing the intermediate steps and transitions. It offers a fresh perspective and invites
the user to look deeper into the data presented.
The visualization of these movements does not need to be distractingly complex.
Simple designs of networks are illustrated in the MASON package and allow for the viewer
to see the necessary components of the network with ease. Agents can be represented in any
number of ways, however the intuitive design is to simply represent and agent located on a
node as a different color at that specific node location. Attacked nodes are represented in
yet another color, with the malicious traffic they create represented in a different color from
normal network traffic. An example from the MFIREv3 visualization system is illustrated
in Figure 3.19, with malicious traffic represented in a dark gray and agents in position to
classify the attack shown as dark ovals inside network nodes.
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Figure 3.19: Illustration of MFIREv3 Visual Interface

Visualization however appears to fall short in representing complex data in the form of
scatter-plots. Two separate studies have looked at different types of animations concerning
data and found that they rarely help improve a student’s understanding of the system [60].
Instead, detailed static graphs that utilize varying color schemes and angles appear to
help understanding data most effectively. People have difficulty tracking more than four
moving points at a time, and in the case of MFIREv3, there would be six moving points for
a 3-dimensional graph in feature space.
Research shows that illustrating one concept or theory in a static graph is the best
method to convey meaning [117]. For this research, outside of the animation of agent
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and attack movement, data must be analyzed using static graphs. Illustrations of class
separation, classification accuracy, and results of attacks does not only help convey
understanding of the success or shortcomings of the system, but also helps convey the
meaning of the algorithm and data themselves. The key is to not only provide the
histograms, scatter-plots, or graph of the network, but to also place the images in a logical
order with thorough descriptions as to tell a story that conveys the meaning in the simplest
form [117].
3.7

Summary
This chapter illustrates the design and implementation of MFIREv3, including the

MASON discrete event simulator, network features, feature selection, attack models,
defensive measures, and SVM classification. The following chapters build upon these
design implementations through experimentation and analysis of the results.
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IV.

MFIREv3 Experimentation and Analysis of Results

The previous chapter illustrates the design and implementation of MFIREv3,
including the MASON discrete event simulator, network features, feature selection,
attack models, defensive measures, and SVM classification. This chapter presents the
experimentation and analysis plan evaluating the objectives stated in Section 1.2. Section
4.1 provides insight into testing a Software System. Section 4.5 describes the experimental
design. Results and analysis are presented in section 4.6. The Defense experimental design
and analysis is presented in Section 4.7.
4.1

Software Testing
This chapter discusses the design and testing methods and techniques for the

MFIREv3 system. This section details the multiple agent testing.
Software testing is an investigation conducted to provide stakeholders with information about the quality of the product or service under test. For this effort we test synthetic
data, which according to McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms includes “any production data applicable to a given situation that are not directly obtained
by direct measurement” [140]. Instead of using real world data sets of intrusions, which
contain significantly greater variation, increased attack inactivity, and lack of baseline for
any class, we create a model of the network traffic that can be tested more effectively [38].
Another issue with using real network attack traffic is that much of the useful datasets are
proprietary or classified and testing attacks on a live network creates fetching legality issues. Synthetic data helps meet the needs of the investigation, by modeling real attack
traffic as microflows [30].
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Barr et al. [18] explain the need for an experimental design that helps determine
whether a new heuristic method contributes something important. They present a list of
possibilities. A heuristic method makes a contribution if it is:
• Fast: produces high-quality solutions quicker than other approaches;
• Accurate: identifies higher-quality solutions than other approaches;
• Robust: less sensitive to differences in problem characteristics, data quality, and
tuning parameters than other approaches;
• Simple: easy to implement;
• High-impact: solves a new or important problem faster and more accurately than
other approaches;
• Generalizeable: having application to a broad range of problems;
• Innovative: new and creative in its own right.
Barr furthermore asserts [18] that research reports about heuristics are valuable if they
are:
• Revealing: offering insight into general heuristic design or the problem structure by
establishing the reasons for an algorithm’s performance and explaining its behvaior;
• Theoretical: providing theoretical insights, such as bounds on solution quality
From Section 1.2, the goal of this research is to develop a Multi Agent System (MAS)
for the defense of flow based system attacks and anomaly detection and identification. The
objectives supporting this goal are:
• Continue design and evaluate a multi-agent intrusion detection system using a
Reputation system
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• Evaluate the MFIREv2 multi-agent intrusion detection system using stochastic
search
• Design and evaluate a multi-agent intrusion detection system using deterministic
search with search incentives and Maximum Cover
• Design and evaluate a Multi Objective Evolutionary Algorithm for best subset feature
selection
• Determine if attacks can be classified using a Linear Kernel as opposed to the Radial
Basis Function when using MOEA selected features
• Create a robust distributed simulation framework for evolving self organizing multiagent systems
• Create a robust simulation framework for the automated defense of the network
Therefore, the reputation, stochastic, and deterministic systems under a self-organized
and fully-distributed framework are the initial heuristics under study, while the feature
selection algorithm and defensive measures are evaluated for improvements to the overall
effectiveness of the system. Qualitatively, we can observe that these features are all
innovative and effective. Our experimentation aims to demonstrate is that the use of these
features increases the accuracy of the multi agent network attack classifier and improves its
overall ability to identify and eliminate attacks.
The order of these objectives suggests a natural chronological sequence of testing.
Feature selection testing preceded the movement model development for use in agent classification. The Reputation model developed in MFIREv1 [77] is the first model tested using
the fully distributed system. This preceded testing on MFIREv2’s Evolutionary algorithm
[185], and testing on the new Maximum Cover Deterministic Search. Implementation of
the defensive measures is the final stage of this design.
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Software testing provides an objective, independent view of the software to display
the risks, failures, and implementation characteristics of the product. Testing insures that
the errors are eliminated or accounted for, and that in a black-box scenario the software is
capable of providing good solutions [38].
The general focus of software testing is validating and verifying that a computer
application [145]:
• meets the requirements
• works as expected
• the test can be replicated
• satisfies the needs of the user
Different software development models focus the test effort at different points in the
development process [145]. Newer development models, such as Agile [112], often employ
test-driven development and place an increased portion of the testing in the hands of the
developer, before it reaches a formal team of testers. In a more traditional model, most of
the test execution occurs after the requirements have been defined and the coding process
has been completed [135].
Testing software agents and Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) requires subtle differences
in its methodology. For instance, the autonomous behavior of the agents as well as
their distribution, social and deliberative properties, which are particular for MAS, require
evaluation separate from the performance of the classification accuracy, defensive tactics,
feature quality or any other quantitative measure [44, 65, 94, 156]. In other words, the agent
behavior requires some partially qualitative evaluation outside of quantitative measures for
the rest of the software.
Agents operate asynchronously and in parallel making testing and debugging
challenging [134]. Agents communicate primarily through message passing instead of
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method invocation, so traditional testing approaches are not directly applicable. Agents are
autonomous and cooperate with other agents, so they may run correctly by themselves but
incorrectly as a community or vice versa. Adding to the difficulties, agents in MFIREv3 are
programmed to learn thus changing their behavior over time. This means that successive
tests with the same data may yield different (albeit improved) results [185].
Initial works on evaluating MAS quality focused on the definition of techniques
for automating the validation of MAS specifications through formal proofing or modelchecking [30, 112], and on the development of debugging tools and techniques to enhance
MAS development platforms [145].
Structured testing approaches have been proposed more recently, to complement
analysis and design methodologies [38, 68, 135, 145]. These approaches rest on the idea
that behavior of the MAS can be dynamically evaluated providing as input a set of test
cases that are derived from analysis and design artifacts.
Differently from these techniques, simulation-based approaches aim at detecting
abnormal behaviors while a simplified version of the system is executed in a virtual
environment [44, 65, 94, 156]. This is the methodology utilized in MFIREv3 testing,
because they are particularly appropriate to evaluate emerging behaviors in self-organizing
systems [47]. Data mining techniques are applied to simulation logs for the small and large
versions of the MAS by simply taking the output data. In other systems, simulation logs
are dealt with using ACLAnalyser in order to deal with scalability issues in a large MAS
[152]. This is not utilized in the current installment of MFIRE, but should be looked at for
future, larger versions of the system.
4.2

K-Fold Cross-validation
In all research it is important to validate the results of the experiment by observing the

results of the test data. Results of the training data show very little; only that the learning
machine was able to model the training data. Given that there is no baseline for comparing

133

the effectiveness of the model (outside of the static model), the performance of the system
is evaluated based on the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve [134] and tables
illustrating the percentages of correct classifications by the machine after training to the
model. For this effort, a 5-fold Cross-validation was used over the approximately twentythousand data points produced.
This means that approximately twenty-four thousand points helped in the training
process, while six thousand validated the results of the model. For validation purposes,
it is normal to choose a value of ten for K [134], however for this effort a 5-Fold validation
affords plenty of training data while allowing a larger, more exhaustive set of data points to
be used for validation.
4.3

Feature Selection
Feature selection effectiveness improves the overall quality of the agent’s classification

ability. Section 2.2.2 explains the importance of good features in classification systems,
while section 3.3.3 details our design. Testing the quality of features is completed using
static agents to provide standardized results.
The test with five attacks compares the accuracies between a random set of three
features (as conducted in MFIREv2 [185]) and the set of three features selected by the
MOEA Algorithm 10. Agents are trained using all 84 features for twenty-four thousand
samples, and validated using their respective features with six-thousand points. The
training involves using only two agents, while the validation uses four static agents located
at predetermined locations with high visibility of a majority of nodes on the network.
The Radial Basis Function (RBF) Kernel is selected for this experiment for its accurate
classification results. For each MOEA, we populate the space with 30 samples over 40
iterations.
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Table 4.1: Feature Selection Classification Accuracies
Random

MOEA

mean

0.642

0.698

median

0.639

0.690

stddev

0.032

0.040

The feature set provides a 13.1% increase in classification accuracy for static agents
over the six scenarios. These results support the design objective: Design and evaluate a
Multi Objective Evolutionary Algorithm for best subset feature selection.
We also test the classification improvement between each individual attack and the
non-attack mode. This test only uses two features, but two separate feature selection
algorithms choose “optimal” two-feature sets to compare with the random set. The first
algorithm uses the Bhattacharya coefficient to choose the “best” two-features and the
second is the MOEA; Algorithm 9. This test allows us to determine the increase in
performance if all agents are trained to detect the specific attack that takes place. Once
again, two static agents are trained using all 84 features. This time however, only eightthousand points are used for each test (four-thousand attack and four-thousand non-attack),
and validated using their respective features with two-thousand points.
The results illustrated in Table 4.2 show an improvement in the classification
accuracies when agents use the best features for classifying an individual attack. The
results are more accurate than the five-attack classification, because the agents only have to
distinguish between two states.
4.4

Kernel Functions
As illustrated in section 3.3.4, the data cannot be linearly separated into classes without

entering a higher dimension. To enter a higher dimensional space, we must introduce a non-
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Table 4.2: Feature Selection Single Attack

DDoS

Scan

Worm

MitM

Trojan

Random

BC

MOEA

mean

0.802

0.858

0.859

median

0.803

0.860

0.861

stddev

0.052

0.057

0.040

mean

0.772

0.778

0.828

median

0.780

0.791

0.833

stddev

0.032

0.033

0.039

mean

0.782

0.824

0.869

median

0.776

0.811

0.870

stddev

0.025

0.031

0.032

mean

0.696

0.737

0.748

median

0.697

0.731

0.751

stddev

0.043

0.044

0.041

mean

0.802

0.855

0.869

median

0.796

0.840

0.880

stddev

0.046

0.042

0.050

linear Kernel. Testing conducted with a linear Kernel provided inaccurate classification
results. Figure 3.8 shows the classification data for the optimal pair of features for the
Denial of Service attack. It is clear that a simple linear classifier is incapable of providing
quality separation between the attack data and the normal non-attack set.
The other attacks can be found in Appendix F, and the figures support the use of a nonlinear Kernel. Section 4.3 details the accuracy of the Gaussian Kernel with all attacks and
individual attacks. Testing using a linear Kernel took place with only individual attacks.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of DDoS vs Normal Features F1: Num inbound Bytes F2: Num
inbound Packets

As Figure 3.8 and the Figures in Appendix F indicate, the accuracy of the classifier was
substantially diminished using a linear Kernel.
The results of the linear Kernel classification using the same feature sets as the
Gaussian Kernel are shown in Table 4.3.
As the results illustrate, with the current datasets a non-linear Kernel is required. In
this research investigation we utilize a Gaussian Kernel, however section 3.3.4 illustrates
other options.
4.5

Movement Models Experimental Design
Three movement models are designed and tested in this research effort: Reputation,

Stochastic Evolutionary Algorithm, and Deterministic Max-Cover.
Testing the effectiveness of the MFIREv3 MAS using each model consists of training
two classifiers (local and combined) using data generated offline, and testing the MAS
online in two modes of operation.

In particular, we seek to find the overall MAS

classification accuracy with a 4-agent and 8-agent model. For both models, we observe
the accuracy at the initial time in the simulation, and at the end. The change in accuracy
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Table 4.3: Linear Kernel Accuracies

DDoS

Scan

Worm

MitM

Trojan

Random

BC

MOEA

mean

0.612

0.648

0.646

median

0.613

0.640

0.641

stddev

0.080

0.069

0.070

mean

0.622

0.644

0.634

median

0.612

0.623

0.622

stddev

0.066

0.075

0.059

mean

0.581

0.601

0.609

median

0.589

0.601

0.600

stddev

0.055

0.060

0.061

mean

0.598

0.612

0.619

median

0.597

0.609

0.611

stddev

0.062

0.059

0.058

mean

0.571

0.600

0.608

median

0.579

0.599

0.604

stddev

0.068

0.068

0.069

during this time represents the increase in performance attained from agents finding better
vantage points in the network.
To create the training data, we run repeated simulations on a single, 100-node regional
network, where each simulation represents a single attack scenario. The attack is selected
one-at-a-time from our six defined scenarios: Normal, DDoS, Worm, Scan, Man-in-theMiddle, and Trojan. Flow-based statistics are captured in two places in the network and
processed to create two training sample sets, local data and combined data. We then train
both classifiers with an SVM using an RBF Kernel, 5-fold cross validation, and a grid
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search for optimal parameters C and γ. The two resulting classifier models are used for all
subsequent testing.
To limit the variance in the experiment, all six scenarios are executed 20 times, and
average accuracy recorded. We perform 30 sample observations, which yields 7200 total
simulations needed. This sample size is chosen to allow first and second order statistics to
be used to evaluate the results. More observations are preferred, and 30 is an acceptable
number to achieve a good confidence level while still running in a reasonable time [184].
Each simulation must be performed for a minimum number of necessary time steps to
ensure agents have time to move to better vantage points, and a time span of 80 time
periods is conservatively allocated.
4.5.1

MFIREv3 Reputation System Experimental Design.

The Reputation Model is thoroughly tested by both the creator Hancock [77] and
Wilson [185]. This research effort aims to improve upon the previous versions results with
feature selection and distributed control of the agents.
Experiment summary for the Reputation model:
• Six attack scenarios: Normal, DDoS, Worm, Scan, MitM, Trojan
• Each simulation: 80 time periods
• One observation: six scenarios over 20 simulations each
• Total sample size: 30 observations
• Number of agents: four or eight
4.5.2

MFIREv3 Stochastic Search Experimental Design.

The Stochastic Search, created by Timothy Wilson [185], required full experimental
testing. Wilson validated the functionality of the system in MFIREv2 [185] and this
research investigation tests the accuracy of the search using the features selected in section
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4.3. The effectiveness of the search is compared with the other two models and the baseline
model.
The free-movement model is created by running a generational genetic algorithm on
a population of candidate solutions. Each successive generation, the individuals become
more adapted to solving the problem. We conduct the GA with the following parameters
to validate its functionality:
• Single objective: maximize overall classification accuracy
• Individual solution: real-valued agent movement actuator
• Feature selection: three features selected
• Maximum evaluations: twenty generations
The experiment summary for Stochastic Search is defined as:
• Four and eight agents in the network
• Six scenarios: Normal, DDoS, Scan, Worm. MitM, Trojan
• One observation: six scenarios over 20 simulations each
• Total sample size: 30 observations
• Improvement: difference between final and initial accuracy
• Fitness: average improvement over 2 simulations
The test parameters and experiment are not meant as a complete method to find a nearoptimal movement actuator, but provide a detailed analysis of the current effectiveness
of the design. With a stochastic search genetic algorithm, infinite variations of decision
parameters provide varying degrees of effectiveness in any system. Areas of optimization
in the stochastic search model include:
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• Fitness function
• Polynomial mutation
• Simulated Binary Crossover (SBX)
• Binary tournament selection
• Parent-child replacement
• Convert actuator to chromosome
• Convert chromosome to actuator
• Save actuator model
• Read actuator model
• Agent behavior
The stochastic search model provides an alternative movement model for the agents
with different areas of optimization from the other two models. All three models can be
optimized independently or specific benefits of one model can be brought into the other
models.
4.5.3

MFIREv3 Deterministic Maximum Cover Algorithm Experimental Design.

This final movement model is a Deterministic Maximum Cover model, using a MultiObjective Evolutionary algorithm. The purpose of exploring this avenue in agent location
optimization is determining the validity of distributing knowledge of node quality among
the nodes in the network. The deterministic model is created by running an optimization
algorithm on the agents. Each successive generation, the individuals choose to search new
locations, while maintaining a “good” cover of nodes. We conduct the algorithm with the
following parameters to validate its functionality:
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• objectives: maximize classification accuracy, coverage of network, exploration of
network
• Individual solution: choose best valued location based on rewards of cover or new
node
• Feature selection: three optimal features selected
The experiment of the Deterministic Search is defined as:
• Four and eight agents in the network
• Six scenarios: Normal, DDoS, Scan, Worm. MitM, Trojan
• Simulated for twenty observation periods
• Improvement: difference between final accuracy and initial accuracy
• Fitness: average improvement over 2 simulations
Once again, the test parameters and experiment are not meant as a complete method
to find a near-optimal model, but rather as a method for validating the core functionality of
the deterministic model. The key component of the model is the retention of information
about specific nodes. This feature can be applied directly to the other movement models
in any number of key areas. In this instance, the nodes retain the time between their last
observation. As addressed by David Hancock [77], if nodes retain the information that a
node is not beneficial for classification (does not provide a good reputation), agents would
be able to avoid moving to that location as frequently. Specific areas of optimization in the
deterministic search model include:
• Fitness function
• Classification accuracy
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• Max Cover Reached
• Nodes searched
• Agent behavior
The final results of the Reputation model, free-movement model, and the maximum
cover model are presented in the next section.
4.6

Movement Model Analysis
The next three sections provide the detailed results for the experiments defined in

Section 4.5.
4.6.1

MFIREv3 Reputation System Performance Assessment.

The MFIREv3 reputation system is tested with the plan described in Section 4.5.1.
Figure 4.2 shows the number of agents that move in each time period. As agents
develop better reputations with time, the number of agents moving each time period begins
to settle at 2 agents. This is because the reputations of the agents approach optimal locations
for classification, and only a small number of the agents need to seek better vantage points.

Figure 4.2: Average Agents Moving (8-agent Reputation Model)
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Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate the average accuracy and false positive rate for the MAS
at every time period, for the 4-agent and 8-agent models. Each data point is the average of
120 simulations: 20 for each of the six scenarios.
The data shows that the false positive rate remains relatively steady throughout the
simulation, however there are drastic increases in the accuracies as the agents locate
improved vantage points.

Figure 4.3: 4 Agent Reputation Model: Accuracy & False Positives vs. time
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Figure 4.4: 8 Agent Reputation Model: Accuracy & False Positives vs. time

145

We now evaluate the relative performance of Reputation system when using 4 or 8
agents in the network. When making a classification, the result can be correct, a false
positive, or a false negative (see Section 2.3). Accuracy =

numbercorrect
.
total

Accuracy data for

all 30 sample observations is provided in Table 4.4. The columns show results for each of
the two experiments: 4-agent and 8-agent, and provides both the initial and final accuracy.

Table 4.4: Reputation System Overall Accuracy
Initial: 4-

Initial: 8-

Final:

agent

agent

agent

agent

mean

0.703

0.698

0.891

0.940

median

0.721

0.720

0.890

0.956

stddev

0.038

0.043

0.032

0.023

Figure 4.5: Accuracy box plots
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4-

Final:

8-

To compare any two of the models we use Wilcoxon Rank Sum (Mann-Whitney) test
[128], which is a non-parametric statistical hypothesis test for assessing whether one of two
samples of independent observations tends to have larger values than the other. It remains
the logical choice when the data are ordinal but not interval scaled, so that the spacing
between adjacent values cannot be assumed to be constant. The Mann-Whitney test is
more robust than the Student t-test, as it is less likely to spuriously indicate significance
because of the presence of outliers [128]. We use the MATLAB ranksum function [77] to
compare of all six possible combinations of the three models under test. A p-value of less
than 0.05 indicates a significant difference between the two models under comparison, with
99% confidence. A p-value of larger than 0.05 indicates there is not sufficient evidence that
the two models perform differently.

Table 4.5: Wilcoxon Rank Sum p-values
p-value
Initial:4-agent vs. Final:4-agent

2.5 × 10−22

Initial:8-agent vs. Final:8-agent

1.7 × 10−30

Initial:4-agent vs. Initial:8-agent

4.9 × 10−4

Final:4-agent vs. Final:8-agent

2.3 × 10−9

The p-values between all of the models listed in 4.5 illustrate that there is significant
evidence that a difference exists between the models in each category. The most important
significance is the evidence that the agents improve with time in classifying attacks as time
continues and the agents reach improved vantage points.
4.6.2

MFIREv3 Stochastic Search Performance Assessment.

Timothy Wilson created and successfully validated the use of a stochastic search
algorithm for the MFIRE system [185]. Testing the accuracy of the system in accordance
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with section 4.5.2 and the use of the “optimal” feature subset for classification allows us to
compare the effectiveness of the stochastic search with the other movement models.
Figure 4.6 shows the number of agents that move in each time period.

Agent

movement is locally decided based on probabilities within the movement actuator. The
movement actuator does not stabilize as the Reputation model does with time and agents
locating good observation points. Instead, as the probabilities to move remain constant, the
number of agents moving each timestep never remains sporadic.

Figure 4.6: Average Agents Moving (8-agent Stochastic Model)

Figures 4.7 and 4.8 illustrate the average accuracy and false positive rate for the
stochastic search model at every time period, for the 4-agent and 8-agent models. Once
again, each data point is the average of 120 simulations: 20 for each of the six scenarios.
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The number of false positive classifications continues to remain low, while the
classification accuracy increases from the initial values. Neither the 4-agent nor 8-agent
models perform as well as the Reputation model in terms of classification accuracy.
Furthermore, consistent improvement as time continues does not occur with the stochastic
model. Instead the classification accuracies remain sporadic and hover around the 80% and
83% marks for the 4-agent and 8-agent models respectively. The simulations also indicate
a broad variance between classification accuracies, with classifications as good as 92% and
as low as 70% after the initial results.

Figure 4.7: 4 Agent Stochastic Model: Accuracy & False Positives vs. time

We now evaluate the relative performance of Stochastic search model when using 4 or
8 agents in the network. Accuracy data for all 30 sample observations is provided in Table
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Figure 4.8: 8 Agent Stochastic Model: Accuracy & False Positives vs. time

4.6. The columns show results for each of the two experiments: 4-agent and 8-agent, and
provides both the initial and final accuracy.

Table 4.6: Stochastic Search Overall Accuracy
Initial: 4-

Initial: 8-

Final:

4-

Final:

agent

agent

agent

agent

mean

0.651

0.708

0.800

0.859

median

0.639

0.711

0.803

0.861

stddev

0.071

0.077

0.062

0.048

8-

The Reputation model outperforms the Stochastic search in classification accuracy.
The the Stochastic movement is capable of further optimization that may improve locating
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better nodes for classifying attacks. Furthermore, the Stochastic model places all decisions
locally on the agents. Agents act completely independent of one another in terms of voting
and movement, yet self-organize to avoid coexisting on the same node. The greatest benefit
of the model is that agents can be removed or added to the system without affecting the
abilities of the other agents to function.
4.6.3

MFIREv3 Deterministic Algorithm Performance Assessment.

The Deterministic Search with Maximum Cover is a new movement model designed to
test the effectiveness of distributing knowledge amongst nodes. Testing the accuracy of the
system in accordance with section 3.4.3 us to compare the effectiveness of the deterministic
model with the other movement models.
Figure 4.9 shows the number of agents that move in each time period.

Agent

movement is locally decided based on greedily achieving the greatest “gain” determined
by an agents location with respect to nodes covered, distance from perceived threat, and
amount of time the node remained unevaluated. The movement of agents stabilizes at
around two almost immediately. This is due to the agent’s desire to visualize the maximum
number of nodes possible. Agents only seek new locations when the gain of seeking an
un-searched node surpasses the gain of the maximum cover, or an agent detects an attack.
The number of false positive classifications increased dramatically for the deterministic model. The false positive classification averages 14% and 18% for the 4-agent and
8-agent models respectively, since only one agent is required to classify the network as
under attack. Although the false positive rate is relatively high, the accuracy of the attacks classified remained good throughout the experiment. Table 4.7 provides the overall
classification accuracies for both models.
The accuracy of the classifier is misleading, as far more normal scenarios are classified
as attacks. However, when an attack takes place it is quickly classified as only one agent
needs to recognize the attack.
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Figure 4.9: Average Agents Moving (8-agent Deterministic Model)

Table 4.7: Deterministic Search Overall Accuracy
Initial: 4-

Final:

agent
mean

4-

Initial: 8-

Final:

agent

agent

agent

0.744

0.821

0.889

0.912

median

0.751

0.833

0.878

0.922

stddev

0.032

0.036

0.041

0.049

8-

The classification accuracies are good when the network is under attack, since only
one agent needs to recognize the attack. Furthermore, the agents tend to monitor the
network nodes with the most connections to visualize the entirety of the network. These
results provide an alternative method for classifying network intrusions that could augment
common Intrusion Detection approaches.
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The movement of the agents within the network creates large data problems. With
each node requiring an update each timestep as to what value it is since its last observation,
validating the agent classifications takes a large amount of time. The calculations on the
100-node simulated network severely inhibited the performance of the agents with respect
to time required.
The agents stay near the most actively connected nodes within the network each
timestep, and as previously stated achieve good classification results. Making the agents
motionless and placing them directly on the most connected nodes would create the same
effect without creating an artifact of information on nodes visited.
The lack of an effective voting scheme lead to the high false-positive rate, however
this voting system is required when the agent objective is to spread away from other agents
in order to visualize the greatest number of uniques nodes. Testing effectively illustrated
that quality classifications occur when agents maintain a broad view of the network,
however node knowledge requires more computational complexity than desired for an
effective MAS. The use of stationary agents located at highly connected nodes provides
more research opportunities than the use of distributed knowledge at nodes. Stationary and
mobile agents in cooperation with one another could utilize a variation of the Reputation
model’s voting system to improve network classification.
This concludes the testing and validation of the three MFIREv3 classification models.
4.7

Defense Analysis
The automated defenses of the agents in the MFIREv3 system is not meant to stop

all attacks or even all instances of one attack. Attacking and defending networks is a
probabilistic balance. As discussed in sections 2.9 and 3.5; the aim of network defense
is to decrease the probabilities that: an attacker desires attacking the network, and that
an attack on the network is successful. No defensive system is immune to every attacks,
however bolstering the defenses increases the probability that the network remains safe.
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Rate limiting greatly reduced the effective spread of the DDoS attack in the MFIREv3
system. Qualitatively validating the effectiveness of the rate limiting defensive measure
illustrates that it is effective in preventing the DDoS attack from overflowing its target
node.
In the 30 observations taken of the DDoS attack with rate limiting on the network,
each consisting of 20 simulations, the attack failed to reach the target node 97% of the time.
In the instance where the attack was successful in reaching the target node, the attackers
were located within a very short distance of the target node, making flooding the target
significantly easier. This result qualitatively validates that rate-limiting is an effective tool
in defense against DDoS attacks. Figure 4.10 illustrates how rate limiting greatly reduces
the spread of the DDoS attack within the MFIREv3 framework.

Figure 4.10: Figures A: Illustrating the effective spread of a DDoS attack without Rate
Limiting and B: Illustrating Rate Limiting’s effectiveness against DDoS attacks
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The elimination of ports on network nodes in the presence of a Worm attack greatly
improves the ability to protect vital resources in the network [127]. The objective of Worm
containment defense is to qualitatively validate the ability to contain Worm Propagations
by blocking all network traffic through nodes connecting infected areas to the rest of the
network.
Section 3.5 illustrated the simple network used to validate the defensive system. At a
minimum the Worm attack compromises three nodes due to the structure of the network’s
interconnected areas. If the attack expands beyond the initial quadrant it attacked, the
defensive system fails the observation.
With 30 observations consisting of 20 simulations, we test the elimination of node
ports by attacking one of four locations with a Worm propagation. The agents prevented
the spread of the Worm propagation in 28 of the 30 observations. The success of the system
is qualitatively validated on the test network. The defensive system can be implemented on
more complex networks with larger numbers of nodes to determine its utility in structures
without clear areas to contain an attack.
4.8

Summary
This chapter details the experimental results of our research effort. The chapter begins

with a discussion of proper software testing and validation of results. Feature selection
testing and analysis follows in Section 4.3. All three movement model experimental
designs and analysis occur before the discussion of Defensive methods design and analysis
concludes the chapter.
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V.

MFIREv3 Conclusions and Future Research

This chapter highlights the successes and opportunities resulting from MFIREv3
concerning the continuing development of a multi agent system for flow-based intrusion
detection and cyber security.

Section 5.1 discusses the observations of meeting the

objectives proposed in Section 1.2. Section 5.2 highlights opportunities for future research
activity. Potential Real World applications of the MFIREv3 system are presented in 5.3.
Finally an overall research summary is presented.
5.1

Conclusions
The critical need for research investigations into distributed, flow-based intrusion

detection systems is stated in Chapter 1. As noted by Sperotto et al. [163], “distributed
detection is particularly important, because the amount of traffic on high-speed networks
is still increasing, suggesting that scalability remains an issue in the future.” Furthermore,
the ability to defend these attacks is of increasing importance, as the risk-reward scenario
favors attacking valuable assets at this point in time.
The goal of this research is to develop a scalable distributed Multi Agent System
(MAS) for the defense of flow based system attacks and anomaly detection and
identification. The following high-level objectives from Chapter 1.2 support this cyber
security goal:
1. Continue design and evaluate a multi-agent intrusion detection system using a
Reputation system
2. Evaluate the MFIREv2 multi-agent intrusion detection system using stochastic
search
3. Design and evaluate a multi-agent intrusion detection system using deterministic
search with search incentives and Maximum Cover
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4. Design and evaluate a Multi Objective Evolutionary Algorithm for best subset feature
selection
5. Determine if attacks can be classified using a Linear Kernel as opposed to the Radial
Basis Function when using MOEA selected features
6. Create a robust distributed simulation framework for evolving self organizing multiagent systems
7. Create a robust simulation framework for the automated defense of the network
We are successful in achieving all of the listed objectives. Our successful research
effort develops a unique multi agent system designed to engage in flow-based intrusion
detection in a distributed fashion. The achievement of the listed measurable objectives
illustrates completion of our research goal.
The fully distributed system eliminates the single point of failure that existed with the
centralized controller. This functionality was validated through the elimination of a single
agent during a test, but extensive experimentation on the accuracy of the system was not
conducted. Testing of systems with changing numbers of agents was conducted by Eric
Holloway with SOMAS [84].
Objective 1 is achieved by the experimental design described in Section 4.5.1 and the
analysis of the results in Section 4.6.1. The results illustrate not only the completion of the
objective, but also that of the current MFIREv3 Reputation model achieves a 94% average
classification accuracy using 8-agents.
Objective 2 is met by the experimental design described in Section 4.5.2 and the
analysis of the results in Section 4.6.2. The completion of the evaluation of a Stochastic
Search technique shows that the use of genetic algorithms to influence movement actuators
provides a viable solution to a fully distributed MAS. Although the model is not optimized
for comparable results to the Reputation model at the current time, it presents a faster
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approach that with further research could rival the Reputation model in finding good agent
locations for attack classification.
Objective 3 is achieved by the experimental design described in Section 4.5.3 and
the analysis of the results in Section 4.6.3. The deterministic search model provides an
additional avenue of research. The model provides good vantage points for a large portion
of the network when the agents approach Maximum Cover nodes. In the large and complex
environment of a network, node reputation presents big data issues. The use of a similar
model in a larger network requires network specific agent locations over smaller areas.
Another option is the use of stationary agents located at predetermined Maximum Cover
locations working in conjunction with moving agents. Stationary agents achieve the birdseye view of the network missing from the movement models that aim to move all agents
towards attacks, without the big data.
The increase in classification accuracy over the previous effort, MFIREv2 [185], is
directly attributable to the use of feature selection. In both the baseline and Reputation
model, classification accuracies surpassed the previous effort. Section 4.3 indicates that the
MOEA for feature selection designed in Section 3.3.3 provided a good set of features to
improve the classification accuracy of the system. These results indicate the completion of
Objective 4.
Objective 5 aims to improve the efficiency of classification using a Linear Kernel to
classify network attacks. Using the features selected by the MOEA, Section 4.4 tested the
accuracy in classifying individual attacks. The results supported the use of a Radial Basis
Function, as the data is not linearly separable until it is mapped to a higher dimensional
space. Appendix F contains the rest of the graphical results of all of the Linear Kernel Tests
mot included in Section 4.4. The testing provided deeper knowledge into the clustering of
our datasets.
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Self-organization is the ability of a system to adapt in pursuit of better performance.
The multi agent system reconfigures itself (in terms of spatial distribution of the agents)
through the use of reputation, stochastic free-movement, and Multi-Objective search. This
testing, discussed in Section 4.1, validated the completion of Objective 6. This is because
the performance gains in certain conditions are attributable to the use of these models, the
multi agent systems exhibit evidence of self-organization.
Section 4.7 illustrates the testing and analysis of network defenses against simulated
attacks. The results of the defense methods of the agents indicate that agents are capable
of containing and slowing attacks autonomously in a flow based simulation. The ability for
a mobile agent to recognize an attack and attempt to prevent the spread of and shutdown
the attack is important. The ability to contain an attack protects network resources and
has the potential to allow the user to detect the origin of the attack. The possibility
of potential criminal prosecution provides an additional psychological deterrence for the
system defenses. The results of Section 4.7 indicate the completion of our final objective.
With the completion of these objectives, we achieve the goal of developing a
distributed MAS for the defense of flow based system attacks and anomaly detection and
identification.
5.2

Future Research Activity
The most immediate need for future research is a total, comprehensive performance

evaluation of MFIREv3. Factorial design can investigate the effects of various factors
individually and jointly for increased understanding of how to set system parameters for
effective performance. The objective is to determine the effectiveness of the support vector
machine for classification in this domain.
One of the products that evolved out of our research is a set of network simulation
model refinements and extensions that, if pursued, may increase the range and depth of
MFIREv3 impact. These include:
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• Agents with adaptability to set different feature subsets for classifying attacks based
on previous network observation
• The voting system could be changed to a probabilistic model as opposed to the
current one-vote/best-guess system.
• Adaptive numbers of agents as illustrated in SOMAS [84].
Finally, a very good area of future research is the use of both mobile and stationary
agents on the same network. The Max Cover Algorithm illustrated that a single agent
can make a good classification solely from a network hub. The distribution of knowledge
is more effective if certain agents monitor the major traffic areas while others seek to
optimally classify attacks at specific locations. The reputation/voting model could be
completely modified to include combinations of what a local agent sees with respect to
what its closest stationary agents sees. This model would effectively use a variation of the
Reputation model’s voting system, with stationary agents as well as mobile agents.
MFIREv3 developed from an object oriented framework, making these improvements
readily incorporable. It can be expanded or focused as needed to run countless conceivable
experiments with Multi-Agent systems, Intrusion Detection, and network or attack
simulation.
5.3

Applications in Real-Word Settings
MFIREv3 presents supplementary methods to bolster any network’s cyber security

systems. Signature-based intrusion detection system libraries allow for rapid classification
of known network attacks, however when these systems fail an anomaly-based detection
system may still be capable of detecting the attack.
Failures arise with signature-based IDSs when new attack implementations exploit
a previously unknown vulnerability, known as a zero-day attack [129]. Attacks such as
StuxNet and Flame bypassed common IDSs with ease [7]. Although the MFIREv3 system
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is not deployed on active networks, and StuxNet and Flame present advanced capabilities
that do not compare with standard attacks, it is possible that StuxNet and Flame create
anomalous flows detectable by a system such as MFIREv3.
MFIREv3’s application to real-world intrusion detection is that it does not require an
updated library of known attack signatures. If a zero-day worm creates a flow that the
system can recognize, then the anomaly-based IDS detects it and thwarts an otherwise
successful intrusion.
5.4

Overall Summary
This chapter began with a review of the research goals and objectives and their

completion. Following, we provided a path for research into future iterations of MFIREv3
and multi agent, flow-based intrusion detection systems.
This research effort showed that given the objectives listed in Section 1.2, the
effectiveness of the intrusion detection and classification system is improved. This is an
important contribution that supports our goal of developing an effective, flow-based, multi
agent system for inter-AS network attack classification.
The field of cyber security research for distributed, flow-based intrusion detection
continues to be wide open for exploration. In the fight to protect the inestimable advantages
of our networks of autonomous systems, whether for civilian applications or in support of
operations conducted by the United States military with which we are affiliated, one cannot
afford to overlook multi-agent, flow-based intrusion detection techniques. It is our hope that
MFIREv3 can serve as an inspiration for parallel efforts, with the possibility of creating an
effective and scalable complement to a suite of cyber network defense capabilities.
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Appendix A: History

This appendix details the development of the MFIRE Simulator from its beginnings
to its current version: MFIREv3.0
A.1

SOMAS
Self Organized Multi Agent Swarms (SOMAS) was created by Eric Holloway to study

the effects of a dynamic, decentralized intrusion defense system [84]. The multi agent
system is formally modeled as a DEC-POMDP, a I-POMDP, and a new F(*-POMDP).
Agents in the network are evolved using a multi-objective genetic algorithm. These agents
have the ability to change location, instantiate other agents and delete agents, as well as
various methods to modify GA chromosomes and fitness values. Also, enemy agents have
additional methods of stealing or corrupting data on a node, sending denial-of-service
packets, compromising a node, and others. These functions are activated by actuators,
which get their input from rules and sensors. The relationship between the sensors, rules
and actuators are optimized by the GA, which allows agents to defend against threats
in the network. The agents learn to defend against attacks in a number of pre-defined
scenarios, including: Intrusion Elimination, Enemy Avoidance, DDoS, and Information
War. The primary goal of SOMAS is to evaluate the effectiveness of self-organization
and “entangled hierarchies” for accomplishing scenario objectives. One of the interesting
features of SOMAS is the ability for agents to take active defensive action in the network,
rather than simply passively detecting an attack. For a complete description of SOMAS,
see [84].
A.2

MFIRE v1.0
MFIRE 1.0 was created by Capt David Hancock as a network simulation environment

to conduct flow-based intrusion detection experiments using a reputation-based multiagent
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system [75–77]. One critique of SOMAS was its rudimentary implementation of network
topology and routing. MFIRE 1.0 was an attempt to create a more realistic simulation
environment. MFIRE 1.0 is written in Java, and makes use of the MASON DES, and
TopGen network topology generator. Networks and gateway routers are simulated down to
the Autonomous System level, and packet routing is a faithful implementation of the Border
Gateway Protocol. Delays and packet loss are handled by the system to a reasonable level
of realism, while still allowing the DES to simulate a large network at a fast rate. In addition
to the network components (nodes, links and packets), the prominent high-level objects are
processes, observations and classifiers. A process object allows arbitrary code to run on
any node. Subclasses derived from processes are made into agents, attackers, background
internet traffic, etc. In addition, each node collects flow-based observations based on the
current and past network traffic. Agents create features from these observations, which
are used to classify if an attack is occurring. Agents may use any user-defined classifier.
Finally a Reputation system for the MAS allows the providers to rate the reliability of
each agent’s classifications. This system prompts the agents to move to better vantage
points within the network, and imparts self-organization to the MAS. Special attention is
paid to the design of the MAS communication, which allows inter-agent communication
in the presence of many types of faults (see Appendix A). The provided hierarchical class
structure allows the framework to be extended for many different experiment types, using
an object-oriented approach.
Capt Hancock [77] presents the hypothesis that a flow-based, multi-agent network
attack classifier can be made more effective by:
1. employing a reputation system to govern agent mobility
2. adding a decay factor to each agent’s reputation to further spur agents to find nodes
providing the most “useful” information
From this hypothesis, four objectives are defined:
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1. Develop an effective network simulation environment appropriate for the problem
scope.
2. Validate the proper functioning of simulated malicious traffic.
3. Validate the proper command, control, and communications in the multi agent
intrusion detection system.
4. Study the effects of several factors on classification accuracy.
The first three objectives are qualitatively validated with MFIRE 1.0.
A.3

MFIRE v2.0
Captain Timothy Wilson continued the research hypothesis of Hancock in MFIREv2

[185]. The main focus was to study the effects of several factors on classification accuracy.
Wilson conducted this testing by applying different numbers of agents to the system.
Wilson introduced a free-movement model, that eliminated the need of a central
reputation controller. This system did not undergo accuracy analysis, but provided a new
system for classification testing. For a complete description of MFIREv2, see [185].
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Appendix B: Network Threats

Within these categories, many types of intrusion are recognized and five of them are
evaluated in this research [126]:
Information Gathering—Network devices can be discovered and profiled in much the
same way as other types of systems. Attackers usually start with port scanning. After they
identify open ports, they use banner grabbing and enumeration to detect device types and
to determine operating system and application versions. Armed with this information, an
attacker can attack known vulnerabilities that may not be updated with security patches.
Sniffing—Sniffing or eavesdropping is the act of monitoring traffic on the network for
data such as plaintext passwords or configuration information. With a simple packet sniffer,
an attacker can easily read all plaintext traffic. Also, attackers can crack packets encrypted
by lightweight hashing algorithms.
Spoofing—Spoofing is a means to hide one’s true identity on the network. To create
a spoofed identity, an attacker uses a fake source address that does not represent the actual
address of the packet. Spoofing may be used to hide the original source of an attack or to
work around network access control lists (ACLs) that are in place to limit host access based
on source address rules.
Session Hijacking—Also known as man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks, session
hijacking deceives a server or a client into accepting the upstream host as the actual
legitimate host. Instead the upstream host is an attacker’s host that is manipulating the
network so the attacker’s host appears to be the desired destination.
Denial of Service—Denial of service denies legitimate users access to a server or
services. The SYN flood attack is a common example of a network level denial of service
attack. It is easy to launch and difficult to track. The aim of the attack is to send more
requests to a server than it can handle. The attack exploits a potential vulnerability in the
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TCP/IP connection establishment mechanism and floods the server’s pending connection
queue.
Viruses, Trojan Horses, and Worms—A virus is a program that is designed to perform
malicious acts and cause disruption to the operating system or applications. A Trojan horse
resembles a virus except that the malicious code is contained inside what appears to be a
harmless data file or executable program. A worm is similar to a Trojan horse except that
it self-replicates from one server to another. Worms are difficult to detect because they do
not regularly create files that can be seen. They are often noticed only when they begin
to consume system resources because the system slows down or the execution of other
programs halt. The Code Red Worm is one of the most notorious to afflict IIS; it relied upon
a buffer overflow vulnerability in a particular ISAPI filter. The success of these attacks on
any system is possible through many vulnerabilities such as weak defaults, software bugs,
user error, and inherent vulnerabilities in Internet protocols.
Footprinting—Examples of footprinting are port scans, ping sweeps, and NetBIOS
enumeration that can be used by attackers to glean valuable system-level information to
help prepare for more significant attacks. The type of information potentially revealed by
footprinting includes account details, operating system and other software versions, server
names, and database schema details.
Password Cracking—If the attacker cannot establish an anonymous connection with
the server, he or she will try to establish an authenticated connection. For this, the attacker
must know a valid username and password combination. Unchanged default account
names, and the use of blank or weak passwords makes the attacker’s job even easier.
Arbitrary Code Execution—If an attacker can execute malicious code on the server,
the attacker can either compromise server resources or mount further attacks against
downstream systems. The risks posed by arbitrary code execution increase if the server
process under which the attacker’s code runs is over-privileged. Common vulnerabilities
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include weak IIS configuration and unpatched servers that allow path traversal and buffer
overflow attacks, both of which can lead to arbitrary code execution.
Unauthorized Access—Inadequate access controls could allow an unauthorized user
to access restricted information or perform restricted operations. Common vulnerabilities
include weak IIS Web access controls, including Web permissions and weak NTFS
permissions.
Hansman and Hunt [78] provide a short taxonomy of network and computer attacks
listed in Figure B.1.

Figure B.1: Short Taxonomy of Attacks [78]

Once again, this is not a plethoric list of possible attacks, but does list the common
categories of attacks on networks. The attacks examined in this research effort include:
Denial of Service, Worm, Scan, Trojan, and Man-in-the Middle. These represent a list
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of attacks that create flow-based anomalies in the network in both a local and distributed
fashion.
For an exhaustive taxonomy of network threats, see Lough’s dissertation on a
taxonomy of computer attacks [114]
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Appendix C: Popular DES Engines

Some of the more well-known DES options and their areas of emphasis are:
• OMNeT++, [174]: network simulation
• MASON, [115]: agent-based systems simulation
• CNET, [122, 123]: network simulation
• GloMoSim, [191]: large-scale wireless networks
• OPNET : network simulation
• NS2, [121]: network simulation
• PARSEC, [12]: parallelization
• SystemC : electronics systems-level modeling
• Tortuga : general DES with Java/Eclipse integration
• SimPy: general DES for Python

169

Appendix D: Popular SVM Packages

A subset of popular SVM packages [89]:
• SVMlight [91]: SVMlight , by Joachims, is one of the most widely used SVM
classification and regression packages. It has a fast optimization algorithm, can
be applied to very large datasets, and has a very efficient implementation of the
leave-one-out cross-validation. Distributed as C++ source and binaries for Linux,
Windows, Cygwin, and Solaris. Kernels: polynomial, radial basis function, and
neural (tanh).
• LibSVM [36]: LibSVM (Library for Support Vector Machines), is developed by
Chang and Lin and contains C-classification, v-classification, and -regression.
Developed in C++ and Java, it supports also multi-class classification, weighted
SVM for unbalanced data, cross-validation and automatic model selection. It has
interfaces for Java, Python, R, Splus, MATLAB, Perl, Ruby, and LabVIEW. Kernels:
linear, polynomial, radial basis function, and neural (tanh).
• SVMTorch: SVMTorch, by Collobert and Bengio, is part of the Torch machine
learning library and implements SVM classification and regression. Distributed as
C++ source code or binaries for Linux and Solaris.
• Weka: Weka is a collection of machine learning algorithms for data mining tasks.
The algorithms can either be applied directly to a dataset or called from a Java code.
Contains an SVM implementation.
• SVM in R: This SVM implementation in R (http://www.r-project.org/) contains
C-classification, n-classification, e-regression, and n-regression. Kernels: linear,
polynomial, radial basis, neural (tanh).
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• MATLAB SVM Toolbox: This SVM MATLAB toolbox, by Gunn, implements SVM
classification and regression with various kernels: linear, polynomial, Gaussian radial
basis function, exponential radial basis function, neural (tanh), Fourier series, spline,
and B spline.
• TinySVM: TinySVM is a C++ implementation of C-classification and C-regression
which uses sparse vector representation and can handle several ten-thousands of
training examples, and hundred-thousands of feature dimensions. Distributed as
binary/source for Linux and binary for Windows.
• Spider:

Spider is an object orientated environment for machine learning in

MATLAB, for unsupervised, supervised or semi-supervised machine learning
problems, and includes training, testing, model selection, cross-validation, and
statistical tests. Implements SVM multi-class classification and regression.
• jlibsvm [160]: Heavily refactored Java port of LibSVM. Implements optimized kernel functions using Java class structure and APIs, and has support for multithreaded
training.
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Appendix E: Intrusion Detection System Details

Concepts of classifying intrusions require terminology and metrics. For ease of
readership this list provides many of the terms used in quantitatively evaluating the quality
of the MFIRE system.
Some terminology and important concepts for IDSs are as follows [182]:
• Alert/Alarm: A signal suggesting that a system has been or is being attacked.
• True Positive: A legitimate attack which triggers an IDS to produce an alarm.
• False Positive: An event signaling an IDS to produce an alarm when no attack has
taken place.
• False Negative: A failure of an IDS to detect an actual attack.
• True Negative: When no attack has taken place and no alarm is raised.
• Noise: Data or interference that can trigger a false positive.
• Site policy: Guidelines within an organization that control the rules and configurations of an IDS.
• Site policy awareness: An IDS’s ability to dynamically change its rules and
configurations in response to changing environmental activity.
• Confidence value: A value an organization places on an IDS based on past
performance and analysis to help determine its ability to effectively identify an attack.
• Alarm filtering: The process of categorizing attack alerts produced from an IDS in
order to distinguish false positives from actual attacks.
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• Attacker or Intruder: An entity who tries to find a way to gain unauthorized access
to information, inflict harm or engage in other malicious activities.
• Masquerader: A user who does not have the authority to a system, but tries to access
the information as an authorized user. They are generally outside users.
• Misfeasor: They are commonly internals who misuse their powers
• Clandestine user: A user who acts as a supervisor and tries to use his privileges so
as to avoid being captured.
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Appendix F: Kernel Tests

This section provides the data of the five attack scenarios using the “optimal” features
to create separability from normal attack traffic. The results visually illustrate the attacks
non-linear separability. This test illustrates the need for a higher dimensional support vector
machine kernel function. For this effort we utilize a Gaussian Kernel.

Figure F.1: Illustration of DDoS vs Normal Features F1: Num inbound Bytes F2: Num
inbound Packets
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Figure F.2: Illustration of Scan vs Normal Features F1: Num distinct dest addrs F2: Num
distinct dest ports

Figure F.3: Illustration of Worm vs Normal Features F1: Ratio of packets to dest tuples F2:
Ratio of packets from source tuples
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Figure F.4: Illustration of MitM vs Normal Features F1: Local Num inbound Bytes F2:
Ratio of source ports to addr

Figure F.5: Illustration of Trojan vs Normal Features F1: Num distinct source ports F2:
Num inbound packets
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Appendix G: MFIRE System Details

This appendix provides some additional MFIRE details. In section G.1, the messages
used by MFIRE are detailed. Section G.2 lists the fourteen observations collected by
MFIRE agents for use in derived features.
G.1

MFIRE: Messages
The figures provided in this section show the messages used in MFIRE. In each figure,

the left side is used for the sender. The type of the message is displayed first, and below it,
the format. The format is essential for extracting message components from the packet’s
payload, which itself is a single string. On the right side of each figure, we show the actions
that are taken by the recipient.
Figure G.1 shows the messages sent from the controller and received by agents.
Figure G.2 shows the messages sent from agents and received by the controller.
Figure G.3 shows the SHARE message used for feature value exchange between
agents.
Figure G.4 shows the messages involved in agent migration. MIGRATE is sent by an
agent that received MOVE from the controller previously. It is sent to the AgentManager at
the migration destination node. The MIGRATE message contains all information required
to reinstantiate the agent at the distant end. MIGRATEACK is sent by an AgentManager
that received a MIGRATE message previously. It is sent to the AgentManager at the
node where the original copy of the migrating agent still resides. The AgentManager that
receives MIGRATEACK terminates the agent.
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ASSIGN

ASSIGN

ASSIGN:[end of OBSERVE phase]:
[dest address of assignment]:[dest port]

verify message is current:
Assign.getEndObserve() == this.endobserve?
If so, store dest address and port in ArrayList<Integer> tracking all
recipients to whom this agent needs to send feature measurements
at the end of the observation period

RESYNC

RESYNC

RESYNC

send SYNC to controller and go to SYNCHRONIZING mode

SYNCREPLY

SYNCREPLY

SYNCREPLY:[t0]:[t1]:[t2]:[start of next observation period]:
[CHECKINSlength]:[OBSERVElength]:
[EXCHANGElength]:[RESULTSlength]:
[MOVESTAYlength]

Use NTP offset calculation: offset = ((t1-t0)+(t2-t3))/2 and add this
offset to the agent's clock. t3 is the agent's time of receipt of this
SYNCREPLY. Using the updated clock, start collecting at the start of
the next observation period and send CHECKIN at the earliest
opportunity.

MOVE

MOVE

MOVE:[end of MOVE/STAY phase]

verify message is current:
Move.getEndMoveStay() == this.endmovestay?
If so, send MIGRATE to a neighboring node.
Otherwise, send SYNC to controller and go to
SYNCHRONIZING mode.

STAY

STAY

STAY:[end of MOVE/STAY phase]

verify message is current:
Move.getEndMoveStay() == this.endmovestay?
If so, send MIGRATE to a neighboring node.
Otherwise, send SYNC to controller and go to
SYNCHRONIZING mode.

Figure G.1: MFIRE: Messages sent by the providers and received by agents
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CHECKIN

CHECKIN

CHECKIN:[end of CHECKIN phase]:[agentID]

verify message is current:
Checkin.getEndCheckin() == this.endcheckin?
If so, store source addr & port in ArrayList<Integer>s so that at the
end of the Checkin phase, a sharing assignment is made.
Also, add new entry to agentRatings if the agentID hasn't been seen
before. Set initial rating to a common base value.
Otherwise, send RESYNC.

SYNC

SYNC

SYNC:[t0]

Reply with SYNCREPLY

RESULTS

RESULTS

RESULTS:[end of RESULTS phase]:[agentID]:
[combined classification]:[local classification]

verify message is current.
If so, register the combined classification as one vote in the global
classification, unless the combined classification == NONE,
in which case we can use the local classification but weighted
differently than the combined classification.
If the message is not current, disregard the classifications and
send RESYNC.

Figure G.2: MFIRE: Messages sent by agents and received by the providers

SHARE

SHARE

SHARE:[end of EXCHANGE phase]:
[feature1 ID]:[feature1 value]:
[feature2 ID]:[feature2 value]:[...]

verify message is current.
If so, store features to use at the end of the EXCHANGE phase
to make the combined classification.
If the message is not current, disregard.

Figure G.3: MFIRE: Messages sent by agents to other agents

MIGRATE

MIGRATE

MIGRATE:
[classifier class name],[param 1],[param 2],[...]:
[observation 1 class name]*[o1 param 1]*[o1 param 2]*[...],
[observation 2 class name]*[o2 param 1]*[o2 param 2]*[...],
[...]:
[feature 1 class name]*[f1 param 1]*[f1 param 2]*[...],
[feature 2 class name]*[f2 param 1]*[f2 param 2]*[...],
[...]

Instantiate agent at this node.

MIGRATEACK

MIGRATEACK

MIGRATEACK:[original port]

Invoke this.host.killProcess([original port])

Figure G.4: MFIRE: Messages involved in agent migration
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G.2

MFIRE: Observations
Each observation in MFIRE represents a traffic statistic collected over the duration of

a single timestep. These are used to derive feature values.
The fourteen observations collected by agents in MFIRE:
1. Average number of bytes per < destaddr, destport >-tuple
2. Average number of bytes per < sourceaddr, sourceport >-tuple
3. Number of distinct destination addresses
4. Number of distinct < destaddr, destport >-tuples
5. Number of distinct destination ports
6. Ratio of destination ports to destination addresses
7. Total number of inbound bytes
8. Total number of inbound packets
9. Ratio of packets to < destaddr, destport >-tuples
10. Ratio of packets to < sourceaddr, sourceport >-tuples
11. Number of distinct source addresses
12. Number of distinct < sourceaddr, sourceport >-tuples
13. Number of distinct source ports
14. Ratio of source ports to source addresses
Clearly there are many linear dependencies in this set of observations. Care must be
exercised when performing feature selection from this set.
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